French Revolutionary Wars

FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY WARS (1792-1800), the general name for the first part of the series of French wars which went on continuously, except for some local and temporary cessations of hostilities, from the declaration of war against Brit ain in 1792 to the final overthrow of Bonaparte in 1815. The most important of these cessations—viz., the peace of 18o1–o3— closes the "Revolutionary" and opens the "Napoleonic" era of land warfare, for which see NAPOLEONIC CAMPAIGNS, PENINSU France declared war on Austria on April 20, 1792. But Prussia and other powers had allied themselves with Austria in view of war, and it was against a coalition and not a single power that France found herself pitted, at the moment when the "emigra tion," the ferment of the Revolution, and want of material and of funds had thoroughly disorganized her army. The first engage ments were singularly disgraceful. Near Lille the French soldiers fled at sight of the Austrian outposts, crying "Nous sommes trahis," and murdered their general (April 29). The commanders in-chief of the armies that were formed became one after another "suspects" ; and before a serious action had been fought, the three armies of Rochambeau, Lafayette and Liickner had resolved them selves into two commanded by Dumouriez and Kellermann. Thus the disciplined soldiers of the Allies had apparently good reason to consider the campaign before them a military promenade. On the Rhine, a combined army of Prussians, Austrians, Hessians and emigres under the duke of Brunswick was formed for the invasion of France, flanked by two smaller armies on its right and left, all three being under the supreme command of the king of Prussia. In the Netherlands the Austrians were to besiege Lille, and in the south the Piedmontese also took the field. The first step, taken against Brunswick's advice, was the issue (July 25) of a proclamation which, couched in terms in the last degree offensive to the French nation, generated the spirit that was afterwards to find expression in the "armed nation" of and sealed the fate of Louis. XVI. The duke, who was a model sovereign in his own principality, sympathized with the constitu tional side of the Revolution, while as a soldier he had no con fidence in the success of the enterprise. After completing its preparations in the leisurely manner of the previous generation, his army crossed the French frontier on Aug. 19. Longwy was easily captured; and the Allies slowly marched on to Verdun, which was more indefensible even than Longwy. The command ant, Col. Beaurepaire, shot himself in despair, and the place sur rendered on Sept. 3. Brunswick now began his march on Paris and approached the defiles of the Argonne. But Dumouriez, who had been training his raw troops at Valenciennes in constant small engagements, with the purpose of invading Belgium, now threw himself into the Argonne by a rapid and daring flank march, al most under the eyes of the Prussian advanced guard, and barred the Paris road, summoning Kellermann to his assistance from Metz. The latter moved but slowly, and before he arrived the northern part of the line of defence had been forced. Dumouriez, undaunted, changed front so as to face north, with his right wing on the Argonne and his left stretching towards Chalons, and in this position Kellermann joined him at St. Menehould on Sept. 19.

Valmy.

Brunswick meanwhile had passed the northern de files and had then swung round to cut off Dumouriez from Cha lons. At the moment when the Prussian manoeuvre was nearly completed, Kellermann, commanding in Dumouriez's momentary absence, advanced his left wing and took up a position between St. Menehould and Valmy. The result was the world-renowned cannonade of Valmy (Sept. 20, 1792). Kellermann's infantry, nearly all regulars, stood steady. The French artillery justified its reputation as the best in Europe, and eventually, with no more than a half-hearted infantry attack, the duke broke off the action and retired. This trivial engagement was the turning-point of the campaign and a landmark in the world's history. Ten days later, without firing another shot, the invading army began its retreat. Dumouriez's pursuit was not seriously pressed; he occu pied himself chiefly with a series of subtle and curious negotia tions which, with the general advance of the French troops, brought about the complete withdrawal of the enemy from the soil of France.

Meanwhile, the French forces in the south had driven back the Piedmontese and had conquered Savoy and Nice. Another French success was the daring expedition into Germany made by Custine from Alsace. Custine captured Mainz itself on Oct. 21 and pene trated as far as Frankfurt. In the north the Austrian siege of Lille had completely failed, and Dumouriez now resumed his in terrupted scheme for the invasion of the Netherlands. His for ward movement, made as it was late in the season, surprised the Austrians, and he disposed of enormously superior forces. On Nov. 6 he won the first great victory of the war at Jemappes, near Mons, and, this time advancing boldly, he overran the whole country from Namur to Antwerp within a month.

