Relation of Feeling to Other Mental Processes

RELATION OF FEELING TO OTHER MENTAL PROCESSES "Bound" and "Free" Feelings.—This brings us to the diffi cult subject of the relation between feeling on the one hand and cognition and conation on the other. As regards cognition, perhaps the most important fact to bear in mind is that there may exist all degrees of closeness in the relation between a feeling and the ac companying precepts or ideas. At the one extreme there are feelings which are intimately "bound" to a single definite sensation--so much that we tend to regard them as "objective" in the sense that they seem to belong more to the external object producing the sen sation than to our inner "self"; as when we say "That deep blue sky is lovely," or "That treacle tart is delicious." At the other ex treme are feelings which are relatively "free" in the sense that they do not seem to have a special relationship to any particular sensations or ideas; feelings which we regard as definitely "sub jective" and belonging to the self. These latter feelings are rela tively persistent and often form a background upon which the more fleeting parts of our experience come and go. When the persistence is strong, such feelings may be designated "moods." But though a mood may have no specially intimate connection with any one idea or precept, it tends to colour everything so long as it lasts, so that the same ideas may seem pleasant or unpleasant according as we are in a happy or unhappy mood. Moods are thus very important factors in determining the relative amounts of pleasure and unpleasure in our life.

Let us start with a consideration of the field of the emotions. What are the "emotions" and how do they differ from feelings? Unfortunately there is as yet no generally accepted use of the term emotion among psychologists, but all modern writers seem agreed that emotions have, unlike feeling, a special relationship to some particular kind of conation. Pleasure and unpleasure may, as we have seen, be aroused in connection with any kind of experi ence. Emotions are only aroused under more specific circum stances, and each particular emotion stands in connection with a particular tendency to action ; as is easily seen in the case of the more definite and pronounced emotions, such as fear and anger. William McDougall, to whom we owe perhaps more than to any other author for clarification of thought on this subject, holds that there is a "primary" emotion corresponding to each of the chief instincts, the emotions corresponding in specificity to the specificity of the correlated instinct, that the relative emotion to some extent inevitably accompanies the operation of an instinct and that "secondary" emotions are formed by the blending of two or more primary emotions, when two or more instincts are simultaneously at work. A. F. Shand, chiefly owing to a narrower conception of instinct, holds that each emotion is correlated not with one but with several instincts, while James Dreyer and a considerable number of quite recent writers maintain that the term emotion is better reserved for the stronger affective states which result from the blocking of an instinctive tendency when it cannot be easily or quickly gratified. There is likewise no com plete agreement as to what are the primary emotions, and the reader must be referred to the text-books for the various views on this subject.

Shand (and following him McDougall) is responsible for intro ducing the concept of another class of so-called "emotibns" 'prospective" and "retrospective," "emotions of desire" or "de rived emotions." These are complex states in which cognitive, conative and affective elements are all strongly marked. Those in the "prospective" group relate to desires whose fulfilment (or non-fulfilment) is anticipated in the future. In order of decreas ing anticipation of fulfilment they are :—confidence, hope, anxiety, despondency, despair. The "retrospective" group is more difficult to classify, but it certainly includes regret, remorse and grief. McDougall correctly draws attention to the fact that these "emo tions" are not emotions in the strict modern sense, inasmuch as they may be aroused in connection with any conative tendency whatsoever. It would be better in many ways to call them "feel ings of desire." Emotions, like feelings, tend to persist longer than the percep tions and ideas that arouse them, and thus they also may form moods, such as the timorous mood, the irritable mood, the tender mood, etc. Such a mood—"a resonating echo of the emotion"— is most easily brought about when the emotion (and its corres ponding instinctive tendency) is denied free expression. It is in this way that conation as well as feeling contributes to the forma tion of moods.

