Question

QUESTION) .

War of the Austrian Succession.

France had become once again the arbiter of Europe when, in 1740, the unexpected death of the emperor opened a new period of war and misfortune for Europe and for the pacific Fleury. The whole of Europe had signed the Pragmatic Sanction (q.v.) which assured to Maria Theresa the succession to Charles VI. ; but his death was followed by an almost general renunciation and an attempt to partition his inheritance. Maria's most dangerous rival was Frederick II. of Prussia, a stark realist, who was resolved to unite the scattered portions of his dominions, and to secure for himself the hegemony in northern Germany. Silesia was Brandenburg's shield against Austria; and, without making a formal declaration of war, Frederick seized it after the victory of Mollwitz (April 1741) . Seeing that Austria was no longer dangerous Fleury's inclination was not to misuse France's traditional policy by exaggeration, but to respect his sworn word. He dared not press his opinion, however, and yielded to the anti-Austrian party of the two Belle Isles—who were sick of peace, infatuated by Frederick II., and supported by the belli cose mistresses of Louis. This party brought about the League of Nymphenbourg between France, Spain, Prussia, Bavaria and Sax ony for the dismemberment of the Austrian empire (1741) . Fleury lived to witness the frequent treasons of Frederick II. in his own interests; the precipitate retreat of Belle Isle from Bohemia, the humiliation of France before Austria, and her isolation in Europe. The hour had come for the old Nestor, fallen into his second child hood, to depart (Jan. 1743).

The Personal Government of Louis XV., 1743-74.—Thus at the age of 33 years Louis became his own first minister and governed for himself : but nothing had prepared him for his royal task. Orphaned at the age of two, schooled in arrogance by his early tutors, ignored by Fleury in the administration because of his frail health, Louis grew to manhood in the midst of a dissolute court ; indolent and egoistic he thought only of avoiding the boredom of business, of etiquette and of his neglected queen by hunting, supper-parties and spicy indiscretions. Thus he sank into sensuality and into the hands of favourites. His mistress, the duchess de Chateauroux, did indeed endeavour to arouse him to action, but she disappeared at the moment of her triumph. There followed the insolent tyranny of the little bourgeoise the Pompa dour, and for almost 20 years her whims and caprices ruled the realm (1i45-64). A prime minister in petticoats, she established her own political system, upset the time-honoured alliances of France, made and unmade ministers, commanded the army and navy, concluded treaties, and miscarried in all her enterprises. She was the queen of fashion in a society where corruption bloomed luxuriantly and exquisitely, and in a century of wit, hers was second to none. In the midst of this extraordinary instability, the mistress alone ruled on; in a reign of all-pervading satiety and tedium she managed to remain indispensable and bewitching to the day of her death. France had in truth no real interest at stake in the war of the Austrian Succession ; and when, in the attempt to make a stage-emperor of the elector of Bavaria she was defeated at Dettingen by the English and Hanoverians and driven back upon the Rhine (17 43 ), it was realized that the policy of waging war in Germany was mistaken, for the true soul of the coalition had always been England, and the attack must be made where England was most vulnerable—in Flanders. The victories of the marshal de Saxe, another brilliant adventurer, at Fontenoy, Rau coux and Lawfeld, were hailed with joy as continuing those of Louis XIV. The "disinterested" peace of Aix-la-Chapelle (Oct. 1748) had no effectual result except to destroy in Germany, and to the advantage of Prussia, a balance of power which was not yet secured in Italy, despite the establishment of the Spanish prince, Philip, at Parma (see AIX-LA-CHAPELLE, CONGRESS OF).

In this war France had fallen into the Continental snare laid for her by England in order to distract her from India (where Dupleix was founding an empire with a handful of men) ; and for the sake of conquering Silesia for the king of Prussia, Canada had been left exposed by the capture of Cape Breton. She was now to lose both India and Canada for the sake of restoring this same Silesia to Maria Theresa.

The Seven Years' War, and Secret Policy.

In '755 England suddenly attacked France at sea, and Frederick II. by a fresh volte-face passed over to the English alliance. Thereupon Louis XV. allied himself with Maria Theresa in the Treaties of Ver sailles, by which he received the promise of the extension of the French frontier to the south of the Austrian Netherlands (1756 58). Instead of remaining on the defensive in this continental war, to which he was no more than an accessory, Louis sought to play the chief part, and permitted himself to be governed by three women—Maria Theresa, Elizabeth of Russia, and the Pompa dour. Out of this reversal of the alliances sprang the Prussian and English empires. In three battles, three victories for the enemies of France, Rosbach (1757), Plassey (1757), Quebec thanks to the recall of Dupleix who was not returning large enough dividends to the Compagnie des Indes, and to the abandonment of Montcalm who could not interest anybody in "a few acres of snow"—Silesia was finally acquired by Frederick II., and Canada by William Pitt, who adopted also as his own the French plan for the conquest of India.