Such was the prelude of what was called the "Great War" in England and the "Epopee" in France. Before going farther it is necessary to summarize the special features of the French army —in leadership, discipline, tactics, organization and movement— which made these campaigns the archetype of modern warfare.

The French Army 1792-1796.

At the outbreak of the Revo lution, the French army, like other armies in Europe, was a "voluntary" long-service army, augmented to some extent in war by drafts of militia. One of the first problems that the Constitu ent Assembly took upon itself to solve was the nationalization of this strictly royal and professional force, and as early as October 1789, the word "conscription" was heard in its debates. But it was decreed, nevertheless, that free enlistment alone befitted a free people, and the regular army was left unaltered in form. However, a national guard came into existence side by side with it, and the history of French army organization in the next few years is the history of the fusion of these two elements. The first step, as regards the regular army, was the abolition of proprietary rights, the serial numbering of regiments throughout the army, and the disbandment of the Maison du roi. The next was the pro motion of deserving soldiers to fill the numerous vacancies caused by the emigration. Along with these, however, there came to the surface many incompetent leaders, favourites in the political clubs of Paris, etc., and the old strict discipline became impossi ble owing to the frequent intervention of the civil authorities in matters affecting it, the denunciation of generals, and especially the wild words and wild behaviour of "Volunteer" (embodied national guard) battalions.

When war came, it was soon found that the regulars had fallen too low in numbers and that the national guard demanded too high pay, to admit of developing the expected field strength. Arms, discipline, training alike were wanting to the new levies, and the repulse of Brunswick was effected by manoeuvring and fighting on the old lines and chiefly with the old army. The cry of "La patrie en danger," after giving, at the crisis, the highest moral support to the troops in the front, dwindled away after victory, and the French Government contented itself with the half-measures that had, apparently, sufficed to avert the peril. More, when the armies went into winter quarters, the volunteers claimed leave of absence and went home. But in the spring of confronted by a far more serious peril, the Government took strong measures. Universal liability was asserted, and passed into law. Yet even now whole classes obtained exemption and the right of substitution as usual forced the burden of service on the poorer classes, so that of the 1 oo,000 men called on for the regular army and 200,000 for the volunteers, only 18o,000 men were actually raised. Desertion, quite usually regarded as the curse of professional armies, became a conspicuous vice of the defenders of the Republic, except at moments when a supreme crisis called forth supreme devotion.

Amalgamation and Universal Service.

While this un satisfactory general levy was being made, defeats, defections and invasion in earnest came in rapid succession, and to deal with the almost desperate emergency, the ruthless Committee of Pub lic Safety sprang into existence. "The levy is to be universal. Un married citizens and widowers without children of ages from i8 to 25 are to be called up first," and 450,000 recruits were imme diately obtained by this single act. The complete amalgamation of the regular and volunteer units was decided upon. The white uniforms of the line gave place to the blue of the national guard in all arms and services. The titles of officers were changed, and in fact every relic of the old regime, save the inherited solidity of the old regular battalions, was swept away. This rough com bination of line and volunteers, therefore—for the "Amalgam" was not officially begun until 1794—must be understood when we refer to the French army of Hondschoote or of Wattignies. It contained, by reason of its universality and also because men were better off in the army than out of it—if they stayed at home they went in daily fear of denunciation and the guillotine— the best elements of the French nation. To some extent the polit ical arrivistes had been weeded out, and though the informer, here as elsewhere, struck unseen blows, the mass of the army gradually evolved its true leaders and obeyed them. It was, therefore, an army of individual citizen-soldiers of the best type, welded by the enemy's fire, and conscious of its own solidarity in the midst of the revolutionary chaos. After the system underwent but little radical change until the end of the Revolu tionary period. Its regiments grew in military value month by month and attained their highest level in the great campaign of 1796. In 1795 the French forces (now all styled national guard) consisted of 531,00o men, of whom 323,00o were infantry (loo 3-battalion demi-brigades), 97,000 light infantry (3o .demi-bri gades), 29,000 artillery, 20,000 engineers and 59,000 cavalry. This novel army developed novel fighting methods, above all in the infantry. This arm had just received a new drill-book, as the result of a long controversy (see INFANTRY) between the advo cates of "lines" and "columns," and this drill-book, while retain ing the principle of the line, set controversy at rest by admitting battalion columns of attack, and movements at the "quick" (100 120 paces to the minute) instead of at the "slow" march (76). On these two prescriptions, ignoring the rest, the practical troop leaders built up the new tactics little by little, and almost un consciously.