In recent years our knowledge of the physiological basis of emotion has considerably widened—particularly as to the part played by the autonomic nervous system and by the ductless glands. The work of Walter B. Cannon and his coadjutors has shown for instance that the more violent emotions of fear and anger are specially associated with the central or "sympathetic" division of the autonomic nervous system, and that the action of this division tends generally to be antagonistic to the functions of the upper ("cranial") and lower ("sacral") divisions, the first of which is principally connected with nutrition and the more re poseful states, the second with the functions of excretion and re production. We thus see something of the neurological basis of certain psychological antagonisms such as those between fear and eupepsia on the one hand and fear and sexual emotion on the other, which everyday life discloses and which have been emphasised in recent medicine. Furthermore the "sympathetic" division works in intimate relationship with the adrenal glands. The secretion of these glands produces physiological changes which are of use in flight, combat and other circumstances involving great exertion ; it increases the amount of blood sugar and quickens the heart-beat (thus favouring muscular effort) and increases the coagulability of the blood (thus reducing loss of blood if wounded). It seems certain that other ductless glands such as the thyroid and the in testital (puberty or sex) glands have also an important influence on our emotions (and therefore also on our moods), and probably there is a brilliant future for the study of our emotional life along the converging lines of psychology, neurology and chemistry.

"Hedonic" and "Hormic" Theories.

Granted the distinc tion we have made between (the more generally aroused) feelings and (the more specifically conative) emotions, we are still left with the general problem of how feeling is related to conation. It is almost universally recognised that somewhere in this rela tionship lies the key to the understanding of the true nature and function of feeling itself. It is round this relationship there fore that the chief theories of feeling have clustered. These theories are—as often happens in such a case—for the most part complementary rather than mutually exclusive. There is, how ever, one point at issue which is from the theoretic point of view rather fundamental; is conation determined by feeling or feeling by conation? Do we want things because they are pleasant (and try to avoid them because they are unpleasant), or are they pleas ant because we want them (and unpleasant because we try to avoid them) ? These two opposing views have been conveniently called by McDougall the "hedonic" and the "hormic" theories respectively. At first sight the hedonic theory that our desires are determined by our feelings may seem more in accordance with common sense; and indeed it has seemed to many of the earlier psychologists plainly evident that we are constantly endeavouring to secure pleasure and avoid unpleasure. But the great majority are now inclined to believe that the opposite view is the more correct. It is obvious that a great number of our feelings are directly conditioned by the success or failure of our conations both as regards the major and the minor ends of life. Careful study of many cases seems to show that this relation between pleasure and successful conation on the one hand and unpleasure and unsuccess ful conation on the other hand is invariable, whereas the relation of feeling to the cognitive elements is variable ; a perception or idea may be pleasant, indifferent or unpleasant, according to the conative tendencies operative at the moment (e.g., the sight and smell of food may be very welcome if we are hungry, but most dis tasteful if we have just risen from an ample meal) .

The chief difficulty of the "hormic" theory is concerned with the "objective" feelings accompanying sensation, and, as McDou gall has recently shown, many psychologists who elsewhere hold this doctrine, wittingly or unwittingly fall back upon the "hedonic" view when dealing with feelings of this kind. And indeed, we may well be excused for thinking they are right, for the unpleasantness of a severe pain (to take the most striking case of all) seems at first sight to be inherently and inevitably connected with the pain itself and to have nothing to do with our conative attitude towards it. Some modern psychologists, however, have maintained that even the most intense pain can cease to be unpleasant if we can welcome and embrace it instead of trying to put an end to it.

The factors which obstruct conation in the attainment of its end and thus give rise to unpleasure, are, to use Stout's classifi cation, of two main kinds—the material and the formal. The ma terial consists in the nature of our perceptions or ideas themselves, the indication that they give that something in the external world prevents the satisfaction of our desires. If I want to enter a house but my visual and tactile perceptions tell me that the door is locked and that I have not got the key, or if I want to get to a certain town by to-morrow morning but my knowledge of the train service tells me that this is impossible—these are simple examples of material obstacles ; here my cognitions frustrate my conations and are unpleasant. But if I remember that the key is under the scraper, or that by hiring a motor car I can get to the town by morning, the obstacles are removed and the corresponding ideas are pleasant.

