First Battles in Lorraine

FIRST BATTLES IN LORRAINE The first French plan (General Instruction No. 1 of Aug. 8, 1914) was purely offensive. It proposed to seek action with all forces united with the right on the Rhine. The two armies of Lorraine (I. and II.) were to lead, the I. (Gen. Dubail) in the direction of Saarburg, after having thrown back the German VII. Army towards Strasbourg and Lower Alsace, while an isolated corps would make a diversion to the east of the Vosges. The II. Army (Gen. de Castelnau), covering itself from Metz, was to attack in the direction of Saarbruck, pivoting on Dubail's in the neighbourhood of Etangs. The two left corps were to the west of the Moselle, with a view to their eventual employment in the north.

Disposition of Forces.

In front of Dubail's and De Castel nau's armies the Germans had approximately equal strength and VII. Armies) . They would at first keep to the defensive, acting as a pivot to the huge wheel being made by their centre and right. The rapidity of the invasion of Belgium determined the French to hasten the operations in the east in order to make a diversion. On Aug. 13 Dubail's army had two corps on the Meurthe (VIII. and XIII.). Dubail counted besides on the co operation of the two right corps of De Castelnau's army and on that of the XXI. Corps descending from the Vosges on his right. On Aug. 16 the II. Cavalry Corps was placed under his orders. The final concentration of the complete fighting force, however, could not be complete until the i8th. Nevertheless, the XIII. and VIII. Corps moved on the 14th, and on the T 5th entered Cirey Viii. Corps moved on the 14th, and on the T 5th entered Cirey and Blamont, pushing back the I. Bavarian Corps, which retired toward Saarburg.

By the evening of the 17th the two French corps had reached the line Vasperveiller-Aspach-St. Georges, and the XXI. extended the line toward the Vosges. The II. Cavalry Corps had orders to go ahead on the i8th towards Saarburg, which was entered after a skirmish. The XXI. Corps pushed to the north-east as far as Walscheid ; the XIII. held the heights north and east of Saarburg; the VIII., marching on Heming, seized the passage of the Marne-Rhine Canal and entered Saarburg. The II. Cavalry Corps bivouacked toward Diane-Capelle, in liaison with De Castel nau's army, which had reached the line Bisping-Chateau Salins. The Germans held entrenched positions on a front of 4om., from the neighbourhood of Dobbenheim to Biberkirch.

Dubail's Offensive.

It was decided that Dubail's army should attack with its left north-west of Saarburg, its centre and right standing fast to repulse an eventual counter-attack in the Vosges. The II. Cavalry Corps was to move on Saar-Union in order to operate south of the Saar. On Aug. 19 the VIII. Corps commenced the attack before dawn, gained the terrain north west of Saarburg, and repulsed a counter-attack. On the loth it resumed the offensive, but during the morning it became evident that it was incapable of opening a passage for the Cavalry Corps; indeed, it was necessary to bring back a division on the canal with heavy losses. In the centre and on the right the French were more fortunate. The XXI. Corps met no resistance on the 19th, and the XIII. had not yet been engaged.

On Aug. 20, the XXI. Corps, attacked by the German XIV. Corps, inflicted on it a serious check near Walscheid ; the XIII. Corps, coming into line, attacked to the north-east of Saarburg, disengaging the right of the VIII. Corps, which held the town till nightfall. Dubail's intention was to entrench on the front Kerp rich-Soldatenkopf, and to undertake afterwards a methodical ad vance; but the check to De Castelnau's army led Joffre to direct a retreat in Lorraine. On the morning of Aug. 21 Dubail's army retired slowly towards Blamont. Afterwards it was necessary to accelerate the movement on account of the rapidity of De Castel nau's retreat. On the evening of the 23rd, Dubail held a front from Dames-aux-Bois to the Col du Bonhomme. His army had suffered heavy losses, the casualties in the VIII. Corps amounting to more than 5o%.

De Castelnau's Offensive.

The offensive of De Castelnau's army had been still less fortunate. On Aug. 14 the XVI. and XV. Corps moved in the direction of Avricourt, with the bulk of the XX., the remainder covering the front to the north. In the eve ning the army faced to the north-east on the high ground at Gondrexon, the XV. Corps alone having been stopped by the enemy at Moncourt. On the 15th the advance still suffered a brake by the condition of the XV. Corps, which had suffered heavily, but the XVI. and XX. Corps made fair progress. The IX. Corps remained on the Grand Couronne east of Nancy and sent out detachments toward the north-east.

