After the War

AFTER THE WAR The Conference of Paris.—A people battered in a four and a half years' struggle was swept by a wave of optimism. Peace seemed a happy and easy thing. But how different was the reality! The allies had no more foreseen the peace than they had an ticipated the war. The French programme consisted of a vague formula of "restitution, reparation, guarantee." The Fourteen Points (q.v.) put forward by President Wilson were no less vague and were complicated into the bargain. As soon as their common danger was over the Allies returned to a consideration of their national interests; the English were pre-occupied with the sea, the French with their security on the Continent. And so amid the conflict of interests and traditions, the Conference of Paris elaborated a series of treaties which swept away the old Europe.

(See PARIS, CONFERENCE OF, and VERSAILLES, TREATY OF.) Germany was required to restore Alsace-Lorraine to France, and to repair the immense and systematic ruins she had made. As security for the undetermined milliards of these reparations the left bank of the Rhine was to be occupied by the western States until the day when Germany, having reduced her arma ments as directed, should be admitted into the League of Nations, President Wilson's new Holy Alliance. Such were, in its main outlines, the terms of the peace signed on June 29, 1919, in the same Hall of Mirrors at Versailles as had seen the proclamation of the German empire on Jan. 18, 1871. The Treaties of St. Germain, Neuilly and the Trianon (qq.v.) settled the fate of what was left of Austria, Bulgaria and Hungary. Turkey refused the terms of the Treaty of Sevres (q.v.).

And so a multiple peace grew out of a multiple war. It was a mixture of many principles, including those of the balance of power and of nationality, and it left many problems unsettled for the future. It was not a permanent solution, but only one stage of development. The feeling soon arose that the fatality of French history would reappear; that France once more would be forced to pick her difficult way between an England whose sole pre-occupation was the balance of power on the continent now that her sea power was secure ; and a Germany who soon protested against the Treaty of Versailles and whose nature had not changed with her government.

The National Party.

The first essential was to restore to the country its normal political and economic life. Universal suffrage had not been consulted since 1914; the mandate of the existing chamber had expired. The elections of Nov. 1919 were conducted on a basis of proportional representation, and were, moreover, fought on a programme of national republican union and the natural Rhine frontier. The parties of the Left paid for their compromising attitude during the war; the Bolshevik men ace, which had spread from Russia to Germany, secured the victory to the moderates of the Bloc National; the Radicals lost half their seats. But Clemenceau in turn was the victim of the disillusionment caused by the peace : he belonged to the past. Deschanel was chosen president of the Republic when Poincare's term of office expired, for he seemed to be the one man capable of presiding over the organization of peace and the future destiny of the country. For France, terribly wounded, though victorious, the first consideration, as in 1871, was a programme of national reconstruction.

The Millerand Ministry.

The new year opened with a series of strikes, followed by the unhappy Caillaux (q.v.) case. For the first six months of 192o, Millerand, recalled from Alsace to form a ministry, set himself to restore order in the city : order in the streets against the General Confederation of Labour (C.G.T), order in the public services, which were claiming the right of asso ciation and the right to strike, order in the finances by the vote of eight milliards of new taxes. Above all, he strove to extract the best he could from this "treaty, heavy rather with promises than realities." The Allies did not follow him in the interpretation which he put upon it. The American senate threw Wilson over and finally refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, preferring to conclude a separate peace with Germany. The British Cabinet desired to show Germany, a ruined and disarmed enemy, the same leniency which, in 1815, she had shown to France. To lose the fruits of victory or to break the entente—such were the horns of the dilemma upon which Millerand found himself, as had Clemen ceau before him from the end of to the armistice. Every attempt to find a favourable solution, every conference, resulted in the repudiation of some part of the debt to France on the part of Germany ; for she was astute enough to profit by Allied dissen sion. The Treaty of Versailles became a "peau de chagrin." When allied financial solidarity had been broken, recrimina tions were made against the falling exchange and the insufficiency of taxation in exhausted France. When the working classes re plied to the military coup d'etat at Berlin with a general strike, and the Reichswehr entered the Ruhr basin in order to put it down, none of the Allies thought fit to join in Millerand's counter action consisting of the occupation of Frankfurt (April–Aug.). When the Red armies, in April 1920, were threatening Poland, the England of Lloyd George and the United States of Wilson refused to intervene. It was Weygand's army which saved War saw, just as it was Gouraud's which enforced the French mandate in Syria. After the sudden appearance of danger in Poland, the successful action of Millerand resulted in his election to the presidency of the Republic, vacant through the illness of Des chanel (Sept.) .

Leygues and Briand.

Millerand wished to emulate the president of the United States, who, not content to be a figure head, actually governed. He claimed to exercise a kind of higher control over the direction of affairs, and hinted at a change in the constitution of 1875 in this sense. His authority, and the cleverness of Leygues, his president of the council, were necessary to bring to an end numerous difficulties in the grave territorial questions dealing with Upper Silesia, the reunion of Austria to Germany, and the question of disarmament. In the same way his direction was essential in all the incidents arising out of the settlement of reparations, the number of which was increased by the delibera tions of experts, by conferences of Allied ministers, and by the supreme council. After he had re-established a French embassy to the Vatican in the face of Radical and Socialist opposition led by Herriot and Paul Boncour, Leygues fell from power in a new Chamber as a result of the grave deficit in the revenue (Jan. 192I).