"Pleasure" and "Reality" Principles.—It is to be noted that the ideas telling us that our desires can be fulfilled may be just as pleasant as the perceptions telling us they are being fulfilled ; the thought of getting to town by motor car may be as gratifying as the actual perception of the town when I arrive there. Indeed so dependent is human affective life upon ideational, as distinct from perceptual conditions, that a very great proportion of our feelings are determined by anticipated or recollected, rather than per ceived, good or evil. Our desires can be gratified not only in reality but in "imagination," and where there are serious external obstacles, gratification is more easily obtained through imagina tion than through perception. It is true, our most fundamental physiological needs cannot be permanently satisfied in this way, for Who can . .

. . . Cloy the hungry edge of appetite By bare imagination of a feast? Nevertheless in the case of many less urgent desires, the pleasures of imagination often make amends for the difficulties of reality— so much so that we are perhaps only too willing to accept them as a permanent substitute for "real" gratification. Of recent years psycho-analysis has thrown a vivid light upon the importance of this enjoyment without reference to reality. Sigmund Freud has indeed distinguished two principles in mental functioning, the "pleasure principle," which takes no account of outer reality and in which gratification is obtained by simple imagination, and the "reality principle," in which satisfaction of desire is sought in the real world at the cost of a temporary increase of displeasure.

The "formal" obstacles to the anticipated attainment of the ends of conation are due to the imperfect or inharmonious func tion of our own bodies or minds, as when we fail in some delicate adjustment through lack of manual dexterity, or fail to find the solution of a problem owing to confused thought. Here again psycho-analysis has greatly enriched our knowledge, by showing the importance of "conflict" in our mental life.

Many of our desires are incompatible, hence to gratify one is to frustrate another ; and frustration necessarily occasions suffering. Mental conflict is indeed a very obvious cause of unpleasure and has been recognized as such in one form or another by many pre vious psychologists, notably by Herbart, though as a rule these earlier writers, in accordance with the general tendency of psycho logical thought in their time, laid more stress on cognitive and less on conative factors than is now done. One modern author (F. C. Bartlett) has gone so far as to consider that all unpleasure is due to conflict and not to simple frustration. The more general view, however, is that conflict only causes unpleasure indirectly through the frustration of conations, and that therefore, the more harmonious and integrated our personality, the greater our chances of happiness.

The "Super-Ego..

One exceptionally important "formal" fac tor in connection with conflict is the influence exercised by the moral or quasi-moral standards associated with the idea of "self" —the "self-regarding sentiment" in McDougall's terminology, the "super-ego" in Freud's (though these two concepts are by no means entirely synonymous). There are certain standards of achievement and conduct which alone we consider worthy of our selves (though not for the most part by conscious and deliberate formulation), and whenever we fall short of these standards and ideals there is frustration of the very powerful conative tendencies organized within this super-ego. If there is too wide a difference between the standard required by the super-ego and the kind of gratification which our instincts insistently demand, there may be a continuous struggle between the two sets of forces, with perpetual or alternate frustration on one side or the other. If the super-ego predominates, there is frustration of instinctive desire of such a kind as frequently gives rise to neurosis, with all the suffering that this entails; if the super-ego is overcome, it, as it were, seeks vengeance by causing the person to despise himself, self-contempt and self-reproach (and—as we may add—self punishment) from this cause being one of the most potent causes of human misery. A more tolerant super-ego may in many ways permit of greater happiness, though a permanent and com plete overthrow of the super-ego would be incompatible with social conduct and with the adaptation to social reality that civilization demands. The two extreme conditions can be studied in the com plementary mental disorders of mania (where all inhibition, self criticism and control seem to have been abandoned, and succes sive thoughts and impulses are left to jostle one another as best they can), and melancholia (where inhibition and self-criticism are so oppressive that there is little scope for anything but thoughts of self-reproach and self-abasement).

The "Tension" Theory.—Since, according to the "hormic" theory, feeling essentially depends upon conation, further light may be thrown upon feeling by a consideration of the ultimate nature of conation itself ; in fact the theory of feeling is intimately linked with the theory of conation. During the last few years a considerable number of authors have (more or less independently) advocated what in effect may be regarded as a combined theory of feeling and conation. This may be briefly called the "tension" theory. It holds that the ultimate aim of conation is to get rid of tension, whether caused by external or by internal stimulation, and that pleasure accompanies the diminution, unpleasure the in crease of tension.

