DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS DURING THE WAR The Question of Responsibility.—The investigation of war responsibility does not lie within the sphere of this article. But after the Treaty of Versailles had declared Germany responsible for the war by calling upon her to pay for its ravages, the re proach of having started the war provoked in Germany an agitation over war guilt which has become one of the factors of European politics. It will be useful to examine the position of this question.
The secret documents published since 1919 do not confirm the opinion that was prevalent during the war that Germany had deliberately intrigued to inveigle France and Russia into a trap prepared for many years with a view to the extension of dominion by war. It is certain that no Government really desired a Euro pean war ; Austria desired only a local war with Serbia ; Germany supported her, as in 1909, in order to frustrate Russia. When the Russian Government had shown itself determined to defend Serbia, the German and Austrian Governments refused to retreat from the risk of a general war. This risk compelled the Euro pean States to make military preparations. It was Russia who took the initiative in ordering a general mobilization, and German public opinion has seen in this fact the proof of a determination to make war, and so has thrown the responsibility for the war on Russia. It was Austria and Germany, however, who first declared war ; but neither a mobilization nor the declaration show who really willed the war. Undoubtedly international law was violated. It was violated when Austria sent an ultimatum to Serbia contain ing clauses incompatible with the rights of a sovereign State, and when she invaded Serbian territory in order "to chastise the Serbs," who were not her subjects. It was violated when Germany invaded Luxembourg and Belgium, notwithstanding the neutrality which she herself had guaranteed.
The Governments of the three empires wished to avert a general war but they were too distrustful of one another frankly to con sult upon the means of avoiding it ; for each feared to reveal its plan lest it should become the dupe of a bluff or ruse. France and England were powerless spectators of the conflict. France was bound by the Russian alliance; the British cabinet did not dare to risk action which had not been approved by the nation. The war was not the work of personal ambitions, but the result of the system of the three military empires, Austria, Russia and Ger many. The civil authorities responsible for the acts of their Gov ernments, did not venture to decide on war. Of the three emper ors not one desired the war but all three, brought up in an en tourage of officers and accustomed to show deference to military opinions, felt obliged to leave to the general staff, not only the decision as to how the war should be conducted but also the moment when it should be begun. The general staffs, eager to take action in order to deprive the enemy of the offensive, which was then considered the decisive factor, extorted from their sov ereigns authority to take the initiative. The war was thus the result of a military plan. (See WAR GUILT.) Course of the War.—The history of the war is treated else where. (See WORLD WAR.) But inasmuch as military operations exercised a decisive influence upon diplomacy it may be as well to indicate here its general course. The general staffs of all the States were convinced of the great advantage to be derived from taking the offensive, and they each sought to take it in the hope of bringing the war to a speedy conclusion by a decisive victory. But the war lasted for more than four years without any of fensive resulting in a lasting success.
The Austrian offensive in Serbia in 1914 was repulsed by the Serbs; the German offensive in France was stopped on the Marne; the Russian offensive in Prussia ended in disaster. The Serbian offensive in Austria and the Russian offensive in Galicia in 1915 were repulsed; the French offensives first in Artois then in Cham pagne, were arrested with great loss. The Italian offensive against Austria was checked on the Corso, and the British offensive against the Turks in the Dardanelles failed after a massacre of British colonial troops. In 1916 the German offensive at Verdun failed, the Russian offensive was checked on the borders of Galicia, and the Rumanian offensive resulted in the invasion of Rumania. In 1917 the British offensive was checked in Artois, the French in Champagne, the Russian at Tarnepol where the Russian army was destroyed; the Italian offensive was arrested by the debacle of Caporetto (q.v.) and the Austro-German counter-offensive against Italy ended on the Piave. In 1918 the supreme offensives of the Germans in Picardy on the Marne and at Rheims were alike repulsed.
The war was decided not by victories but by the exhaustion of the armies and by the failing morale that manifested itself suc cessively among the nations—in Austria in the defection of the Austrian Slays, in Russia after the revolution, in Rumania, Bul garia, and finally in Germany. In this war between two coalitions the one which possessed the greatest extent of territory, the greatest population, and the most abundant resources, ended by conquering the other, which at the outset had had the advantage of a better trained army, one able to operate on interior lines. But the coalition primarily achieved victory because as mistress of the seas she preserved the means of revictualling her armies and peoples, whereas the central empires had access only to two small ocean-highways—the Adriatic and the North Sea—which were blockaded by the navies of their enemies. Victory did not take the customary form of an invasion of the territory of the van quished; the victor while yet in occupation of enemy territory had been converted into the vanquished by the exhaustion of his armies and by the demoralization of the civilian population.