Briand, his successor, declared that he would not allow himself to be taken in by "the last struggles of German trickery," that France was tired of going from conference to conference—from deception to deception, and even threatened to seize guarantees. He allowed himself, however, to be drawn into making more and more concessions to the changeable opinions of Lloyd George. The Conference of Cannes followed the CONFERENCE OF LONDON (qq.v.) : (Great Britain), Upper Silesia, the Ruhr, Constantinople, Angora, Feisal, Poland and Russia—all thee were questions re quiring a settlement. It was claimed that some kind of com promise could be made between the victors and the vanquished by the admission of Germany to the deliberations; and Soviet Russia was to be asked to attend a future conference at Geneva. The chambers and public opinion protested, and Millerand re called Briand, and asked for his resignation, although he had not been defeated in parliament (Jan. 1922).

Poincare's Ministry.--Poincare, hostile to

all concessions to Germany, while she refused either to disarm or to pay, was chosen to reform French policy. His policy was founded on re spect for treaties and social order ; in his opinion the Treaty of Versailles, although he might have wished it different, was in violable and he demanded that it should be exactly carried out. After the Genoa conference (q.v.) which, thanks to the Russo German treaty of Rapallo (q.v.) was nothing but another Day of Dupes, after so many experiments which had done nothing but reduce German indebtedness, only one policy, he considered, was lef t--the policy of safeguards. No further reduction of Germany's debt was to be allowed unless the former allies accepted the cancellation of Allied debts, of which they had just demanded payment.

At the end of June Poincare was victorious in the chamber in spite of an entente cordiale between communists, socialists and radical-socialists preparatory to the elections of 1924, and in spite of England. And so when the repeated and deliberate evasions of her engagements by Germany had been attested under the Treaty of Versailles by the Reparations Commission, Franco-Belgian troops occupied Essen (Jan. 11, 1923), and France declared that she would not evacuate either the Ruhr or the left bank of the Rhine so long as Germany refused to fulfil her en gagements. The likelihood was that foreign pressure or a change of feeling at home would weaken this resolution. True to her traditional policy, England several times proposed mediation. France declined, maintaining that she claimed nothing but her due and was not seeking the hegemony of Europe. She refused to allow the war debts of Germany to be put on the same footing as the inter-Allied debts, contracted for the common purpose of winning the war, or to admit a prior claim to the recovery of these inter-Allied debts before the payment of reparations. Hence, faced by the inevitable ruin of German finance and the danger of the collapse of the Reich, Stresemann yielded (Sept. 24).

This was the moment chosen by the congress of French Radical-Socialists to begin an intensive campaign against the Bloc National, in reply to a speech of President Millerand at Evreux, wherein he had restated the vital necessity of unity, if victory was to be achieved. Already many radicals, especially in the south, had joined the socialists in forming the cartel of the Left, with the object of defeating Poincare in the elections of May 1924. In the meanwhile, the signing (Sept. 23) of an agreement between the representatives of the great industries of the Ruhr and the Franco-Belgian authorities, was both a fresh proof of victory and a proposal for peace. But the advent of a labour Government in England stiffened German resistance.

Financial Policy.

The reparations on which France had reckoned had not been paid, and it was doubtful whether they ever would be ; hence she was obliged to rebuild the ruins by her own efforts. The work, far from being finished, had already used up considerable capital which, joined to the enormous war debts and aggravated by paper currency, had attained fabulous figures. Grave financial difficulties soon became a political danger, as the ancien regime and the revolution had shown. Very heavy taxa tion provoked resistance and encouraged demagogy. The too easy expedient of paper currency precipitated the crash. The foreign policy of Poincare was only vulnerable at two points : the sta bility of the franc and the high cost of living. In order to com bat an international attack on the franc, economies and taxes such as had been too much neglected during the war, were now neces sary, and this was a difficult policy for an election programme. On ground so favourable to its electoral hopes the opposition con fronted the Government with obstruction both in and out of parliament, and the Government, as had happened in other war stricken European countries, reinforced its power and substituted a regime of law by decree for the rules of ordinary parliamentary practice (Feb. 1924). The vote of the double decime was a financial Verdun. In ten days the franc rose from 120 to 80. In April, allied unity was reconstructed on the solid basis of the Dawes plan (see REPARATIONS and DAWES PLAN), Which set up over Germany a tutelary council invested with very ex tensive powers.