Biological and Physiological Theories.—Besides these psychological or psycho-physical theories of feeling, there are also theories of a more biological or physiological nature. The bio logical theories are all variants on the theme that pleasure occurs under conditions which are favourable to the organism, unpleasure under conditions which are unfavourable. There is pretty gen eral agreement as to the fundamental correctness of this view, but it is also agreed that the correlation implied is far from being perfect. Some pleasant things are harmful and some harmless (or even beneficial) things are unpleasant. But, it is maintained, in the majority of such cases the harm or the benefit are not simulta neous with the feeling, but occur in the future; and feeling only in dicates present conditions and is rio prophet, or at best only be comes one after much experience—racial or individual.

Physiological theories are mostly based on the phenomena of fatigue, nutrition and dissimilation. Thus H. R. Marshall's theory' asserts that "Pleasure is produced by the use of surplus stored force in the organ determining the content, and pain is determined by the reception of a stimulus to which the organ is incapable of reacting completely. Indifference occurs when the action is exactly equalized to the stimulus." According to the theory of Alfred Lehmann, pleasure occurs when Assimilation = I, the intensity Dissimilation of pleasure increasing with simultaneously increasing values of A and D, while unpleasure occurs when A < z, increasing with the D decrease of the value A • The difficulty of these theories is (here once again) to account for the exciting pleasures and for the fact that pleasures may be tiring. In any case, however, all such the ories are at present mere speculations lacking all detailed verifi cation.

Since feeling can accompany any kind of mental process, it has often been argued that there is no cerebral centre for feeling; indeed, such a view is implied in the two above-mentioned physi ological theories in their present form. But, as Wohlgemuth has pointed out, the position now most frequently adopted that feel ing is an elementary mental process, combined with the further usual assumption that elementary mental processes have definitely corresponding brain centres, compels us to suppose that some such centre exists. Physiological and neurological evidence (particu larly the clinical researches of Sir Henry Head and his co-workers) points rather strongly to the thalamus being such a centre ; though in the past numerous other parts of the brain have been suggested (mostly on very insufficient evidence).

"Expression" and "Impression" Methods.—Experimental Psychology has devised various methods for the more accurate qualitative and quantitative investigation of the feelings and of their conditions and effects, and a good many of the already men tioned conclusions have been obtained by the use of such methods, though vast problems still await research. It has become custom ary to classify these methods into two main groups, the "ex pression" and "impression" methods respectively. In the expres sion method, feeling is studied through its physiological concomi tants, muscular contractions, pulse, blood pressure, breathing, volume of a limb and electrical resistance being the physiological expressions that have been most frequently measured. Of these the observation of changes in electrical resistance (the psycho galvanic reflex) has on the whole shown itself most fruitful in results, though there is still much uncertainty as to the ultimate physiological and psychological interpretation of these results; in particular (on the psychological side) as to how far the changes in resistance are correlated with conative or affective experiences. The study of muscular contraction shows the sthenic and asthenic efforts of pleasure and unpleasure respectively, while it has also shown that pleasure tends to produce an increase in voluntary extensor movement and a decrease in a voluntary flexor movement of a standard length, together with an increased liability to in voluntary extensor movements and a decreased liability to invol untary flexor movements, unpleasure producing precisely opposite effects; an interesting result that is readily understandable if we remember that in joy a man tends to throw out his chest, extend his limbs and generally occupy more space than in the bent and huddled position that is characteristic of sorrow.

The impression method dispenses with physiological measure ments and relies entirely upon introspective reports upon the f eel ings produced by experimental stimuli. With suitable precautions this method is proving itself surprisingly adequate to deal with many of the difficult problems in the psychology of feeling, and it looks as though we may expect great contributions from it in the near future. It has become very clear also that carefully con trolled introspection is essential for the proper interpretation of the results obtained by the expression method.

"Is Life Worth

Living?"—Quantitative methods have recent ly been applied to the age-old problem of the relative proportions of pleasure and unpleasure that are encountered in ordinary life.

