MODERN ETHICS Hugo Grotius.—The need of such independent principles was most strongly felt in the region of man's civil and political rela tions, especially the mutual relations of communities. Accordingly we rind that modern ethical controversy began in a discussion of the law of nature. Albericus Gentilis (1557-1611) and Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) were the first to give a systematic account. Natural law, according to Grotius and other writers of the age, is that part of divine law which follows from the essential nature of man, who is distinguished from animals by his "appetite" for tranquil association with his fellows, and his tendency to act on general principles. It is therefore as unalterable, even by God himself, as the truths of mathematics, although its effect may be overruled in any particular case by an express command of God ; hence it is cognizable a priori, from the abstract consideration of human nature, though its existence may be known a posteriori also from its universal acceptance in human societies. The con ception, as we have seen, was taken from the later Roman jurists; by them, however, the law of nature was conceived as something that underlay existing law, and was to be looked for through it, though it might ultimately supersede it, and in the meanwhile represented an ideal standard, by which improvements in legisla tion were to be guided. Still the language of the jurists in some passages (cf. Inst. of Justinian, ii. I, 2) clearly implied a period of human history in which men were governed by natural law alone, prior to the institution of civil society. Thus there had become current the conception of a "state of nature" in which individuals or single families lived side by side—under none other than those "natural" laws which prohibited mutual injury and interference in the free use of the goods of the earth common to all, and upheld parental authority, fidelity of wives, and the observance of compacts freely made. This conception Grotius took, and gave it additional force and solidity by using the principles of this natural law for the determination of interna tional rights and duties, it being obvious that independent nations, in their corporate capacities, were still in that "state of nature" in their mutual relations. It was not, of course, assumed that these laws were universally obeyed ; indeed, one point with which Grotius is especially concerned is the natural right of private war, arising out of the violation of more primary rights. Still a general observance was involved in the idea of a natural law as a "dictate of right reason indicating the agreement or disagreement of an act with man's rational and social nature"; and we may observe that it was especially necessary to assume such a general ob servance in the case of contracts, since it was by an "express or tacit pact" that the right of property (as distinct from the mere right to non-interference during use) was held by him to have been instituted. A similar "fundamental pact" had long been generally regarded as the normal origin of legitimate sovereignty.
The ideas above expressed were not peculiar to Grotius; in particular the doctrine of the "fundamental pact" as the jural basis of government had long been maintained, especially in Eng land, where the constitution historically established readily sug gested such a compact. At the same time the rapid and remark able success of Grotius's treatise (De jure belli et pacis) brought his view of Natural Right into prominence, and suggested such questions as—"What is man's ultimate reason for obeying these laws? Wherein exactly does this their agreement with his rational and social nature consist? How far, and in what sense, is his nature really social?" English Ethics: Hobbes.—It was the answer which Hobbes (i 5884-16; 9) gave to these fundamental questions that supplied the starting-point for independent ethical philosophy in England. The nature of this answer was determined by the psychological views to which Hobbes had been led, possibly to some extent under the influence of Bacon, partly perhaps through association with his younger contemporary Gassendi, who, in two treatises, published between the appearance of Hobbes's De Give (1642) and that of the Leviathan (1651), endeavoured to revive interest in Epicurus. Hobbes's psychology is in the first place materialis tic ; he holds, that is, that in any of the psychophysical phenom ena of human nature the reality is a material process of which the mental feeling is a mere "appearance." Accordingly he re gards pleasure as essentially motion "helping vital action," and pain as motion "hindering" it. There is no logical connection between this theory and the doctrine that appetite or desire has always pleasure (or the absence of pain) for its object; but a materialist, framing a system of psychology, will naturally direct his attention to the impulses arising out of bodily wants, whose obvious end is the preservation of the agent's organism ; and this, together with a philosophic wish to simplify, may lead him to the conclusion that all human impulses are similarly self-regarding. This, at any rate, is Hobbes's cardinal doctrine in moral psy chology, that each man's appetites or desires are naturally directed either to the preservation of his life, or to that heightening of it which he feels as pleasure. Hobbes does not distinguish instinc tive from deliberate pleasure-seeking; and he confidently resolves the most apparently unselfish emotions into phases of self-regard. Pity he finds to be grief for the calamity of others, arising from imagination of the like calamity befalling oneself ; what we ad mire with seeming disinterestedness as beautiful (pulchrum) is really "pleasure in promise" ; when men are not immediately seeking present pleasure, they desire power as a means to future pleasure, and thus have a derivative delight in the exercise of power that prompts to what we call