Italy had armed and opened negotiations with both parties. At first she did not demand from Austria more than the cession of the Italian-speaking Trentino, but as the war went on she de termined to place a higher price on her support. In April 1915 she demanded from Vienna, as the price of her neutrality in ad dition to the Trentino, Gorz and Gradisca, numerous islands in the Adriatic, which should be handed over to the immediate possession of Italy, and a declaration of Austria's disinterested ness in Albania. On the advice of the Germans and of Conrad, the Austrian Government continued negotiations. But Italy preferred the offers of the Entente and undertook to support the allies "with all her resources" by the Treaty of London of April 26, 1915. She was promised by this treaty the whole of the Tirol south of the Alps, with its natural and geographical frontiers up to the Brenner ; Istria as far as Guarnero and the islands, and the whole of Dalmatia, of which the southern portion was to be neu tralized. In event of a partition of the Turkish empire, Italian interests were to be safeguarded in the Near East. On May 3 the Italian Government denounced its treaty with Austria and on May 23 declared war on her. Thereupon Germany broke off diplomatic relations, although Italy did not declare war on Ger many until Aug. 1916.
A secret agreement concluded by Great Britain in 1915 for the creation of an Arab kingdom should be mentioned here, since it compelled Great Britain to come to an agreement with France for a division of their spheres of influence in Syria and Cilicia. This agreement, known as the Sykes-Picot agreement from the names of the negotiators, was communicated to Russia, but concealed from Italy, whose claims it controverted.
The Rumanian disaster gave an added importance to Greece as the sole country by which the Allies were able to invade eastern Europe. The quarrel between Constantine and Venizelos led to a civil war. The latter, supported by the Greek islanders, established a Provisional Government at Salonika under the protection of the Franco-British army and made war in Bulgaria. France and Great Britain were prevented by Russia and Italy from taking action against Constantine, who remained master of the old kingdom. An Inter-Allied conference at Boulogne on Oct. 2o, 1916, com posed of the Allied chief ministers, for foreign affairs, war, and the marine, commanders-in-chief, and the chiefs of the British and French general staffs, determined to give financial and military assistance to Venizelos. The conflict with Constantine was re solved by the intervention of the French Government, which demanded on Oct. io, the disarmament of the Greek fleet and the control of the police and the railways. The excitement in Athens, which was encouraged by the king, resulted in a massacre of Allied marines and Venizelists. The crisis was not ended until 1917, when Constantine left Greece and Venizelos, returning to power, brought Greece into the coalition and into the war against Bulgaria.
The sinking of the "Lusitania" by a German submarine, involv ing the death of 124 Americans, aroused public opinion in the United States and Wilson informed Germany that he would be obliged to go to war if she continued to take the lives of American citizens. At the same time he promised to use all means at his disposal to raise the starvation blockade. The German ambas sador, Count Bernstorff, declared that German submarines had already received orders not to attack passenger vessels. Notwith standing this, the "Sussex" was torpedoed in March 1916, and American lives were lost. The United States despatched an ulti matum to the German Government, which promised not to sink merchant vessels without affording the passengers an opportunity of saving their lives; the Germans demanded in return an inter vention on the part of the United States in London to force Eng land "to recognize the laws of humanity." While he refused any intervention, Wilson exerted himself to the utmost to preserve peace. Af ter his re-election he proffered his mediation to the belligerents on Dec. 18, 1916, inviting them to make known their conditions of peace, and expressing the hope of rendering peace durable by the creation of a League of Nations (q.v.).
The Central Empires were now beginning to feel the privations of the blockade. The emperor Francis Joseph, who died on Nov. 21, 1916, was succeeded by the young and inexperienced Charles, who desired peace, and who communicated his desire to William II., by whom it was approved. The two emperors in a conference with their ministers and chiefs of staff, decided to suggest peace at a moment when their military successes would enable them to dic tate conditions. In the name of Germany and her Allies, Beth mann-Hollweg addressed a note to the neutral States announcing "propositions" that should serve as a basis for a lasting peace (Dec. 12). Germany answered Wilson by proposing a direct negotiation between the belligerents in a neutral country.
