BATTLE OF THE ARDENNES On the outbreak of the World War, the French III., IV. and V. Armies concentrated towards the frontier, west of the Meuse. On hearing of the German attack on Liege, Gen. Joffre decided to post the V. Army (Gen. Lanrezac) toward the Sambre and to direct the IV. Army, which he had grouped between Vitry-le Francais and Sainte-Menehould, in the region of Stenay. The concentration, which had scarcely begun on Aug. 8, was nearly finished on the 14th. Until the commander-in-chief had all his forces at hand, the covering troops were not to be drawn into an important action. The German high command had made a similar decision, hence the battle of the Ardennes was the "battle of the two blind men." French Plan of Attack.—The German plan of operations placed the V. Army between Thionville and Tintigny, the IV. between Tintigny and the Meuse de Dinant (the Meuse between Mezieres and Namur), the III. Army between Dinant and the Sambre, the II. on the Sambre, and the I. in the .neighbourhood of Mons. The III. Army was still in the Ardennes behind the IV., and the I. Army was hastening towards Brussels and Antwerp, when on Aug. 22 Joffre decided to attack. It was certainly a strategic success to bring about a battle with all his forces in the Ardennes, while the German III. Army was unable to take part in it. Joffre had disposed his III. and IV. Armies in echelon, the left in front, so that he could face the north or east as he wished. On Aug. 16 he decided to attack towards the north with these two armies massed, while the 7th Cavalry Division reconnoitred to wards Thionville, and the 4th and 9th Cavalry Divisions to the north towards the Meuse. The result was that in front, and almost everywhere, the Army Corps had only weak and insufficient cavalry for reconnoitring purposes.
During the night of Aug. 20-1 the whole mass moved forward. The only instructions given by Joffre were "to attack the enemy wherever met." He estimated that the IV. Army would have almost nothing in front of it, and yet it was precisely there that the Germans had their IV. and III. Armies, the III. being behind the IV. The French Lorraine army, which consisted of groups of reserve divisions, was placed under the command of Gen. Maunoury with orders to defend the Hauts de Meuse, or eventu ally, in the event of the advance of the III. Army, to besiege Metz and Thionville. These reserve divisions were mobilized after the active forces, the men were elderly, they had few officers, and their staffs were inexperienced, so that the III. Army could get little help from them.
On the evening of Aug. 21, after a long period, during which only patrols had been encountered, the III. Army arrived on the line Conz-Lagranville-Tellancourt-Virton. At Virton, the left corps tried to get in touch with the right of the IV. Army. The line continued by Villers-la-Loue, Geronville, Florenville and the Semoy. The IV. Army (De Langle de Cary) was to push on towards the north, while the III. Army was to cover its right against any attack coming from the north or east. Everywhere the advance was made in divisions except one corps, which marched entire on a single road.
On Aug. 22 all the columns started in a fog at a very early hour for a long march with the idea of "attacking the enemy wherever met." To march quickly rather than to take precautions was the order of the day, and almost everywhere the presence of the Germans was only discovered by receiving shell fire. In the III. Army, the V. Corps sent its infantry to the attack without the support of artillery, and it suffered such terrible losses that the leaders became completely unnerved, and Gen. Grossetti, chief of the staff, had to intervene to prevent a precipitate retreat.. In the IV. Army the Colonial Corps exposed a division in column of-route to the German guns. The XVII. Corps also suffered from a sanguinary surprise. But the most serious danger arose on the right wing of the IV. Army, uncovered by the premature check of the IV. Corps at Virton, and on the exposed right wing of the III. Army.
Fortunately, the II. Corps was in a single column, so that the rear division was able to make up for the absence of the IV. Corps. On the right of the III. Army there was a leader, Gen. Hache, who with his heroic division gained the necessary time for the other divisions to fall back. The Germans did not exploit their tactical success but remained practically stationary in their positions. This battle of the Ardennes taught the French the necessity for co-operation of all arms in the field of battle. On Aug. 23, 24 and 25 the two armies retired slowly without being disturbed.