After the battle of the franc, the electoral battle had to be won. Poincare lost it on May I I, 1924. It was the result of a movement towards the Left at the very moment when the German elec tions of May 4 strengthened the parties of the extreme Right and the extreme Left. This was not entirely the fault of an electoral law mutilated by Radical amendments ; the action of the Government had been weak and vacillating in home politics; neither patriotism nor republicanism was sufficient in itself, and the suffering country listened more readily to those who promised it peace and an end of its difficulties. The cartel of the Left began with a parliamentary coup d'etat: the forced resignation of the president of the Republic, for Millerand was sacrificed to the hatred of the radicals and the socialists (July 1924). They had never forgiven him for the Bloc National of 1919, for his as sumption of increased powers, nor, above all, for the speech at Evreux. However, instead of Millerand, and against Painleve, the candidate of the cartel, Doumergue was elected by a large ma jority. The candidate of the Left for the presidency of the senate, Bienvenu-Martin, was also rejected—a double warning on the part of the senate to the party which for the time possessed the majority in the chamber.

The Herriot Ministry.

The Herriot ministry brought once more to the fore the old Radical programme ; anti-clericalism ex tending to Alsace-Lorraine, the withdrawal of the embassy to the Vatican and the income-tax, together with Socialist demands: the right of trade unionism for State employees, the capital levy and the reduction of military service. The socialists, thanks to their "policy of support," shared in the benefits of office with out its responsibilities. The new government had to face great financial difficulties. From 1924-26 there were no less than seven ministers of finance.

The encashment of bonds, the depletion of bank balances, the flight of capital, the fall of the franc, followed in quick succession. The ministry's record was no better in foreign policy. Having given up the guarantee of the Ruhr in Aug. 1924 at the Con ference of London (q.v.), it did indeed at Geneva, by its valuable initiative, secure the triumph of the principle of arbitration. But the refusal of the British House of Commons to ratify "the protocol" and the German elections of Dec. 7, crowned on April 26 by the election of Hindenburg as president of the Reich, were not balanced by the resumption of relations with Bolshevik Russia.

The ministry of Herriot fell on April i 1, 1925, when it was discovered that the Government had borrowed from the Banque de France a great deal more than it was legally allowed to borrow, and had secretly inflated the currency. On April 11 the order of the day in the senate demanded the re-establishment, "by the union of republicans, of internal peace and national concord." The Painleve Ministry.—The Painleve-Caillaux-Briand min istry came into office after the socialists had once more refused the responsibilities of government through fear of their sup porters joining the Communists. While proclaiming itself a loyal adherent of the radical policy, it had to make concessions to the senate on the subjects of military reform, the capital levy, the embassy to the Vatican and the Alsatian Concordat. Its first consideration was the development of the Protocol of Geneva and financial stability. Although its make-up was Cartellist, its policy was quite different.

The Locarno Conference.—The Painleve ministry adopted a policy of relative conciliation. At Locarno (Oct. i6, 1925) Briand renounced the spirit, though not the letter, of the Treaty of Versailles, and patched up the entente between France and England. At the same time he opened the way to rapprochement with Germany, provided that she remained faithful to her treaties. It was the first step towards a federation of Europe. At home, the Government weakly took part in the Radical and Radical Socialist conference at Nice, at the moment when, amidst the financial distress, the rising of Abd-el-Krim in Morocco, and of the Druses in Syria made it necessary to incur unforeseen expenses. At Nice the suggestion was made that a new Cartel should be formed—a consummation which the Socialists no longer desired. The first victim was Caillaux : rehabilitated on the strength of his financial reputation, he fell because in his financial projects he sinned against radical doctrine; the Painleve cabinet patched up after his fall (Nov. 22, 1925), fell itself shortly afterwards, on a proposal to stop the payment of French Government Treasury Bonds.

After Herriot an inflation of five milliards had to be voted; after Painleve seven and a half milliards. In addition to the double decime which the Cartel was to suppress, a quintuple decime was raised. Meanwhile the cost of living rose higher and higher. In Alsace and Lorraine there arose a movement in favour of autonomy. Briand could not decide between two possible ma jorities; concerned with conciliating the Left, he did all in his power to conciliate the Socialist group. On the other hand, Doumer, his finance minister, broke with the formula of the Cartel and followed an anti-socialist fiscal policy. On March 6, 1926 the ministry fell, being deserted by the Left and the Right.

The Geneva Ministry.—On March 1o, 1926 Briand patched up the "Geneva" ministry, since it was impossible to keep waiting 45 nations assembled to decide upon the admission of Germany to the of Nations. The same ministers, therefore, re appeared, but with a third and different finance minister, Peret. But Malvy's inclusion as minister of the interior did not help in the formation of a new majority, a task rendered yet more dif ficult by by-elections in Paris, in which appeared a new Cartel, including the Communists, and by the speech of Herriot at Chateauroux.

In spite of fresh taxation, the balancing of the budget was as precarious as ever, the problem of stabilization had not yet been faced, and the question of debts owed to the Anglo-Saxon coun tries, in spite of Caillaux's efforts at London and Washington, followed by those of Berenger, had not reached a satisfactory settlement. This was slight material upon which to resume the "battle of the franc," which was beginning again as in 1924. On May 20 it had fallen to i 70 to the pound sterling. The expedient of throwing in the Morgan funds as masse de manoeuvre failed. The struggle was still political rather than financial; the refusal of the Banque de France to pledge its gold reserve without politi cal union in face of the common danger, brought about the fall of the second Briand ministry (June i5, 1926).