The Allies denounced this offer as a manoeuvre calculated to promote discord between them. Lloyd George, who had become the head of a coalition ministry, declared that to enter into a con ference with a Germany that claimed to be victorious without any notion of the propositions to be made would amount to "placing our heads in a noose." On Dec. 3o the Allies replied that the proposal was entirely unsubstantial, and they demanded expiation for crimes committed, and complete indemnity for all the destruction caused by the war.
On Jan. 1o, 1917, they replied to Wilson with a statement of their peace conditions: Reduction of the territory of Germany; dismemberment of Austria by "the liberation of the Italians, Slays, Rumanians, Czechs and Serbs from an alien rule"; and the expulsion of the Turks from Europe. Further, they announced that they adhered with all their heart to the idea of the League of Nations.
Judging the German reply to be too vague, Wilson invited the German Government to define more exactly its conditions of peace. Bernstorff was instructed to inform Wilson that Germany was unable to accept his offer of mediation because such an acceptance might give to her enemies the impression that the German offer of peace was inspired by fear. Wilson continued to work for a peace "by understanding" and he said, in January 1917, that "only a peace between equals can be durable." His confidant, Col. House, who in 1915 and 1916 had entered into conversations in Europe with the leaders of both groups of bellig erents, besought Bernstorff to advise his Government to communi cate to the President their terms of peace in order that he might then propose a peace conference. But a royal council in Germany, notwithstanding the opposition of the chancellor, had already determined to embark on unrestricted submarine warfare, which, according to the German admiralty, would force Great Britain to sue for peace in five months.
An Allied conference at Paris on Nov. 15 and 16, 1916, com posed of British and French delegates, discussed the critical situa tion in Russia and later, in conjunction with Russian and Italian delegates, the Polish and Greek questions. The conference in London on Dec. 16 between the British and French statesmen drafted replies to Germany and America and discussed operations in Palestine and the extension of the British front in France. The Rome conference of Jan. 5, 1917, between the four European members of the alliance discussed the military and financial help to be given to Russia, decided the measures to be taken in Greece against Constantine, and the instructions to be given to Gen. Sarrail, commander of the allied army at Salonika.
The German Government was ignorant of the secret negotia tions with France in which the emperor Charles was already engaged through his brother-in-law, Prince Sixtus of Parme, who had arrived in Vienna following the departure of Bethmann Hollweg. Czernin did not approve of the proposed conditions, and Charles, without advising Czernin, despatched by Sixtus, on May 24, an autograph letter addressed to the president of the republic, Poincare, in which he professed himself willing to support in Berlin "the just claims of France to Alsace-Lorraine" and to work for the re-establishment of Belgium and Serbia as sovereign States; he further agreed to grant Belgium an indemnity and to give Serbia an outlet to the Adriatic. The Allies regarded this letter as a proof of the weakness of Austria and observed that no mention was made of a cession of territory to Italy. At the con ference of St.-Jean-de-Maurienne, Sonnino declared that he could admit no discussion of "the aspirations of Italy as recognized in the Treaty of London," and he added that Italy could never con clude a "white peace." The Russian Revolution.—The March Revolution of 1917, by which the tsardom was overthrown in Russia, left Russia still a member of the alliance of 1914. The Provisional Government carried on the war with the support of all parties—even of the Socialists—with the sole exception of the Bolsheviks. But the regulations introduced by the revolutionaries into the army, and the revolutionary propaganda for the return of the troops to their homes, paralysed the Russian'army. The Bolshevik leaders, some of whom had returned to Russia through Germany, established themselves in St. Petersburg and engaged in a violent propa ganda against the provisional Government. Socialists through out Europe gave their support to a proposal of the Germanophil Dutch Socialist, Troelstra, to hold a conference at Stockholm, in a neutral country, for the purpose of concerting measures to compel the belligerents to conclude peace, and to force them to make known their war aims. Kerensky, the Russian presi dent, and Arthur Henderson, the leader of the British Labour Party and a member of the British cabinet, gave their support to the proposal, which was also favourably regarded by Lloyd George. At a conference in London on May 28, composed solely of British and French representatives, any participation in the conference at Stockholm was rejected and passports refused to British and French delegates. This conference further took meas ures to reorganize the Salonika front.