benevolent action. Since, then, all the voluntary actions of men tend to their own preserva tion or pleasure, it cannot be reasonable to aim at anything else; in fact, nature rather than reason fixes this as the end of human action; it is reason's function to show the means. Hence if we ask why it is reasonable for any individual to observe the rules of social behaviour that are commonly called moral, the answer is obvious that this is only indirectly reasonable, as a means to his own preservation or pleasure. It is not, however, in this, which is only the old Cyrenaic or Epicurean answer, that the distinctive point of Hobbism lies. It is rather in the doctrine that even this indirect reasonableness of the most fundamental moral rules is entirely conditional on their general observance, which cannot be secured apart from government. For example, it is not reasonable for me to perform my share of a contract, unless I have reason for believing that the other party will per form his ; and this I cannot have, except in a society in which he will be punished for non-performance. Thus the ordinary rules of social behaviour are only hypothetically obligatory; they are actualized by the establishment of a "common power" that may "use the strength and means of all" to enforce on all the observance of rules tending to the common benefit. On the other hand, Hobbes yields to no one in maintaining the para mount importance of moral regulations. The precepts of good faith, equity, requital of benefits, forgiveness of wrong so far as security allows, the prohibition of contumely, pride, arrogance, --which may all be summed up in the formula, "Do not that to another which thou wouldest not have done to thyself" (i.e., the negative of the "golden rule")—he still calls "immutable and eternal laws of nature"—meaning that, though a man is not unconditionally bound to realize them, he is, as a reasonable being, bound to desire that they should be realized. The pre social state of man, in his view, is also pre-moral ; but it is there fore utterly miserable. It is a state in which everyone has a right to everything that may conduce to his preservation; but it is therefore also a state of war—a state so wretched that it is the first dictate of rational self-love to emerge from it into social peace and order. Hence Hobbes's ideal constitution naturally comes to be unlimited despotism. Whatever the government de clares to be just or unjust must be accepted as such, since to dispute its dictates would be the first step towards anarchy, the one paramount peril. It is perhaps easy to understand how, in the crisis of 164o, when the ethico-political system of Hobbes first took written shape, a peace-loving philosopher should regard the claims of individual conscience as essentially anarchical, and dangerous to social well-being; but however strong might be men's yearning for order, a view of social duty, in which the only fixed positions were selfishness everywhere and unlimited power somewhere, could not but appear offensively paradoxical.
There was, however, in his theory an originality, a force, an apparent coherence which rendered it undeniably impressive; in fact, we find that for two generations the efforts to construct morality on a philosophical basis take more or less the form of answers to Hobbes. From an ethical point of view Hobbism divides itself naturally into two parts, which by Hobbes's peculiar political doctrines are combined into a coherent whole, but are not otherwise necessarily connected. Its theoretical basis is the principle of egoism; while, for practically determining the particulars of duty it makes morality entirely dependent on positive law and institution. It thus affirmed the relativity of good and evil in a double sense ; good and evil, for any individual citizen, may from one point of view be defined as the objects respectively of his desire and his aversion ; from another, they may be said to be determined for him by his sovereign. It is this latter aspect of the system which is primarily attacked by the first generation of writers that replied to Hobbes. This attack, or rather the counter-exposition of orthodox doctrine, is con ducted on different methods by the Cambridge moralists and by Cumberland respectively. Cumberland is content with the legal view of morality, but endeavours to establish the validity of the laws of nature by taxing them on the single supreme principle of rational regard for the "common good of all," and showing them, as so based, to be adequately supported by the divine sanc tion. The Cambridge school, regarding morality primarily as a body of truth rather than a code of rules, insist on its absolute character and intuitive certainty.
Cumberland's treatise De Legibus Naturae (1672) is in its ethical matter thoroughly modern. Cumberland is noteworthy as having been the first to lay down that "regard for the common good of all" is the supreme rule of morality or law of nature. So far he may be fairly called the precursor of later utilitarianism. His fundamental principle and supreme "Law of Nature" is thus stated: "The greatest possible benevolence of every rational agent towards all the rest constitutes the happiest state of each and all, so far as depends on their own power, and is necessarily required for their happiness; accordingly Common Good will be the Supreme Good." Locke agrees entirely with Hobbes as to the egoistic basis of rational conduct, and the interpretation of "good" and "evil" as "pleasure" and "pain," or that which is productive of pleasure and pain, yet he agrees also with Hobbes's opponents in holding ethical rules to be actually obligatory in dependently of political society, and capable of being scientifically constructed on principles intuitively known—though he does not regard these principles as implanted in the mind at birth. The aggregate of such rules he conceives as the law of God neces sarily sanctioned by adequate rewards and punishments.