On June 23 Briand returned to power, this time with Caillaux as financial dictator, in order to rectify the finances. An isolated interpellation by Herriot, the president of the chamber, and one by L. Marin, president of the Republic-Democratic Union over threw it over the question of the full powers claimed by Caillaux, the financial dictator.

The Ministry of National Union.—The announcement of a possible return of Herriot to power produced a general panic: the franc fell to 24o. The State had only 6o millions in the treasury. The bankruptcy of the Cartel restored Poincare. A ministry of National Union was composed of the leaders of the chief groups in both chambers. It needed the evidence of danger, and the authority of Poincare to effect a truce between the two opposing parties in order to save the national finances, and with them the system of government.

The opposition recruited from Cachin's Communists, Blum's Socialists, and the extreme Left Radical-Socialist group led by Caillaux, was more or less resigned to allowing "the Poincare experiment" to have its way, in the secret hope of seeing it fail, or of profiting, as in 1924, by the unpopularity of fresh taxation and a new economic crisis. At the re-election of the third of the Senate in Jan. 1927, the party forces remained unchanged, despite the small schism of the Radical-Nationalists of Franklin-Bouillon. Nevertheless, Poincare was, at last, able to carry out a logical programme, proceeding from the simple to the composite, and resolved to awaken general confidence in the country and among its allies.

Foreign Policy.—Two years of the Cartel had led foreign States to believe that the Government of the Republic was pre pared to yield on all hands. Germany, after her admission to the League of Nations in Sept. 1926, and the meeting at Thoiry, (Italy) under the expansionist sway of Mussolini, and even Spain, under Primo de Rivera, with a view to Tangiers, had not resisted the temptation to exploit the weakness of France. With regard to Germany, Poincare declared himself ready to adopt a policy of rapprochement without sacrificing French contractual rights, and without withdrawing from an attitude of watchful ness or allowing any doubt to arise as to the responsibility for the war. The reparations question had been settled by the Dawes scheme. He therefore settled the question of disarmament by supporting the suppression of the inter-allied mission of military control on " Jan. 21, 1927, and then signed a Franco-German treaty of commerce on Aug. 17. But he refused the desired evacuation of the Rhineland and a proposal for a revision of the Dawes scheme.

The visit of the president to London in May was a solemn affirmation of the entente with regard not only to the questions of eastern Europe but to the world-wide problems entailed by Bolshevik propaganda. Poincare also helped to strengthen the Little Entente (q.v.) against all attempts to call in question the settlement of territories in the Balkans. Having learnt by experience in 1925 at Washington, he refused to play what he considered the part of dupe at the naval conference at Geneva, for in his eyes disarmament was of necessity dependent on se curity.

Financial Reconstruction.—Thanks to this stability, long a stranger in home politics, financial recovery was carried through by regular steps. The budget was balanced by means of nine milliards of new taxation, and voted twice before Jan. i, 1927. The floating debt was gradually consolidated and the value of money, pending its legal stabilization, stabilized de facto. Hence France gradually settled down on a firm economic basis, and progressed along the path of financial reconstruction. The final step was taken in 1928 by the re-establishment of the gold standard at about one-fifth of pre-war parity. (P. W.) During these years French policy was dominated by the march of events abroad, and by financial problems. Domestic history may conveniently be considered in two periods, divided by the elections of 1936 and the formation of the Popular Front, during the former of which the country was alternately swayed by two political tendencies : the National Union which united under a sin gle moderate leadership all parties except the socialists and com munists ; and the Cartel of the Left, in which radical-socialists and socialists combined under a radical leadership. But the so cialists, having Marxist and internationalist sympathies, were not at one with the radical-socialists, who represented the small bour geoisie and defended private property; and the socialists refused to take part in the Government and to vote the budget.

In 1928 the three outstanding statesmen were the President of the Republic, Gaston Doumergue; Raymond Poincare, premier from July 26, 1926, until the end of July 1929; and Aristide Briand, minister for foreign affairs. The elections of April 27 and 29 gave the moderate parties a majority in the Chamber, and on June 24 Poincare turned his success to advantage by stabilizing the franc at 124.21 to the pound sterling. The Left, however, opposed his policy and seceded from the National Union, and the Congress of the radical-socialist party at Angers called upon their four ministers, who included Herriot and Sarraut, to resign, which they did on November 6. Poincare formed a new cabinet, with a majority of the Centre parties, and on Jan. 11, 1929, obtained a vote of confidence by 317 votes to 253. But on July 27, having to undergo a surgical operation he resigned; and France was thenceforward deprived of the great experience and authority of this great statesman. On March 20, 1929, France paid her last honours to Ferdinand Foch, Marshal of France, Field-Marshal in the British Army, Marshal of Poland, victor of the World War.