The collapse of the Russian army forced the Allies to take certain decisions. A great inter-Allied Conference was held in Paris on July 25, composed of representatives of Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Greece, Rumania and Serbia. At a further conference, on the succeeding day, were added representatives of Belgium, Japan, Montenegro and Portugal. These conferences decided to grant financial aid to the Government of Venizelos, discussed the proposal of establishing an allied base at Corfu and Italian operations in Epirus.
German Peace Negotiations.—The German nation, which was depressed by the privations of the blockade and the failure of the U-boat warfare, despaired of a victorious peace. On July 19 a majority in the Reichstag, which up to then had been the docile servant of the Government, passed a motion proposed by Erzberger, the leader of the Centre, in favour of a peace by understanding, without territorial acquisitions and financial or economic constraints. The resolution demanded freedom of the seas and announced the determination of the German people to fight on for so long as "the enemy Governments threatened Ger many and her allies with conquest and oppression." Bethmann Hollweg, attacked by the majority, resigned, and the new chan cellor, Michaelis, deprived the motion of all real effect by his declaration that its objects were capable of attainment within the limits of the motion "as I understand it" a declaration that was regarded by the Allies as a sign of bad faith on the part of the German Government.
The peace negotiations that had been carried on secretly in Switzerland between unofficial agents—Baron Revertera, an Aus trian diplomat, and Comte Armand, a French officer—in Aug. 1917, failed on account of the conditions to be imposed upon Germany. The deep resentment that had been aroused in the French and Belgian peoples by the ravages of war and the repres sive measures of the Germans against non-combatants—measures that were exaggerated and distorted in propaganda—rendered a friendly understanding with Germany impossible of achievement.
The Pope's Intervention.—In agreement with the German Catholics and in an endeavour to save the Catholic Austrian mon archy, Benedict XV. appealed to the heads of the belligerent States to negotiate on the basis of arbitration, reparation and reciprocal restitution, and liberty of the seas. The Allies returned no reply, and Wilson sent a refusal. The British cabinet stated that it could enter into no negotiation that had not been preceded by an unequivocal declaration on the part of Germany that Bel gium would be restored after the war. At a royal council at Pots dam on Sept. 14 it was decided, on Ludendorff's advice, that Germany should stand firm. The German reply to the pope, on Sept. 19, did not even mention Belgium, while a verbal note handed to the papal nuncio at Berlin, stated that Belgium must grant Germany the right to undertake commercial ventures and preserve the separation of Flanders as established by the Germans. Thus the peace-move of the Vatican ended in failure. Nor were the conversations in Belgium between Lancken and Coppee, and the Spanish negotiations attended by any greater success.
The Supreme War Council.—The Caporetto disaster led to the holding of a conference at Rapallo, on Nov. 7, between the French, British and Italian statesmen and the chiefs of staff, at which military measures were taken to avert the threatening danger. On the proposal of Lloyd George the conference deter mined to set up a central body to direct operations on all fronts. At a general inter-allied conference in Paris, on Nov. 29, a Supreme War Council was established which held its first meeting on Dec. 1. It was a permanent advisory body composed of the heads of the Allied Governments and its recommendations were not put into practice until they had been accepted by the Govern ments. Since it was composed of representatives of the British Colonies, India and the majority of the Allied Governments, its real authority became very great. Its deliberations have been kept secret. All that is known is that at its meeting at Versailles (Jan. 3o–Feb. 2, 1918) it determined to constitute a general re serve for the whole of the armies on the Western, Italian and Balkan fronts, and entrusted the execution of this task to an executive body composed of military representatives of Great Britain, Italy, the United States and France. After the German offensive on March 21, a meeting of the council was held at Doul lens, on March 26, at which Marshal Foch was charged with the duty of establishing co-ordination between the French and British armies; and, after the failure of the German offensive, the council, at its meeting at Abbeville on May 1, decided to abolish the mili tary executive and entrusted to Foch the supreme command of the Allied armies.
Renewed Austrian Peace Moves.—In Germany, Count Hert ling, the leader of the Catholic Bavarian Centre, became chan cellor in Nov. 1917. He was inclined for peace but was powerless against the military leaders, Admiral Tirpitz, who had just founded, in September, the warlike Vaterlands-partei, and, above all, Gen. Ludendorff, who was the soul of the general staff. Wil liam II., yielding to their counsels, decided to continue the war. In France, Clemenceau, who had become president of the council, exclaimed in the chamber on Nov. 20, 1917 "La Guerre, rien que la guerre," and he adopted repressive measures against the paci fists. In England, Lord Lansdowne pointed out, in a letter to the Daily Telegraph, that a continuation of the war would entail the ruin of the entire civilized world and he suggested that the Allies should reconsider their war aims. In December the South African representative, Gen. Smuts, engaged in conversations with the late Austrian ambassador in London, Count Mensdorff-Pouilly, with a view to separate peace with Austria ; they failed because Mens dorff's instructions compelled him to act in unison with Germany.