On Aug. 16 the Germans continued their retreat and the French followed' rapidly as far as Morhange, north-west of Donnelay. On the 17th the army was to swing round to the north-west toward Delme-Chateau Salins-Dieuze. The XVI. Corps progressed with out difficulty; the XV. occupied Marsal, but could not bring its main body beyond the Seille; the XX. Corps, in possession of Château Salins, reconnoitred toward the north. Rearguard fights only were expected, but on the 18th the XVI. Corps from the early morning met the enemy in strength. The German artillery held the XV. Corps in the valley of the Seille and prevented it from oc cupying Dieuze. The XVI. Corps had to fall back on Angviller, and only the XX. advanced to the north of Morville-les-Vic and Chateau Salins. In spite of the loss of the IX. Corps, sent to the IV. Army on Aug. 18, De Castelnau ordered for the i9th the continuation of the offensive in the direction of Loudrefing, Bensdorf and Morhange.

Retreat: Aug. 19-20.

From the morning of Aug. 19 the XVI. Corps was stopped on the Salines canal; the XV. could Xvi. Corps was stopped on the Salines canal; the XV. could not pass Zommange and Vergaville ; and only the XX. could make a real advance, pushing a brigade as far as Morhange. The 68th Reserve Division, which had relieved the IX. Corps, in sufficiently covered the left of the XX. Corps. De Castelnau ordered for Aug. 20 a combined attack by the two other corps on the line Cutting–Dommon–Bassing; the XX. was to consolidate its positions, ready to march to the north or north-east. On the loth the corps on the right, instead of progressing, was attacked and even thrown back. The XX., having attacked and not having improved its position, was stopped by De Castelnau, but the Germans, taking the offensive in turn, threw the left back on Chateau Salins. The right followed this movement on Lidrequin and the 68th Division resumed its position of the previous day. At 4 P.M. the general ordered a retirement, which began during the night and continued through Aug. 21 under the protection of the XX. Corps and the 68th Division. In spite of the arrival of two new reserve divisions and the II. Cavalry Corps, De Cas telnau had to retire to the west of the Meurthe, his left to St. Nicholas. To the north, three divisions held the Grand Couronne.

Dubail's Action.

On Aug. 23, Dubail's army commenced a three weeks' battle destined to stop the enemy and aid De Castelnau, who was heavily attacked. To effect this, it took the offensive on the 24th and 25th, while De Castelnau's army threw back the Germans to the north-east. From the 28th to the 31st the Germans held up Dubail's advance, and their VI. and VII. Armies even aimed at forcing "the gap of Charmes," in such a manner as to carry out an enveloping movement to the west of the Vosges. This action was helped by the French XXI. Corps being despatched to take part in the battle of the Marne.

From these circumstances there resulted a series of very con fused fights extending over a large front between the Grand Couronne and the Vosges. On Sept. 6, the German VII. Army, facing Dubail, was broken up, divided between the VI. Army, and the main German right wing was then engaged on the Ourcq against Maunoury. But Dubail's army was also enfeebled by the removal, westwards also, of the XIII. Corps; and at the same time De Castelnau lost the i8th Division and the XV. Corps. Clearly both sides had given up the idea of striking seriously in Lorraine. After having gloriously held its positions to the east of Nancy and on the Meurthe, De Castelnau's Army was itself to be broken up, to be reconstituted on the left of the French armies in the "race to the sea." Thus, after checks resulting from an inopportune offensive, Dubail's and De Castelnau's armies had been first able to stop the German progress, then to throw the enemy back to the fron tier. Moreover, their merit was all the greater as they had been constantly weakened by the withdrawal of their best units. Dur ing the battle of the Marne they provided the unshakable pivot of the vast movement undertaken by the Allies. It was thanks to their efforts that that movement succeeded. But they had paid the price. A single reserve division between Aug. 24 and Sept. 12 lost 14o officers and more than 5,000 men.

See R. Christian-Froge, Morhange et les Marsouins en Lorraine (1916) ; J. B. J. Rimbault, Journal de Campagne d'un officier de ligne (1916) ; M. Barres, Voyages de Lorraine et d'Artois (1916) ; A. Bertrand, La Victoire de Lorraine: Carnet d'un officier de Dragons (1917) ; Y. Dubail, Quatre annees de commandement, vol. i. (192o) ; A. Dubois, Deux ans de commandement, vol. i. (1921). (B. E. P.)