ORIGINS OF THE WORLD WAR The Serajevo Crime.—Peace was broken by an event that occurred in the Balkan territory of Austria—the murder of the heir to the Austrian throne, the archduke Francis Ferdinand, at Serajevo, the capital of Bosnia. The murderers were Bosnian Slays, and subjects of Austria; the weapons they used came from a Serbian arsenal. Long afterwards it became known that these weapons had been supplied to the assassins by a Serbian officer, a member of a secret society known as the Black Hand, which was led by an officer of the Serbian staff named Dimitrievic. The Serbs were inspired by hatred for Austria, who persecuted its orthodox Serb subjects and stood in the way of Serbian national unity. But the report made to the Austrian Government by Wies ner on July 13, 1914, rejected the idea of any complicity in the crime on the part of the Serbian Government.
The Austrian Government was convinced that the independence of the kingdom of Serbia imperilled the existence of the Austro Hungarian empire, because it provoked the Slav subjects of the emperor to break away from the empire. Austria had already determined to render Serbia harmless by making it again depend ent upon her, and she had instituted diplomatic action to isolate her by means of the Balkan league. The murder of the Archduke, however, opened the way for military action and Berchtold, the minister for foreign affairs, announced to Count Tisza, the Hun garian minister president, Austria's intention "to take advantage of the crime" to "settle its account with Serbia." Tisza advised that Austria should await a more favourable time and act only after she had achieved an agreement with Rumania and Bulgaria. The Austrian Government before entering into a war that might lead to Russian intervention wished to assure itself of the support of Germany and Count Hoyos was sent to Berlin with a letter from the emperor which was handed to the kaiser on July 5 by the Ambassador Count Szogeny.
The kaiser replied that Austria could count on "the complete support of Germany" ; Russia was not ready for war and would think twice before taking up arms. The kaiser himself made preparations for leaving on the nth for his annual holiday in the North Sea. He did not hold, as has been thought, a royal council at Potsdam, but confined himself to having an informal conversa tion with the chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg and interviews with certain officers whom he warned to take dispositions, although he did not believe Russia would go to war.
Without giving a definite reply Bethmann-Hollweg told Szogeny and Hoyos that in the relations between Austria and Serbia it was for Austria to judge as to what should be done, and he did not seek to learn the intentions of the Austrian Government (the Bavarian chargé d'a ff wires in Berlin said, on July 18, that Germany had given Austria "a free hand") . The two governments agreed that Italy should not be informed but the Germans advised Austria that it would be necessary to compensate Italy for any advantage which Austria might gain in the Balkans.
The Austrian council of ministers proposed at Vienna, on July 7, to impose on Serbia conditions so inacceptablc as to lead only to war; Tisza opposed this policy and threatened to resign. The decision was taken on July 14. The chief of the general staff, Conrad, declared that from a military point of view "all tem. porizing" would be dangerous. The minister for foreign affairs, Count Berchtold, considered that from a political point of view this decision would be damaging to the prestige of Austria which Germany would tax with weakness. Another council held on the i 9th agreed to the terms of the ultimatum to Serbia and discussed the results to be expected from the war. Serbia was to be placed in a state of dependence on the monarchy by a military conven tion ; its dynasty was to be expelled ; its territory apportioned between the other Balkan States. On July 21 the emperor gave his approval to the note, but it was determined to delay its dis patch until President Poincare had left St. Petersburg. The whole operation was conducted in great secrecy. The German Govern ment had adopted a passive attitude and had not made any attempt to induce Austria to modify the terms of the note. Europe received the impression that the Austrian and German Governments had come to an understanding to lull the suspicions of the other govern ments and take them by surprise.
The Triple Entente could only conclude that Austria was deter mined to make war, notwithstanding the opposition of Russia, and that she had taken this decision in agreement with Germany. Berlin believed that Russia was in no condition to go to war and thought that France and England would not intervene; but the German ambassador in London, Prince Lichnowsky, made known to Berlin that the British Government counted on Germany not to associate herself with demands that manifestly had for their object the provocation of war.