Poincare was succeeded as premier by Briand, with an un changed cabinet. From July 1929 until the elections of May 1, 1932, there was a succession of moderate cabinets, in which the radical-socialists declined to participate, which could command only small and precarious majorities in the Chamber and the Senate; the Government's authority was crippled, and its policy was further complicated by the economic crisis of 1929. The Briand cabinet was defeated on October 28 by 288 votes to and President Doumergue called upon Andre Tardieu to form a Government. But Tardieu's remarkable capability was fettered by ministerial instability, and on Feb. 17, 193o his government was defeated by 5 votes. A radical cabinet under Chautemps lasted only one day ; and a second Tardieu cabinet lasted from March 2 until it was defeated in the Senate by 3 votes on De cember 4. A radical cabinet under Steeg held office until Jan. 22, 1931, and was succeeded by a Laval ministry, including Tardieu and Briand, which continued a like policy, uninterrupted by the election on May 13 of Paul Doumer to succeed Doumergue as President of the Republic.

The death in January 1932 of M. Maginot, to whom France's gratitude is due for having built the "Maginot Line," coupled with the unsatisfactory state of Briand's health, compelled Laval to remodel his cabinet; and on Feb. 16 he was defeated in the Senate by 157 votes to 134. Tardieu formed a new government, but not one of National Union, and at once proceeded to pass the budget and prepare for the elections.

Foreign Policy.-The

Briand-Kellogg pact, renouncing and condemning war, was signed on Aug. 27, 1928, by sixteen Powers including Germany. The signatory Powers of the Locarno pact decided to negotiate an arrangement for anticipating the evacua tion of the left bank of the Rhine in consideration of a new settle ment for the payment of reparations. The result was the Young Plan, by which payment was to be made in 59 annuities, the funds were to be administered by a Bank of International Settlements and the problem put on a commercial basis.

Briand remained in charge of foreign affairs until January 1932. He strove to realize an economic and political agreement in Europe ; but Germany seized upon every concession granted her as an excuse for further claims. The slogan of Herr Stresemann and his successors was: Equality of rights, for the destruction of Treaties and the realization of Pan-Germanism. Stresemann used more skilful methods-"finesse" as he terms it in his "Memoires" -but his objects were the same as those pursued by Herr Hitler after 1933. France was not supported in her resistance by the British Government ; at the instance of Mr. MacDonald and the Labour Government she agreed to anticipate the evacuation of the left bank of the Rhine, and on June 3o, 193o, the French troops left Mainz. Germany at once showed that she had no in tention of carrying out the Young Plan. President Hoover's tele gram on June 20, 1931, put an end to reparations; and in January 1932 Germany announced the cessation of payments. The Lau sanne Conference tried to safeguard the principle, but the Presi dent of the United States would not agree to any compensation for debts. He had upset the Young Plan, making no concessions in exchange, despite his promise to M. Laval at Washington in October 1931. On Feb. 2, 1932, the Disarmament Conference opened at Geneva, while Germany grew more and more na tionalist and was secretly rearming. Briand's scheme for European federation was wrecked by British sentiment for national in dividuality and German bad faith. Clemenceau died on Nov. 24, 1929, Marshal Joffre on Jan. 3, 1931, and Briand on March 7, 1932.

1932-36: Radical-Socialist Government.-The elections of May 1 and 8, 1932, gave the extreme Left a majority, the radical socialists and socialists gaining 90 seats. The Cartel policy was resumed; but the socialists consistently refused to join in the government.

Between the two votes, a Russian terrorist named Gorguloff assassinated President Doumer. M. Albert Lebrun, President of the Senate, was elected by 633 votes to succeed him.

M. Herriot formed an entirely radical cabinet which included MM. Daladier, Painleve, Chautemps, Sarraut, de Monzie, etc. But this and its successors were no more durable than the moderate cabinet of the preceding legislature, being alternately swayed by a desire to placate the democratic and socialist elements, and by the necessity of balancing the budget, ordering the national finance, and restoring the country's confidence. The conversion of 5 and 6 per cent government stock into 42 per cent, involving 88 milliard francs, caused a considerable decrease of the national wealth. In the midst of these difficulties, the question of the instalment to be paid to the United States arose. French opinion had been embittered by President Hoover's telegram putting an end to the payment of reparations; and in spite of the premier's exhortations, the Chamber voted to cease payment. M. Herriot resigned on Dec. 14, and successive governments were formed by Paul-Boncour (until Jan. 28, 1933), Daladier (until Oct. 24), Albert Sarraut (until Nov. 24), and Chautemps (until Jan. 28, The Stavisky scandal, with its revelation of the defects of an outworn system, shocked public opinion. The harsh suppression of a demonstration of ex-service men forced the Daladier govern ment to resign; and President Lebrun called upon ex-president Doumergue, who formed a ministry of National Union. The bloodshed of February 6 aggravated the differences between the nation and the parliament. M. Doumergue, supported by Marshal Petain and MM. Herriot, Tardieu, Barthou, Flandin and Pietri, and upheld by public opinion, could have effected the necessary constitutional reforms by decree; but he was concerned first with financial reform (decrees of April 5, 1934), and when he tried to grapple with constitutional problems the parties of the Left ac cused him of pursuing a "fascist" policy. At the congress of Nantes the radical-socialist ministers were urged to resign, and this brought about (Nov. 8) the downfall of the Doumergue government, which had been restorative rather than reformatory. On October 9 France mourned the assassination at Marseilles of King Alexander of Yugoslavia and M. Barthou, on July 27, the death of Marshal Lyautey, and on October 15 that of ex-president Poincare.

