BATTLE OF LE CATEAU In view of the withdrawal of the whole of the French centre and left wing which Sir John French had been informed was to be continued on Aug. 28, the British C.-in-C. ordered on the evening of the 24th a further retirement of the B.E.F. from the Bavai area to a position on either side of Le Cateau. In order to carry out this movement it was necessary to split the army and send the I. Corps to the east and the II. Corps and cavalry to the west of the great Mormal forest, which lay right across the line of retreat and through which no practicable roads were believed to exist. The I. Corps completed its movement unmolested by the enemy, though not without difficulty and trouble owing to the great heat and the presence of French troops along its allotted route, and went into quarters for the night around Landrecies. Here late in the evening a collision took place with German advance guards, which after some confused fighting were beaten off. On the other flank, however, the II. Corps and the cavalry, who were joined in the afternoon by the 4th Division, just de trained at Le Cateau, had considerable fighting.
The commander of the German I. Army, who had expected the British to stand for battle, realized in the early morning that they were in fact retiring, but concluded as the result of an erroneous air report that the direction of their retreat was not south-westwards but eastwards with a view of seeking shelter under the guns of Maubeuge—a course of action which Sir John French had in fact considered, but on recollection of the fate of Bazaine in similar circumstances in 187o, had rejected. As a consequence of this inaccurate appreciation of the situation, the I. Army column were switched off from their first direction of advance south-westwards towards a new southward direction, and it was not till the afternoon that the error was recognized and the original direction resumed. By that time, as we have seen, the British I. Corps had got a good start of their adversaries; but the II. Corps and cavalry, partly owing to the passage of the French I. Cavalry Corps across their rear to the new position allotted to it on their left, were much delayed in starting their retirement, and the German II. and IV. Corps early got contact with their rear guards; so that the retreat of the British left wing resolved itself into a running fight with a vigorously pursuing enemy. The 4th Division, which had just arrived from England and had taken up a position north of Solesmes, effectively assisted the withdrawal, but the bulk of the troops of the II. Corps were unable to reach the positions allotted to them west of Le Cateau until late that night, and some not even till next morning. The 4th Division and the cavalry were in little better position, the former, which was deficient of many essential units, being unable to fall back from Solesmes to its new positions till long after dark, while the cavalry, being scattered on both flanks of the II. Corps, were much exhausted.
About 9 P.M. Gen. Smith-Dorrien, G.O.C. II. Corps, received orders from British G.H.Q. that the army was not to stand to fight on its present position next day, as expected, but was to continue its retreat to the area Busigny-Beaurevoir-Le Catelet. He now found himself called on to make a critical decision. According to reports from his subordinates, his force could not possibly resume its retreat till well after dawn on the 25th; and as the enemy were, according to information from the cavalry, in force close to his front, to attempt a retirement by daylight and over roads encumbered with transport and refugees would prob ably lead to a disaster. Moreover, the I. Corps was believed to be engaged with the enemy, and the II. Corps, by falling back, would expose its flank and rear. To continue his retirement next day, as ordered, he therefore considered impossible. By standing to fight in conjunction with the 4th Division and the cavalry he might hope to check the hostile advance for a time and utilize the first opportunity to resume his withdrawal before he could be attacked and overwhelmed by greatly superior forces. On this latter course, therefore, Smith-Dorrien eventually decided; and in this decision G.H.Q. concurred. Accordingly, orders were got out for the British left wing to stand for battle, on the heights south of the Le Cateau-Cambrai high road between Le Cateau and Esnes.
The German I. Army halted for the night of the 25th-26th on the general front, cast and south edges of Mormal forest—Soles mes-Bouchain, and its orders for the morrow were to continue the pursuit south-westward so as to cut off the British line of retreat between Cambrai and St. Quentin. About 6 A.M. on the 26th, the 4th Division was suddenly attacked by German cavalry and suffered severely before it could effect its withdrawal to its battle position on the line Ligny-Esnes, and there check the German progress. Meanwhile, on the opposite flank the 5th Division in and west of Le Cateau were as suddenly assailed and forced back to the heights south-west and west of the town. An attempt to get round its right in the Selle valley was, however, foiled with the help of the cavalry on that flank; and with the assistance of troops sent up from corps reserve the British posi tions were maintained intact in this part of the field till noon. The 3rd. Division in the centre had not been seriously attacked. Before long, however, the situation became serious, one fresh German corps, moving west from about Landrecies, was approach ing the field and threatened to envelop the British right; while on the left another which had arrived on the field to support the cavalry, resumed the attack in the sector held by the 4th Division. Under these circumstances Smith-Dorrien, at 1.4o P.M., ordered a general retirement commencing with the right, and as soon as these orders reached the troops, about 3 P.M., the withdrawal commenced. On the 5th Division front considerable difficulties were encountered, and some guns had to be abandoned but the bulk of the troops succeeded in getting away. The 3rd Division had no difficulty in effecting their retreat, and the 4th little more, since the attention of the German II. Corps, which, after driving back French Territorial troops through Cambrai, was preparing to fall on the British left, was distracted by the opportune arrival about Crevecoeur, of the French Cavalry Corps, whose artillery effectively prevented the German attack from developing till the 4th Division had got well away to the south. On the whole front small parties which had not received orders to retire or had received them too late, fought on till finally overwhelmed, and their stubborn resistance prevented any pursuit of the main bodies by the enemy. Marching far into the night despite its intense exhaustion and great congestion and confusion on the various lines of retirement, Smith-Dorrien's command finally halted in the area between Bohain and Le Catelet. It had lost close on 8,000 men and 38 guns, but was still a fighting force. Its escape from the critical position in which it stood on the morning of the battle may be attributed partly to its adversaries' failure to exploit to the fuli their great superiority in numbers and means ; partly to the invaluable help rendered first by the French Territorials and later by their cavalry corps in securing its exposed left flank throughout the day ; but most of all to the fine qualities of its leadership and its own soldierly virtues, which made of Le Cateau an episode more creditable than many a victory.
With the conclusion of the battle the crisis through which the B.E.F. had passed since Mons may be said to have ended. Its retreat was continued on the 27th and 28th unmolested by the German I. Army, which now had to swing westward to deal with a new enemy in the shape of French forces assembling in the Somme valley. The II. Corps, 4th Division, and cavalry moved via St. Quentin and Ham behind the line of the Somme and then behind the Oise, where touch was established with the I. Corps, which, after a series of rear-guard encounters with the right wing of the German II. Army, had successfully effected its retreat by way of Etreux and Guise. Thus, on the 29th, the whole of the B.E.F. stood once more united on the south bank of the Oise be tween La Fere and Noyon, where it was afforded a short respite to reorganize and refit.