Tactics.—The earlier battles were fought more or less accord ing to the drill-book, partly in line for fire action, partly in col umn for the bayonet attack. But line movements required the most accurate drill, and what was attainable after years of prac tice with regulars moving at the slow march was wholly impossi ble for new levies moving at 120 paces to the minute. When, therefore, the line marched off, it broke up into a shapeless swarm of individual firers. This was the form, if form it can be called, of the tactics of 1793—"horde-tactics" as they have quite justly been called—and a few such experiences as that of Hondschoote sufficed to suggest the need of a remedy. This was found in keeping as many troops as possible out of the firing line. In other words, the bravest and coolest marksmen were let loose to do what damage they could, and the rest, massed in close order, were kept under the control of their officers and only ex posed to the dissolving influence of the fight when the moment arrived to deliver, whether by fire or by shock, the decisive blow.

The cavalry underwent little change in its organization and tactics, which remained as in the drill-books founded on Freder ick's practice. But except in the case of the hussars, who were chiefly Alsatians, it was thoroughly disorganized by the emigra tion or execution of the nobles who had officered it, and for long it was incapable of facing the hostile squadrons in the open.

In artillery matters, this period, 1792-96, marks an important progress, due above all to Gribeauval (q.v.) and the two du Teils, Jean Pierre (1722-94) and Jean (1733-1820), who were Bona parte's instructors. The change was chiefly in organization and equipment—the great tactical development of the arm was not to come until the time of the Grande Armee—and may be sum marized as the transition from battalion guns and reserve artillery to batteries of "horse and field." The engineers, like the artillery, were a technical and non noble corps. They escaped, therefore, most of the troubles of the Revolution—indeed, the artillery and engineer officers, Bonaparte and Carnot amongst them, were conspicuous in the political re generation of France—and the engineers carried on with little change the traditions of Vauban and Cormontaigne (see FORTIFI CATION AND SIEGECRAFT). Both these corps were, after the Rev olution as before it, the best in Europe, other armies admitting their superiority and following their precepts.

In all this the army naturally outgrew its old "linear" organ ization. Temporary divisions, called for by momentary neces sities, placed under selected generals and released from the de tailed supervision of the commander-in-chief, soon became, though in an irregular and haphazard fashion, permanent organisms, and by 1796 the divisional system had become practically universal. The next step, as the armies became fewer and larger, was the temporary grouping of divisions; this, too, in turn became per manent as the army corps.

New System of War.

This subdivision of forces was inti mately connected with the general method of making war adopted by the "New French," as their enemies called them. What as tonished the Allies most of all was the number and the velocity of the Republicans. These improvised armies had, in fact, nothing to delay them. Tents were unprocurable for want of money, un transportable for want of the enormous number of wagons that would have been required, and also unnecessary, for the discom fort that would have caused wholesale desertion in professional armies was cheerfully borne by the men of 1793-94. Supplies for armies of then unheard-of size could not be carried in con voys, and the French soon became familiar with "living on the country." Thus 1793 saw the birth of a new system of war— rapidity of movement, full development of national strength, biv ouacs and requisitions, and force, as against cautious manoeuv ring, small professional armies, tents and full rations, and chi cane. The first represented the decision-compelling spirit, the second the spirit of risking a little to gain a little. Above all the decision-compelling spirit was reinforced by the presence of the emissaries of the Committee of Public Safety, the "representatives on mission" who practically controlled the guillotine. There were civil officials with the armies of the Allies too, but their chief function was not to infuse desperate energy into the mili tary operations, but to see that the troops did not maltreat civil ians. Such were the fundamental principles of the "New French" method of warfare, but it only reached maturity after a painful period of trial and error.