M. Flandin, who had not the prestige of M. Doumergue, formed a government with the help of the radical-socialists. Meanwhile the political parties were breaking up, and the communists on one side and the "croix de feu" on the other were organizing. The Government's policy of economy was unpopular with the civil servants, and on May 31, 1935, Flandin was defeated by 353 votes to 202. After a Buisson government had lasted only two days, Pierre Laval formed a cabinet including Herriot, Louis Marin, Leon Berard, Fabry, Pietri and Regnier, pledged to restore financial stability by a series of decrees. To this prudent policy the socialists opposed a plan for raising the purchasing power of money by an increase of salaries and expenditure. At the be ginning of 1936 the radical-socialists, socialists and communists combined to form the "popular assemblage." The radicals, for the third time since 1928, held aloof from the government of concentration, thereby falsifying the parliamentary system whilst the revolutionary elements were active. The Laval cabinet re signed on Jan. 22, and was followed by a Sarraut government supported by the socialists. Domestic policy was increasingly in fluenced by events abroad, and by the preparations for the elec tions.

Foreign Policy.

At Geneva, the Cartel governments had been engaged upon a task of Penelope. They had constantly en deavoured to correlate the granting of "equality of rights" to Ger many, accepted in principle in December 1932, with security based on short-term military service and the supervision of dis armament. After Europe was more than ever troubled by Herr Hitler's policy of Pan-Germanism and the destruction of treaties. In an endeavour to secure the peace of Europe, France sought an understanding with Italy (the Four-Power pact) and a rapprochement with Soviet Russia. By his note of April M. Barthou, in spite of British opposition, established his point that security must be a pre-requisite of the reduction of arma ments, and that this must in no case lead to German rearma ment. The foreign minister visited in succession Prague, Warsaw, Belgrade, and London (July 8-10) . On October 9 he was assas sinated, and M. Laval succeeded him. A settlement of the Saar question was agreed upon by France and Great Britain, acting under the authority of the League of Nations ; and the plebiscite on Jan. resulted in a large majority for the return of the district to Germany. On January 7 M. Laval visited Signor Mussolini in Rome and came to an understanding regarding the points at issue between the two countries. On January 31 he went to London, and his agreement with the British Government was embodied in the "Declaration of London." Germany's declaration of March 16 brought Europe face to face with rearmament. The Stresa agreement (April 11) presented the Reich with a common Anglo-Franco-Italian front in regard to Central Europe. On April 17 the League condemned Germany's rearmament and her violation of treaties. On May 2 M. Laval signed with the U.S.S.R. a pact of mutual assistance within the framework of the League, and later visited Warsaw and Moscow. The Anglo-German agree ment of June 18, permitting Germany a limited naval rearma ment, was a painful surprise to France. The Italo-Abyssinian con flict broke the Stresa front; but it proved the solidarity of the Franco-British entente in the application of sanctions under Article 16 and the settlement of the difficulties which could not fail to emerge from the Ethiopian war.

The successive domestic crises in France, together with the sanctionist embroilment with Italy, led Hitler to believe that he could tear up treaties with impunity; and on March 7 he an nounced that Germany no longer recognized the clauses demili tarizing the left bank of the Rhine and those of the treaty of Locarno which guaranteed peace in the West. M. Sarraut con tented himself with a speech which was as violent in tone as it was empty of effective reality. On that day the victors of 1918 missed their opportunity to check the career of Hitler; on that day, by their inactivity, they made war inevitable. It has been maintained that if the Sarraut government had ordered a mobil ization, Germany would have withdrawn and Hitler would have been forced from power.

In September 1935, in spite of the Anglo-Franco-Italian treaty guaranteeing her independence, Italy invaded Abyssinia; the Stresa front was broken; the League Council decided upon sanc tions against Italy as guilty of aggression against a member of the League, and so brought Italy into opposition against France and Great Britain. The Laval-Hoare proposals, which sought the grounds of conciliation, failed. Germany's action on March 7, the Italian victory in Abyssinia, and the proclamation of the Italian Empire tightened the bonds between France and Great Britain, but also those between Italy and Germany. France and Great Britain realized at last that they were threatened by a common danger and started rearming, without abandoning the hope of a peaceful organization of collective security.

1936-1939: Government of the Popular Front.