Charles and Czernin saw the Austrian monarchy threatened with a revolt of its Slav populations. In the Reichsrat, in May 1917, the Slav majority overthrew the ministry at the first meet ing held since 1914. Charles thought that help might be obtained in England, but Lloyd George told the trade union delegates on Jan. 5, 1918, that England would support French democracy to the death in its demand for a "reconsideration of the great wrong of 1871," although she did not make war to bring about the break up of the Habsburg monarchy. He outlined three indispensable conditions for peace: the re-establishment of the sanctity of treaties; a territorial rearrangement of Europe, based on the right of self-determination; and the establishment of an international organization to limit the burden of armaments and lessen the probability of war.
The German Government declared that, in view of the military situation, it was not in a position to negotiate on the bases laid down by Lloyd George, and demanded their revision, letting it be clearly understood that it would not cede any portion of Alsace Lorraine. The Supreme Council at Versailles answered, on Feb. 4, that this declaration did not propound a suitable basis for negotiations.
A delegation from the Ukraine arrived at Brest-Litovsk to demand that Russia should be constituted a federal republic. On receiving a refusal from the Bolsheviks they proclaimed the independence of the "republic of the Ukrainian people" and con cluded a separate peace on Feb. 9, in which Austria promised, in a secret clause, to erect into a separate crownland, Ruthenian Galicia. The Ukrainians promised to furnish a million tons of corn. But the Bolsheviks overthrew the Ukrainian Govern ment, and the Ukraine was then occupied by Austro-German troops, who succeeded, with difficulty, in collecting a portion of the promised delivery of grain. Concessions made to the Ukrain ians irritated the Poles, and they turned against Austria; a part of the Polish troops in Galicia marched into Russia, whence they were conveyed, under Gen. Haller, to France and there united to the Polish Legion.
In opposition to the German officers by whom the negotiations were conducted, Trotsky announced on Feb. 18 that Russia abandoned the idea of a formal treaty but regarded the war as terminated. Germany at once resumed the war, and forced the defeated Russians to sign the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on March 3. Russia gave up Courland, Lithuania and Poland to the Central Empires, and pledged herself to accord liberty to Finland, Estonia, Livonia, Ukraine, and to certain Caucasian districts claimed by the Turks. The contradiction between German demands and German peace proposals was exploited by the Allied propaganda.
While concentrating her offensive power on the western front, Germany had left troops in Russia, where the Bolsheviks were threatened by the "White armies," led by generals of the former imperial army. Disquieted by the revolutionary propaganda, the German Government refused to send troops to aid the Red armies. But it signed an additional article to the Brest-Litovsk treaty (Aug. 27), in which it promised not to aid the creation of any new independent State within Russian territory, and re ceived in exchange the right to include Lithuania and Estonia, within its sphere of influence.
With almost its entire territory occupied by enemy troops Rumania was forced by an ultimatum to accept the preliminary conditions of the peace of Bufta (March 5), but the victors could not agree upon the distribution of the booty. Peace was not finally concluded until May 7, in Bucharest, by the Ger manophil ministry of Marghiloman; Rumania agreed to cede all the Dobrudja (q.v.) and place herself in economic dependence upon Germany. This treaty was not ratified.
The danger became more pressing. Czernin, in an endeavour to make known the obstacles to peace, blamed Clemenceau's re fusal to renounce the French claim to Alsace-Lorraine. Clemen ceau, in reply, stated that the offer of its restoration came from Austria and published the emperor's letter of March 1917. Czernin withdrew. This revelation, that the emperor had sought to betray his allies by concluding a separate peace at their ex pense, aroused in Germany violent resentment against Charles, who felt obliged to visit the German headquarters at Spa with his new minister, Burian. There they agreed to the establish ment of political, military and economic union between the two empires both during and after the war. This agreement was in terpreted by the Allies as a movement towards the German dom ination of the whole of Central Europe. The apprehension that this step inspired won adherents for the idea of a partition of the Austrian empire, which had hitherto been vigorously opposed by the diplomatic world. The French Government recognized the national Czechoslovak council in Paris, presided over by Prof. Masaryk, as the supreme organ of an independent nation (June 1918) ; and the British Government (Aug. 9) and the United States (Sept. 3) followed its example. The status of an Allied army was accorded to the Czechoslovak legions fighting in Siberia or raised in Italy and France, and the national council at Paris admitted the rights of an Allied Government.