J. C. Fliigel's observers kept a minute record of their pleasant and unpleasant experiences according to a pre-arranged scale for a period of a month or more—making frequent entries in the course of each day. In every record pleasure predominated over unpleasure, the average percentage of the total time passed pleas antly, indifferently and unpleasantly, being 5o, 28, 22, respectively; there were however considerable individual differences and there were also indications that those who frequently experienced the more intense feelings were on the whole rather more unhappy than those who seldom had intense feelings. As regards the actual na ture and occasions of the mental states accompanied by feelings, the descriptions of the four conditions that rank highest as ac companiments of pleasure were (in order) "interest," "joy and elation," "contentment," "pleasant sensations"; the corresponding order for unpleasure being "unpleasant sensations," "anxiety and worry," "anger and annoyance," "fatigue." Applied Hedonics.—In conclusion we may ask, Has psychol ogy thrown any light on the equally ancient practical problem as to how happiness may best be attained? There is little to say definitely; and indeed psychologists have not as yet ventured sys tematically to attack the problem. We can at best only summarize a few scattered results of speculation and research.

Scientific psychology, to the small extent that it has dealt with such matters, has amply corroborated a few hoary commonplaces, such as that regarding the importance of bodily health (the "un pleasant sensations" that are the. most potent causes of unhappi ness in Flugel's results just quoted are largely due to minor ail ments) and that which asserts that "a pleasure shared is a pleasure intensified, while a pain shared is a pain relieved." It has how ever also revealed the great influence of mind over body (indi gestion may be due to worry or irritation as well as vice versa) and (above all) the necessity of harmonious organization and co operation of the various conative trends. A vast amount of un happiness is caused by the conflict of disharmonious tendencies (particularly those connected with the function of the super-ego, as indicated above), and in the study of how harmonious develop ment can be secured lies the chief promise of psychology for human happiness. For the rest, if the hormic theory is correct, all pleasure lies in the gratification of conation, all unpleasure in its frustration, so that there are at bottom only two methods available; either to increase the satisfaction of our desires, or to reduce these desires themselves. Starting from this foundation we may essay the following very provisional scheme of possible pro cedures in which scheme there is a continuous transition from a negative to a positive attitude as we move from left to right.

A is the method of putting from consciousness, of not think ing about, our desires (either by unconscious "repression" or con scious "suppression"). B is the method (shown most clearly in psychopathology) of attributing those desires to someone else. C is the classical method of pretending the things we desire are worthless, as by dwelling on the unpleasant aspect of these things or by laughing at ourselves for wanting them. D is the useful but sometimes unheroic principle of "take the cash and let the credit go." In the form of "sublimation," however, it plays an essential part in human development. In E the wish is father to the thought ; here the "pleasure principle" reigns supreme, and the distinction between the wish and its fulfilment is abolished. In F the pleasure principle again reigns supreme, but in a strictly re served territory. It is the method of day dreams and (to some extent) of art. In G the "fore-pleasure" takes the form of an imaginary satisfaction in anticipation of gratification in reality. Hence it is connected to H by a dotted line.

With this venturesome effort in classification, which (if it is worth anything) the reader should have no difficulty in filling out in detail, we must bid farewell to this precarious aspect of the subject. The true science of applied hedonics is not yet born.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.-GENERAL-E. B. Titchener, Lectures on the EleBibliography.-GENERAL-E. B. Titchener, Lectures on the Ele- mentary Psychology of Feeling and Attention (19o8) ; A. Wohtgemuth, "On the Feelings and their Neural Correlate, with a consideration of the Nature of Pain." British Journal of Psychology (1917) ; and see PSYCHOLOGY. TECHNICAL INVESTIGATIONS.-A. Wohlgemuth, "Pleasure—Unpleasure," Brit. J. of Psychology, Mon. Sup. II. (191g) ; W. Whately Smith, The Measurement of Emotion, 1922 ; Gerald B. Phelan, Feeling Experience and its Modalities (1925) ; J. C. Flugel "A Quantitative Study of Feeling and Emotion in Everyday Life," Brit. J. of Psychology, xv. p. 318 (1925) ; PHYSIOLOGICAL ASPECTS Walter B. Cannon, Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage (1915) ; Special Theories. W. McDougall, "Pleasure, Pain and Cona B. J. of Psy., xvii. p. 171 (1926) ; Paul Bousfield, Pleasure and Pain (1926) . (J. C. F.)