The re appearance of war clouds on the horizon coincided with France's adoption of a government of the extreme Left. The memory of February 6, and socialist propaganda in favour of peace and against the policy of financial deflation, led to a socialist and com munist drive. At the elections of April 20 and May 3, 1936, the socialists increased their representation from 1o1 to 148 seats, and the communists from io to 73 ; the radical-socialists, the strongest group since 1898, fell to second place with 108 seats instead of 159; the parties of the Right and Right-Centre kept their positions. This vote marked the eclipse of liberal sentiment and a return to authoritarian tendencies. With the 1936 elections there began a period of financial trouble and difficulty. In con formity with parliamentary procedure, the president of the Re public summoned to office the leader of the socialist party, M. Leon Blum, who on June 4 formed a "popular front" cabinet made up of socialists (MM. Blum, Auriol, Lebas, Spinasse, Salengro, etc.) and radical-socialists (MM. Delbos as foreign minister, Daladier as war minister, Chautemps, etc.), to the ex clusion of the communists. Its policy was not Marxist, but one of social reform acceptable to the "popular front" as a whole. But the "Government of the Masses" was stronger than the con stitutional ministry. Without waiting for a vote by parliament, workers illegally occupied factories and demanded reforms and wage increases dictated by the C.G.T. (Confederation Generale du Travail) and its leader, M. Jouhaux. A wind of revolution blew over France; but M. Blum managed to withstand its pres sure and to apply the agreements of June 7 to employers and employees for the realization of social reforms (holidays with pay, collective contracts, 40-hour week, etc.) .

The Government had promised to stabilize the franc, but it was driven to devaluation. The agreement with Great Britain and the United States for the "alignment of currency," however, forced the Government gradually into a more prudent and mod erate policy (decisions of March 5, and the subsequent loan was a success, if a burdensome one, for the ministry. Na tional economy and policy continued to be disturbed by reforms too hastily effected in an atmosphere of revolution. There was a panic flight of capital from the country; and by December 1936 it was evident that the experiment had not succeeded and that a financial crisis could not be avoided. The purchasing power theory was proved fallacious. On September 15 M. Daladier, minister for war, uttered at Dieppe a warning to his colleagues. The dis order in the factories was interfering with production and the national defence : "Democracy recognizes no sovereignty but that of the law." Disagreement was rife in the Government. The popular front, effective as an electoral formation, could not be the basis for the formation of a Government. The devaluation of the franc, effected on September 28 though ministers had been promised to the contrary, opened a breach between the socialists and the radicals. The radicals in the Senate attacked the Govern ment, saying that a change of policy was needed if the financial position were to be ameliorated; but M. Blum would not agree to this. The rapid rise in prices annulled the possibly beneficial effects of devaluation.

Nevertheless M. Blum declared that "a pause" was necessary; and on March 5 the Government proclaimed, as measures of urgency, the abandonment of exchange control, an exchange equalization fund, and the launching of a loan. The Ministry was at the parting of the ways, with, on the one hand, a steep slope down to the abyss, and on the other hand the difficult path up the hill. They chose the latter; and there was a sudden return to traditional policy and financial sanity. The bill was passed by 470 votes to 46, and the 10 milliards loan was easily covered. The extremist elements of the C.G.T. tried to force the Government back to a revolutionary policy and organized the Clichy riots (March 16, 1937). These, however, had quite the reverse effect : "France," said M. Daladier on March 21, "is resolutely opposed to all dictatorship, whether it be of a man, of a party, or of a class." Public opinion was irritated by the delay to the Paris Exhibition caused by the workers' lack of goodwill: it was pre pared to allow syndicalism its place in the organism of national life, but no more than its place. In his speech on May 7 the premier repelled the advances of the syndicalists and declared himself a supporter of the authority of the employer and the discipline of labour.

The failure of his experiment was to bring about the resigna tion of M. Blum's cabinet. In face of the diminution of gold stocks in the Bank of France to a figure below the 50 milliards considered indispensable for national defence, the finance com mittee of the Senate assumed responsibility for a crisis, and by i88 votes to 72 refused the Government the powers granted them by the Chamber. M. Blum resigned on June 2I, 1937, and was suc ceeded without difficulty by M. Chautemps, who formed a popular front cabinet under radical leadership, with M. Georges Bonnet as finance minister and M. Delbos remaining in charge of foreign affairs. Parliament granted the Government plenary powers to effect financial rehabilitation. The franc was detached from gold and so became a free monetary unit, but the tripartite agree ment remained in force; after a devaluation of 33 per cent nine months earlier, the franc was further devalued by 14 per cent. The situation was made very difficult by the rise in prices which involved an adjustment of salaries, by the expenditure necessary for national defence, the deficit in the trade balance (a milliard francs a month), and the diminution of production. The Cantonal elections in October marked a swing to the parties of order.

The year 1938 was characterized in France by the progressive breaking up of the popular front. The Chautemps cabinet was ill qualified to repair political mistakes without renouncing the gen eral tendencies which had been responsible for these mistakes, and while dependent upon a socialist and communist majority. It resigned on January 14, and was succeeded by a purely radical socialist government, with Chautemps remaining premier and Daladier and Delbos retaining the portfolios for war and foreign affairs. But the socialists and communists refused to support this government, and it resigned on March io. The crisis thus pre cipitated will live in history because it coincided with Hitler's annexation of Austria. The resignation of M. Chautemps, and M. Blum's inability to form a government of National Union, encouraged German audacity. A popular front Blum cabinet lasted only 28 days, the Senate having refused to grant it plenary powers by 214 votes to 47. On April io M. Daladier formed a radical-socialist and radical government with Georges Bonnet as foreign minister; and this government was still in power at the end of 1939 with certain changes (Paul Reynaud as finance minister, Daladier as minister for foreign affairs and for war, and M. Champetier de Ribes as under-secretary of state at the Quai d'Orsay). A new majority was formed which excluded the communists and socialists; and the popular front was ended. The election in Paris of a republican-national Senator indicated the country's desire to rid itself of the communist influence. Finan cial difficulties and the danger from abroad had combined to pro duce this result. "There is only one problem," declared Daladier, "and that problem is the safety of our country." A further devaluation was necessary, and with the consent of Great Britain and the United States the franc was stabilized at 179 to the pound. Thus in two years of popular front govern ment the Poincare franc had lost 56 per cent of its value. Measures were taken to effect an economic revival and to balance the budget, setting aside the enormous expenditure upon national defence.