Lorraine Army Dissolved.—On the morning of Aug. 25, the right of the IV. Army retired between the Chiers and the Meuse; the III. Army also approached the Meuse facing eastwards. Thus the two armies practically became one, and it is regrettable that from this time they were not placed under one leader. On the same day, the IV. Corps (III. Army) suffered a severe reverse at Marville and they feared they would lose their corps artillery, but the II. Corps came to their assistance and convoyed this artillery to Stenay, where they crossed the Meuse. This shows how intimate was the co-operation between the two armies. It was on Aug. 25 also that Joffre decided to reinforce the left of the Allied Armies and to lose ground in order to gain the necessary time for his strategic plans. The Lorraine Army was dissolved; one group of divisions was to defend the Hauts-de-Meuse; the 55th and 56th Divisions were entrained for Montdidier. Gen. Maunoury had in these two divisions the nucleus of that VI. Army which determined the victory of the Marne.
On the morning of Aug. 26 the entire IV. Army was on the left bank of the Meuse, with cavalry connecting it with the V. Army. On its right flank it was in immediate contact with the III. Army. So much feared was the envelopment of the III. Army's right, that a cavalry division was sent to the rear to Dombasle, between Verdun and Clermont, as if an extensive enemy movement was expected to take place south of Verdun. The III. Army took no part in the battle of the Meuse.
Defence of the Meuse.—On Aug. 26 the orders ran : "From to-morrow the IV. Army will fight a decisive battle on the Meuse . . . The corps will make every effort to prevent any attempt of the enemy to cross the river." Generally speaking, this army was some distance from the left bank. Its object was to carry out vigorous counter-attacks against German infantry who had passed the river before its artillery could come to its support. The Colonial Corps was somewhat driven back by the Germans, who had crossed at Inor and Pouilly, but the arrival of reinforce ments from the II. Corps soon checked this. The struggle was severe on the whole front. On the right wing the II. Corps had decided successes, three times throwing the Germans back into the river at Cesse and Luzy. On the left wing, the success was still more marked. There the XI. Corps, reinforced by two reserve divisions, gained the battle of La Marf ee. A German division, making the same mistake as did the French at the battle of the Ardennes, advanced in massed formation without artillery support and was crushed.
On the evening of Aug. 27, De Langle de Cary gave the follow ing order : "At all costs the Germans must be thrown back into the river Meuse." However, Aug. 28 was not so active as the previous day; the Germans scarcely attacked at all, and the orders given by Joffre for the coming retirement to the Aisne kept the IV. Army to its ground. On the 29th the retirement towards the Aisne commenced—the battle of the Meuse was ended. The French IV. Army had repulsed the German IV. Army—a victory without a to-morrow, but certainly a victory.
Battle of Signy l'Abbaye.—The French V. Army, having been beaten by the German II. Army on Aug. 22 and 23, had to retreat, leaving a gap 25m. wide between it and the IV. Army. The Germans of Hausen's III. Army poured into this open space. Gen. Dubois was ordered to fill up this gap and to cover the left of the IV. Army, and was given command of the IX. Corps, com posed of the 17th Division, the Moroccan Division, and the 9th Cavalry Division. Two roads led to the region occupied by the Germans at Rethel. The road Mezieres-Rethel was barred by the 17th Division and the 9th Cavalry Division at Guignicourt, the road from Rocroi to Rethel by the Moroccan Division at Signy l'Abbaye and Launois.
On Aug. 28, the 17th Division, hearing the guns from La Marf ee, had its attention drawn in that direction. On the same day, at 3 A.M., the advanced posts of the Moroccan Division were attacked by the XII. (Saxon) Corps. At 11 A.M. the Moroccan Division was turned in the west by the enemy, who seized Signy l'Abbaye and so opened up the way to Rethel. But the Germans did not exploit their success and allowed themselves to be checked at Novion-Porcien. The battle manoeuvres lasted through Aug. 29 and 30. Dubois, by clever movements, brought his forces to the north of Rethel, having thus accomplished his difficult mission. Again German strategy had not made the best use of its superior strength. (V. L. E. C.)