After the failure of the German offensive in France, a confer ence of German statesmen and generals was held at the general headquarters at Spa, on Aug. 14. Ludendorff admitted that all chance of a victory had disappeared, but added that he hoped to fight a defensive action which might incline the enemy towards peace. Charles and Burian, who had come to Spa, declared that Austria could not face another winter campaign. The Bulgarians and Turks also announced their inability to continue the war, and Hintze, the secretary of State for foreign affairs, sought and obtained authority to open negotiations for peace. But the Ger man Government still hoped for a military success, and wished to negotiate through the intermediary of a neutral State, while Burian demanded an immediate appeal to all the belligerents. In September, Hintze visited Vienna to negotiate an agreement. When the German army was forced to retreat, Burian deter mined to act without Germany ; and he appealed to all the bel ligerents to negotiate for peace. But Wilson replied that the American Government was neither able nor willing to agree to a conference on a subject on which he had already clearly de fined their attitude.
Unable to resist the Allied offensive, which had been strength ened by the participation of American troops, Ludendorff at the end of September begged to be allowed to apply for an armistice and in spite of the opposition of the new chancellor, Prince Max of Baden, who would have preferred direct negotiations for peace, was granted permission, with the result that on Oct. 4, the Ger man, Austrian and Turkish Governments appealed to Wilson for an armistice. On Oct. 8 Wilson answered that he could not con sult his allies until the Central Empires had admitted their defeat by evacuating all Allied territory. He asked whether the chan cellor spoke in the name of "the constituted authorities of the empire who have so far conducted the war." On Oct. 14, he demanded the cessation of submarine warfare and that the evacu ation should be carried out so as to provide absolutely satisfactory safeguards and guarantees of the maintenance of the present military supremacy of the Allied armies. On the 16th, the em peror Charles, in order to appease Wilson, published a manifesto in which he announced the transformation of the monarchy into a Federal State ; but he preserved the unity of the Hungarian kingdom, that is to say, the domination of the Magyars over the Slays. On the 18th, Wilson replied that the United States having already recognized Czechoslovakia as a belligerent State, and the "justice of the national aspirations of the Southern Slays," it was for these people to decide for themselves what they would ac cept. Before according an armistice, Wilson, on the 23rd, made it clear that none would be granted unless thereby a renewal of hostilities on the part of Germany was rendered impossible, and he declared that "the nations of the world do not, and cannot trust the word of those who have hitherto been the masters of German policy." If he had to continue to negotiate with the mili tary rulers and monarchist autocrats of Germany he must insist, not on negotiations, but on surrender. Thereupon Ludendorff demanded a levy en masse for the defence of the Fatherland, and when the other generals declared further fighting useless, Luden dorff resigned (Oct. 26).
The Austro-Hungarian army in Italy, disorganized and routed, requested an armistice and on Nov. 3 signed a capitulation which compelled them to surrender unconditionally and deprived them of any right to appeal to Wilson's Fourteen Points. The Inter Allied Conference in Paris, from Oct. 31 to Nov. 4, discussed the conditions of the armistice to be granted to Germany on the basis of the Fourteen Points and came to an agreement, with the exception of a reserve as to the freedom of the seas. The note which was sent to Germany on Nov. 5, in the name of President Wilson, announced that the Allies were ready to conclude peace on the conditions and in accordance with the principles laid down by Wilson. Germany was to pay compensation for all damage inflicted on the civilian population and their property. Marshal Foch communicated these conditions to the German delegation. The Germans found them much more severe than they had an ticipated, but the general staff declared that resistance was im possible. Germany was in revolution and the chancellor, acting under the pressure of the Socialists, announced the abdication of the kaiser and the crown prince, and on Nov. 9 a republic was proclaimed. The Provisional Government set up by the Socialists announced its willingness to accept the armistice, which was signed on Nov. 11, in the Forest of Compiegne, by a delegation headed by Erzberger, the leader of the Centre Party, and with the approbation of Marshal Hindenburg.