The failure of the attempted general strike in protest against the decrees of Nov. 3o, 1938, signalled the rout of communism. Domestic policy was increasingly influenced, in a direction favour able to order and work, by the international situation ; and up to the outbreak of war the year 1939 was devoted to retrenchment at home, and especially to financial retrenchment. M. Lebrun was re-elected President by 506 votes out of an electorate of 91o. The national policy was wholly inspired by the moral and ma terial preparation for a war which seemed inevitable. The life of the Chamber was extended for two years, and a "family code" was promulgated, and thus was begun the necessary task of con stitutional reform which, interrupted by the war, would be more than ever indispensable after the war. After the declaration of war the communist party was dissolved and its leaders were arrested on a charge of treason or fled the country. It was a far cry from the popular front of 1936! The Approach of War:--The popular front ministries had shown far more wisdom and prudence in their foreign than in their domestic policy. France's internal difficulties and financial troubles had given rise to the opinion abroad that she was break ing up and that she was in no condition to take action outside her national boundaries; and this emboldened her enemies and dis quieted her friends. The foreign policy of the Blum and Chau temps governments aimed at collective security, collaboration with the League of Nations, and an understanding with Great Britain for the maintenance of peace. The civil war in Spain brought socialist sympathies and the national interest into opposi tion ; but M. Blum and M. Delbos established the principle of non-intervention and of agreement with Great Britain, and the Nyon Conference organized the policing of the seas. Following a visit by Lord Halifax to Germany, MM. Chautemps and Delbos went to London, where they discussed the Sino-Japanese war, German policy in Central Europe, and Italy's policy in the Medi terranean. M. Delbos also visited Warsaw, Bucharest, Belgrade and Prague. On July II, 1937, Cardinal Pacelli, secretary of state to Pius XI, attended the celebrations at Lisieux as papal legate and was given all the honours of an official reception ; for the popular front government avoided an anticlerical policy.

Germany was systematically destroying the Europe of 1919. Her annexation of Austria in March 1938 was made possible by a ministerial crisis in France, and an appeal by France to the Duce to combine with her and Great Britain to save Austria was re fused. The London conversations of April 27-29 proved the close agreement between France and Great Britain in face of Germany's colossal pretensions, and the visit of British ministers to Paris (July 19-22) was an outstanding confirmation of this. The under standing between the two nations was manifested during the Czechoslovak problem: by their visit to Munich M. Daladier and Mr. Chamberlain at least secured a provisional peace, even if they failed to preserve the integrity of Czechoslovakia, and though they were deceived by Hitler. The partial mobilization of September 24 was carried out with calm and resolution. But Czechoslovakia was no longer a political factor, and on December 14 the French military mission left Prague. On November 3o, the day an nounced for the general strike, anti-French demonstrations took place in Italy. On December 17 the Duce denounced the Franco Italian agreement of Jan. 7, ; and the subsequent violent anti-French campaign in Italy resulted in a manifestation of North Africa's loyalty to France on the occasion of M. Daladier's visit to Algeria and Tunis in January 1939. Herr von Ribben trop's visit to Paris, and the declaration (December 6) by which the two Governments bound themselves to use diplomatic means for the settlement of any disputes which might arise between them, were merely a vain attempt to lull the vigilance of France and to detach her from her allies, so that Germany might have a free hand in Eastern Europe.

In 1939 the war rapidly drew nearer. Germany's occupation of Czechoslovakia in March was effected in such conditions that France and Great Britain believed themselves unable to intervene. President Lebrun's visit to London (March 21-23) gave yet further proof that Great Britain and France were united for peace, but also for the defence of European order and of national independence. As the storm clouds gathered, both France and Great Britain reiterated their warnings and made ready for any emergency. The two opposing groups took shape, and after Russia had made her choice Germany decided on war. France and Great Britain, according to their commitments, took up arms when the German troops entered Poland. Thenceforward all France's na tional strength and all her diplomatic activities were concentrated upon achieving victory as quickly as possible. Mobilization was completed in perfect order. The tripartite agreement with Turkey (October 19) set up an eastern barrier against German invasion. Relations improved with Spain, where Marshal Petain was sent as ambassador; with Italy, who did not follow Germany in her policy of aggression, and with Japan, who remained faithful to her anti-communist policy. As events unfolded themselves, the French and British Empires appeared as a rock against which a new barbarism might dash itself to pieces. (R. PIN.)