But virtue, in Shaftesbury's view, is something more ; it im plies a recognition of moral goodness and immediate preference of it for its own sake. This immediate pleasure that we take in goodness (and displeasure in its opposite) is due to a susceptibility which he calls the "reflex" or "moral" sense, and compares with our susceptibility to beauty and deformity in external things; it furnishes both an additional direct impulse to good conduct, and an additional gratification to be taken into account in the reckoning which proves the coincidence of virtue and happiness. This doctrine of the moral sense is sometimes represented as Shaftesbury's cardinal tenet ; but though characteristic and im portant, it is not really necessary to his main argument.
The appearance of Shaftesbury's Characteristics (I 713) marks a turning-point in the history of English ethical thought. With the generation of moralists that followed, the consideration of abstract rational principles falls into the background, and its place is taken by introspective study of the human mind, observa tion of the actual play of its various impulses and sentiments. This empirical psychology had not indeed been neglected by previous writers. More, among others, had imitated Descartes in a discussion of the passions, and Locke's essay had a still stronger impulse in the same direction ; still, Shaftesbury is the first moralist who distinctly takes psychological experience as the basis of ethics. His suggestions were developed by Hutche son into one of the most elaborate systems of moral philosophy which we possess; through Hutcheson, if not directly, they in fluenced Hume's speculations, and are thus connected with later utilitarianism. Moreover, the substance of Shaftesbury's main argument was adopted by Butler, though it could not pass the scrutiny of that powerful and cautious intellect without receiving important modifications and additions. On the other hand, the ethical optimism of Shaftesbury, rather broadly impressive than exactly reasoned, and connected as it was with a natural theology that implied the Christian scheme to be superfluous, challenged attack equally from orthodox divines and from cynical free thinkers. Of these latter Mandeville, the author of The Fable of the Bees, or Private Vices Public Benefits (1723), was a con spicuous if not a typical specimen.
Price published his Review of the Chief Questions and Diffi culties of Morals in 1757. What Price is specially concerned to show is the existence of ultimate principles beside the principle of universal benevolence. Not that he repudiates the obligation either of rational benevolence or self-love ; on the contrary, he takes more pains than Butler to demonstrate the reasonableness of either principle. "There is not anything," he says, "of which we have more undeniably an intuitive perception, than that it is `right to pursue and promote happiness,' whether for ourselves or for others." Finally, Price, writing after the demonstration by Shaftesbury and Butler of the actuality of disinterested impulses in human nature, is bolder and clearer than Cudworth or Clarke in insisting that right actions are to be chosen because they are right by virtuous agents as such, even laying down that an act loses moral worth in proportion as it is done from natural inclina tion.