On July 24, in London, Paris and St. Petersburg, the German ambassadors delivered a note in which the German Government declared that the Austrian demands were "equitable and moderate" and would, if necessary, be enforced by military measures; the matter was one to be settled exclusively between Austria and Serbia. Germany desired "the localization of the conflict" (this note had been drawn up before the German Government had seen the text of the ultimatum). The French replied, merely expressing the hope that Austria would be able to enter into nego tiations with Serbia. The British minister, Grey, declared that the Austrian ultimatum "surpassed anything which he had ever seen" and pointed to the danger of a European war "if public opinion in Russia should compel the Government to make war on Austria"; he proposed a mediation on the part of the "Four Powers not directly interested." The Russian minister, Sazonov, refused to accept the localization for, according to him, it was "a European question," but on the following day he declared that Russia was prepared to exhaust every endeavour to avert war. The German Government, however, believed that the Triple Entente would not go to the extent of making war, though the latter, they saw, were determined to maintain the independence of Serbia.
On the advice of Russia and France the Serbian Government replied to the ultimatum accepting the majority of the demands; as for the conditions which violated the rights of a sovereign State it declared itself ready to submit them to the international tribunal at the Hague. The Austrian minister at once pronounced this reply unsatisfactory, and left Belgrade on July 25.
The German ambassador at Paris proposed to the French Gov ernment that it should use its influence with Russia to prevent the spread of the conflict, but he refused the French proposal of concerted action by the Powers both at Vienna and St. Petersburg. Germany wished to prevent Russia from acting and to leave Austria free. The British Government proposed a conference in London of the four Powers which should demand jointly the sus pension of all active military operations by Austria, Russia and Serbia. The German Government refused, because it could not— so the chancellor wrote—"drag Austria before a European trib unal," nor could it set itself up as mediator between Austria and Serbia except "in a conflict between Austria and Russia." It per sisted in wishing to localize the conflict, that is to say, to hand over Serbia to Austria, and it counted on the inaction of England. The brother of William II., Prince Henry, visited King George in London, and was asked by the king to do his best to keep out of the war. Sazonov proposed a direct negotiation to the Austrian ambassador and Berchtold replied that war had already com menced. This was not true, but Berchtold wished to create a definite situation in order to prevent a further move on the part of the Entente Powers.
On the evening of July 27, the German Government was in formed by its ambassador in London that Grey had said to him that any military action on the part of Austria would be a "direct provocation" to Russia and that it was the duty of Germany to hold Austria in check. The British cabinet had ordered the fleet, which was about to disperse, to remain concentrated (July 28) . The German chancellor informed Austria that Germany could not refuse all mediation, for it was important that they should appear to be forced into war. But he did not advise Austria to stop her military operations. The kaiser, who had returned to Germany, read the Serbian reply and wrote in the margin "a great moral victory for Vienna, but it dissipates every reason for war." He proposed only that Belgrade should be occupied as a pledge of the execution of their promises by the Serbs (July 28). Bethmann, who was informed by the German ambassador that Berchtold was proposing to dismember Serbia, demanded from him a declara tion of his intention to reassure public opinion in Europe. But he advised his ambassador "to avoid creating the impression that we are desirous of resisting Austria." Declaration of War Against Serbia.—On July 28, 1914 Austria declared war on Serbia by telegram and broke off the conversations in which she was engaged with Russia because they no longer served any purpose; on the 29th she began the bombard ment of Belgrade. The Russian Government drew up two mobiliza tion orders, the one a partial one with a view to war with Austria alone, the other a general one. Disagreement now became mani fest within the Governments of both Russia and Germany as to the policy to be followed. For military reasons the general staffs desired to hasten their preparations for war in order to assure the advantage of offensive action, while the civilians for political reasons, sought to delay for fear of appearing responsible for breaking the peace. At first the German Government sought to intimidate Russia and its ambassador, Count Pourtales, declared on the evening of the 28th to Sazonov, that a continuation of the Russian mobilization would compel Germany to mobilize ; "it would be nearly impossible to prevent the European war." The Russian Government determined to order a general mobilization but the tsar, who was anxious for peace, cancelled the order and decreed instead the partial mobilization. In Germany on the same day, July 29, the general staff demanded an immediate decision in order not to leave the initiative to the enemy ; Bethmann sought to delay the decision.