On this latter point Reid, in his Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind (1788), states a conclusion more in harmony with common sense, only maintaining that "no act can be mor ally good in which regard for what is right has not some influence." Utilitarianism had already been taught before the time of Ben tham by Gay and Paley. But Bentham's utilitarianism has a de cided superiority over theirs. He considers actions solely in respect of their pleasurable and painful consequences, expected or actual; and he recognizes the need of making a systematic register of these consequences, free from the influences of common moral opinion, as expressed in the "eulogistic" and "dyslogistic" terms in ordinary use. Further, the effects that he estimates are all of a definite, pal pable, empirically ascertainable quality ; they are such pleasures and pains as most men feel and all can observe, so that all his po litical or moral inferences lie open at every point to the test of practical experience. Everyone, it would seem, can tell what value he sets on the pleasures of alimentation, sex, the senses generally, wealth, power, curiosity, sympathy, antipathy (malevolence), the goodwill of individuals or of society at large, and on the corre sponding pains, as well as the pains of labour and organic dis orders ; and can guess the rate at which they are valued by others; therefore if it be once granted that all actions are determined by pleasures and pains, and are to be tried by the same standard, the art of legislation and private conduct is apparently placed on an empirical basis. Bentham, no doubt, seems to go beyond the limits of experience proper in recognizing "religious" pains and pleas ures in his fourfold division of sanctions, side by side with the "physical," "political," and "moral" or "social" ; but the truth is that he does not seriously take account of them, except in so far as religious hopes and fears are motives actually operat ing, which therefore admit of being observed and measured as much as any other motives. He does not himself use the will of an omnipotent and benevolent being as a means of logically connecting individual and general happiness. He thus undoubt edly simplifies his system, and avoids the doubtful inferences from nature and Scripture; but this gain is dearly purchased. For in answer to the question, How are the sanctions of the moral rules which it will most conduce to the general happiness for men to observe, shown to be always adequate in the case of all the in dividuals whose observance is required? he is obliged to admit that "the only interests which a man is at all times sure to find adequate motives for consulting are his own." Indeed, in many parts of his work, in the department of legislative and constitu tional theory, it is rather assumed that the interests of some men will continually conflict with those of their fellows, unless we alter the balance of prudential calculation by a readjustment of penalties. But on this assumption a system of private conduct on utilitarian principles cannot be constructed until legislative and constitutional reform has been perfected. And, in fact, "private ethics," as conceived by Bentham, does not exactly expound such a system ; but rather exhibits the coincidence, so far as it extends, between private and general happiness, in that part of each man's conduct that lies beyond the range of useful legislation. It was not his place, as a practical philanthropist, to dwell on the de fects in this coincidence; and since what men generally expect from a moralist is a completely reasoned account of what they ought to do, it is not surprising that some of Bentham's dis ciples should have either ignored or endeavoured to supply the gap in his system. One section of the school even maintained it to be a cardinal doctrine of utilitarianism that a man always gains his own greatest happiness by promoting that of others; another section, represented by John Austin, apparently returned to Paley's position, and treated utilitarian morality as a code of divine legislation; others, with Grote, are content to abate the severity of the claims made by "general happiness" on the indi vidual, and to consider utilitarian duty as practically limited by reciprocity ; while on the opposite side an unqualified subordina tion of private to general happiness was advocated by J. S. Mill, who did more than any other to spread utilitarianism.
The fact is that there are several different ways in which a utilitarian system of morality may be used, without deciding whether the sanctions attached to it are always adequate. (I) It may be presented as practical guidance to all who choose "gen eral good" as their ultimate end, whether on religious grounds, or because their conscience acts in harmony with utilitarian prin ciples, or for any other reasons; or (2) it may be offered as a code to be obeyed only so far as the coincidence of private and gen eral interest may in any case be judged to extend; or again (3) it may be proposed as a standard by which men may rea sonably agree to praise and blame the conduct of others, even though they may not always think fit to act on it. We may regard morality as a kind of supplementary legislation, supported by public opinion, which we may expect the public, when duly en lightened, to frame in accordance with the public interest. Still, even from this point of view, which is that of the legislator or social reformer rather than the moral philosopher, our code of duty must be greatly influenced by our estimate of the degrees in which men are normally influenced by self-regard, sympathy or benevolence, and of the range within which sympathy may be expected to be generally effective. Thus, for example, the moral standard for which a utilitarian will reasonably endeavour to gain the support of public opinion must be essentially different in qual ity, according as he holds with Bentham that nothing but self regard will "serve for diet," though "for a dessert benevolence is a very valuable addition"; or with J. S. Mill that disinterested public spirit should be the prominent motive in the performance of all socially useful work, and that even hygienic precepts should be inculcated, because "by squandering our health we disable our selves from rendering services to our fellow-creatures." Continental Ethics.—In the i 7th century and late into the i8th century Continental ethics had no influence on British mor alists. Hence the preceding sketch of English ethics contains no allusion to Continental moralists. English ethics was self-con tained during the period, and was predominantly empirical or psychological, whereas elsewhere in Europe ethics was meta physical. Not till the time of T. H. Greene did English ethics seriously seek a metaphysical basis, though Continenal influences came into play among English moralists long before that.
To understand the moral life of man attention must be fo cussed on a certain self-preserving impulse (conatus) which con stitutes the very essence of each finite individual. Human feel ings and emotions are the outcome of this impulse. Now the character of this self-preservation and self-realization varies with the different stages of man's intellectual development, and moral progress keeps pace with his intellectual progress. Spinoza distinguishes three (sometimes four) ascending grades of knowl edge- Opinion, Reason, Intuition. At the lowest, pre-scientific stage of opinion (or vague experience) one is guided mainly by chance associations without rational insight. At this stage the self which seeks realization is the merely individual self as af fected by accidents of place and time; for it, pleasure is the sole good, pain the sole evil. Not guided by its own intellectual ac tivity, but influenced mainly by outside factors, the mind of man is at this stage in a state of bondage. Human nature, however, tends to emancipate itself from such bondage to the senses and the external objects that lure them on. At the stage of Reason, the active and universal element in human nature asserts itself, and helps man to free himself from the domination of the particu lar and the sensuous. Passions lose their power when they are seen through by penetrating thought. And man frees himself from his bondage to the particular objects of his loves and his hates when he grasps their real place in the order of Nature and the universal laws which control them. As man gains insight into his own place in the whole order of things and realizes the neces sity of the whole cosmic process, he banishes all fear and regret, all disappointments and resentment, and acquires peace of mind. In this way reason uplifts the mind above the unrest of passion, and fills it with the joy of acquiescence in the universal order of things. At the highest stage of intellectual development, that of Intuitive Knowledge, the mind contemplates the whole universe as a complete unity, of which all things (including human beings) are infinitely varied expressions. This attitude induces the high est spiritual activity whereby the mind identifies its essence with the Infinite Being, and is filled with the intellectual love of God.
Kant.—The English moralist with whom Kant has most affin ity is Price ; in fact, Kantism, in the ethical thought of modern Europe, holds a place somewhat analogous to that formerly occu pied by the teaching of Price and Reid among English moralists. Kant, like Price and Reid, holds that man as a rational being is unconditionally bound to conform to a certain rule of right, or "categorical imperative" of reason. Like Price he holds that an action is not good unless done from a good motive, and that this motive must be essentially different from natural inclination of any kind ; duty, to be duty, must be done for duty's sake ; and he argues, with more subtlety than Price or Reid, that though a vir tuousact is no doubt pleasant to the virtuous agent, and any violation of duty painful this moral pleasure (or pain) cannot strictly be the motive to the act, because it follows instead of pre ceding the recognition of our obligation to do it. With Price, again, he holds that rightness of intention and motive is not only an indispensable condition or element of the rightness of an action, but actually the sole determinant of its moral worth; but with more philosophical consistency he draws the inference that there can be no separate rational principles for determining the "material" rightness of conduct, as distinct from its "formal" rightness ; and therefore that all rules of duty, so far as universally binding, must admit of being exhibited as applications of the one general principle that duty ought to be done for duty's sake. This deduction is the most original part of Kant's doctrine. The dic tates of reason, he points out, must necessarily be addressed to all rational beings as such ; hence, my intention cannot be right unless I am prepared to will the principle on which I act to be a universal law. He considers that this fundamental rule or imperative "act on a maxim which thou canst will to be law universal" supplies a sufficient criterion for determining particular duties in all cases. The rule excludes wrong conduct with two degrees of stringency. Some offences, such as making promises with the intention of breaking them, we cannot even conceive universalized; as soon as every one broke promises no one would care to have promises made to him. Other maxims, such as that of leaving persons in distress to shift for themselves, we can easily conceive to be uni versal laws, but we cannot without contradiction will them to be such; for when we are ourselves in distress we cannot help desir ing that others should help us.