The Austrian Government finally declared to Russia on July 29 that it had no intention of annexing Serbian territories but that it could not accept the Russian proposal to respect "the sovereign rights of Serbia." Bethmann sought to avert a British intervention by proposing, on the evening of the 29th, to the British ambassador, Goschen, that if England would remain neutral Germany would not annex any French territory. Immediately there arrived a telegram from the German ambassador in London announcing Grey's declaration that if war broke out England could not remain a spectator. The German Government, advised more over that Italy would not support her allies, during the night sent many communications to Vienna for the purpose of inducing Aus tria not to reject any project of mediation. The same evening the tsar proposed that the Austro-Serbian dispute should be submitted to arbitration and he despatched a personal telegram to William asking him "to exert very great pressure" on Austria. The kaiser replied that if Russia continued to mobilize he would be unable to influence Vienna: "It is on you that the weight of the decision lies." The Russian and German Mobilization.—On the 3oth the tsar gave way to his general staff, who pointed out that partial mobilization on the Austrian frontier would disorganize the gen eral scheme of mobilization ; he, therefore, gave the order for the general mobilization.
The Austrian council of ministers refused to suspend their operations against Serbia, and requested England to stop the Rus sian mobilization ; as yet, it was unaware of the partial mobiliza tion. On the advice of the German general staff, it ordered the general mobilization on the morning of the 31st. Both govern ments declared that the mobilization was a defensive one and would not preclude negotiations. On receiving information of the Russian mobilization, the kaiser proclaimed a state of war to be imminent and informed Sazonov that if the Russian order was not cancelled within 24 hours, Germany would consider herself at war with Russia. The Russian mobilization had, in Germany, given the impression that Russia was the aggressor; all parties, even the Socialists, united to pass the votes of credit and to defend Ger many against the Russian invasion.
Realizing that war was inevitable, the French Government called upon England for assistance. But there the Liberal cabinet was divided, and the majority hesitated to launch Great Britain into a continental war in which its interests and its honour were not immediately engaged. Parliament was not in session and public opinion did not seem ready for war. The decision to take part in the war was precipitated by an action on the part of Germany. Great Britain, in common with France, Austria, Prussia and Russia was a signatory to the treaty of 1839 which guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium, and this obliged it to repel with armed force any violation of Belgian territory. In 1868 the Great Powers had similarly guaranteed the neutrality of Luxembourg. Grey had demanded on July 3o an assurance from the French and German Governments that the neutrality of Belgium would be respected. France gave this, but Germany declared herself unable to make any reply. The plan of the German general staff was to make a swift attack on the French army in order to crush France before the Russian armies were ready, and in order to avoid fighting on two fronts. The chief of the Austrian general staff, Conrad, had been informed that the German general staff calculated that the operations against France would be concluded 33 days after mobilization. But to act quickly the German army was compelled to pass through Belgium. On Aug. 2 it occupied Luxembourg.
The German Government declared war on France on Aug. 3, alleging that the French had violated German territory. The German ambassador in Brussels handed to the Belgian Govern ment a note demanding a free passage for German troops across Belgium, accompanied by a threat that if Belgium refused, she would be treated as an enemy, and adding that it was aware that French troops were about to enter Belgium. The German general staff, however, had actually drawn up this note several days previously and had prepared proclamations to the Belgian people. The Belgian Government refused; the German troops had already crossed the frontier. This intelligence decided the British cabinet to act ; three ministers alone refused to support the war and handed in their resignations. The English ambassador, Goschen, de livered an ultimatum in Berlin, calling upon the German Govern ment to respect the neutrality of Belgium ; he was refused. The war began the night of August