Another important peculiarity of Kant's doctrine is his develop ment of the connection between duty and free-will. He holds that it is through our moral consciousness that we know that we are free; in the cognition that I ought to do what is right because it is right and not because I like it, it is implied that this purely ra tional volition is possible; that my action can be determined, not "mechanically," through. the necessary operation of the natural stimuli of pleasurable and painful feelings, but in accordance with the laws of my true, reasonable self. The realization of reason, or of human wills so far as rational, thus presents itself as the abso lute end of duty; and we get, as a new form of the fundamental practical rule, "act so as to treat humanity, in thyself or any other, as an end always, and never as a means only." We may observe, too, that the notion of freedom connects ethics with juris prudence in a simple and striking manner. The fundamental aim of jurisprudence is to realize external freedom by removing the hindrances imposed on each one's free action through the inter ferences of other wills. Ethics shows how to realize internal free dom by resolutely pursuing rational ends in opposition to those of natural inclination. If we ask what precisely are the ends of rea son, Kant's proposition that "all rational beings as such are ends in themselves for every rational being" hardly gives a clear answer. It might be interpreted to mean that the result to be prac tically sought is simply the development of the rationality of all rational beings—such as men—whom we find to be as yet imper fectly rational. But this is not Kant's view. He holds, indeed, that each man should aim at making himself the most perfect possible instrument of reason; but he expressly denies that the perfection of others can be similarly prescribed as an end to each. It is, he says, "a contradiction to regard myself as in duty bound to promote the perfection of another, . . . a contradiction to make it a duty for me to do something for another which no other but himself can do." In what practical sense, then, am I to make other rational beings my ends? Kant's answer is that what each is to aim at in the case of others is not Perfection, but Happiness, i.e., to help them to attain those purely subjective ends that are determined for each not by reason, but by natural inclination. He explains also that to seek one's own happiness cannot be prescribed as a duty, because it is an end to which every man is inevitably impelled by natural inclination : but that just because each inevit ably desires his own happiness, and theref ore desires that others should assist him in time of need, he is bound to make the happi ness of others his ethical end, since he cannot morally demand aid from others without accepting the obligation of aiding them in like case. The exclusion of private happiness from the ends at which it is a duty to aim contrasts strikingly with the view of Butler and Reid, that man, as a rational being, is under a "manifest obliga tion" to seek his own interest. The difference, however, is not really so great as it seems ; since in another part of his system Kant fully recognizes the reasonableness of the individual's regard for his own happiness. Though duty, in his view, excludes regard for private happiness, the summum bonum is not duty alone, but happiness combined with moral worth; the demand for happiness as the reward of duty is so essentially reasonable that we must postulate a universal connection between the two as the order of the universe; indeed, the practical necessity of this is the only adequate rational ground for believing in the existence of God.
Hegel.—Bef ore the ethics of Kant had begun to be seriously studied in England, the rapid and remarkable development of metaphysical view and method of which the three chief stages are represented by Fichte, Schelling and Hegel respectively had already taken place; and the system of the latter was occupying the most prominent position in the philosophical thought of Ger many. Hegel's ethical doctrine (expounded chiefly in his Philo sophie des Rechts, 1821) shows a close affinity, and also a striking contrast, to Kant's. He holds, with Kant, that duty or good con duct consists in the conscious realization of the free reasonable will, which is essentially the same in all rational beings. But in Kant's view the universal content of this will is only given in the formal condition of "only acting as one can desire all to act," to be subjectively applied by each rational agent to his own volition; whereas Hegel conceives the universal will as objectively pre sented to each man in the laws, institutions and customary mo rality of the community of which he is a member. Thus, in his view, not merely natural inclinations towards pleasures, or the de sires for selfish happiness, require to be morally resisted ; but even the prompting of the individual's conscience, the impulse to do what seems to him right, if it comes into conflict with the common sense of his community. It is true that Hegel regards the conscious effort to realize one's own conception of good as a higher stage of moral development than the mere conformity to the jural rules establishing property, maintaining contract and allotting punish ment to crime, in which the universal will is first expressed ; since in such conformity this will is only accomplished accidentally by the outward concurrence of individual wills, and is not essentially realized in any of them. He holds, however, that this conscientious effort is self-deceived and futile, is even the very root of moral evil, except it attains its realization in harmony with the objective social relations in which the individual finds himself placed. Of these relations the first grade is constituted by the family, the second by civil society, and the third by the State, the highest manifestation of universal reason in the sphere of practice.
Hegelianism appears as a distinct element in modern English ethical thought ; but the direct influence of Hegel's system is per haps less important than that indirectly exercised through the powerful stimulus which it has given to the study of the historical development of human thought and human society. According to Hegel, the essence of the universe is a process of thought from the abstract to the concrete; and a right understanding of this process gives the key for interpreting the evolution in time of European philosophy. So again, in his view, the history of man kind is a history of the necessary development of the free spirit through the different forms of political organization : the first being that of the Oriental monarchy, in which freedom belongs to the monarch only; the second, that of the Graeco-Roman republics, in which a select body of free citizens is sustained on a basis of slavery; while finally in the modern societies, sprung from the Teutonic invasion of the decaying Roman empire, freedom is recognized as the natural right of all members of the community. The effect of the lectures (posthumously edited) in which Hegel's "Philosophy of History" and "History of Philosophy" were ex pounded, has extended far beyond the limits of his special school.