The Treaties of Paris and Hubertusburg (1763) once more re vealed the fact that the French, though superb in their concep tions, were deficient in action; moreover, Choiseul, secretary of State for foreign affairs since 1758, created out of this deceptive Austrian alliance a system which set the finishing touch to disaster. After losing everything to satisfy the hatred of Maria Theresa for Frederick II., he witnessed at Neisse and Neustadt (1769-70) the reconciliation of these two irreconcilable Germans at the expense of Poland—one of the oldest adherents of France. The tardy de vice of the Family Compact, concluded with Spain in 1761 with a view to striking at England whose fleets were threatening the French coasts, served only to involve Spain in the disaster. Choi seul who had, at least, a policy that was sometimes right, and who strove to realize it, saw clearly that the real struggle was with England; hence he devoted all his energies from 1763-66 to the development of the navy, and, as a compensation for the loss of the colonies, annexed Lorraine (1766), while by the acquisition of Corsica (1768) he gave France a base in the Mediterranean mid way between a friendly Spain and Italy, which might one day be a stepping-stone to Africa.

But Louis XV. had two policies. The efforts he made to repair, by the secret diplomacy of the Comte de Broglie, the evils wrought by his official policy, served only to aggravate his mistakes and to betray his weakness. The contradictory intrigues of the king's secret diplomacy in the candidature to the Polish throne of Prince Xavier, the brother of the Dauphin, and the patriotic efforts of the Confederation of Bar, helped to provoke the Polish crisis, which was concluded in Frederick II.'s favour by the partition of 1772. The Turks, in their turn, were involved in the same dis aster. Of the old allies of France, Choiseul retained at any rate Sweden by means of the coup d'etat of Gustavus III. (1772), but instead of being, as heretofore, the arbiter of European destinies Versailles lost all its credit, and only exhibited to a contemptuous Europe the extremity of its decadence.

Home Government of Louis XV.

These defeats and humili ations aroused further resentment in an already discontented nation, as the want of cohesion in the Government and anarchy in the central authority became more and more intolerable in home affairs. In the absence of a royal and directing hand, the king's mistresses were unable, of themselves, to animate the administra tion. Since the days of Fleury a public opinion had gradually grown up in the salons and cafés of Paris which became daily more embittered. It found more and more open expression among the writers, who loudly demanded reforms, and in the political oppo sition of the members of the parlements, the frequenters of the salons of Mesdames d'Epinay, Geoffrin, and Du Deffand, talk was translated into action. The Government undoubtedly still pos sessed traditions and civil servants of capacity who were able to protect it against the ruinous influence of the courtiers; but it was impossible to achieve reforms without affecting private interests or suppressing privileges. Thus in the absence of a firm royal power, the Government was confronted by a universal opposition, at once from the religious party and from Madame de Pompadour, who leaned for support upon the parlernent, the Gallicans, the Jansenists and the philosophers. Apart from the court, the armies, fleets and wars cost a great deal of money. But nobody was will ing to sacrifice fiscal immunity—least of all the Parlementaires. Hence, as in foreign policy, so in home affairs, it was the oppo sition that held to the past and the Government that fought for reform. In reality the Government, far from being absolute, was held in check by the parlements whose resistance paralyzed the administration.

Restored to their political activity the parlements refused to ap prove the plan of Machault d'Arnouville, which insisted on the right of taxation without respect of persons and arranged for the liquidation of the public debt by a tax of a twentieth ; and the clergy for their part were no less selfish. Louis XV. sacrificed his minister to the clamour of the privileged classes (17J4). The parlements intervened also, and with equal vigour, in the dispute that arose regarding the papal Bull Unigenitus and in the question of the Billets de confession. The general confusion was further aggravated by the fact that the parlements, which sympathized with the Jansenists, had the support of the Philosophers and of the sceptical Encyclopaedists. Two facts served to reveal the breach between the nation and the king : since 1750 the marquis d'Argen son had prophesied a revolution and Damiens, in 1757, had at tempted to assassinate Louis, the Well-beloved.

After the Seven Years' War, the necessary reorganization of the army and navy, with a view to a fresh war with England, pro claimed the need of money. Choiseul had to appeal to the parlements. He thought that he would win them and the Encyclo paedists by obtaining Louis XV.'s consent to the expulsion of the Jesuits (1764) . But the opposition to taxation steadily increased and became particularly violent in Brittany, where the estates, at tached to their privileges, were supported by the parlements of Rennes and of Paris from 1766 to 1770. Choiseul fell in his turn in face of the coalition of the new mistress, Madame du Barry, the Abbe Terray, and the Chancellor Maupeou.

The Triumvirate, 1771-74.

The fall of Choiseul was fol lowed by a coup d'etat on the part of Maupeou, who gave Louis XV. to understand that in the opposition of the parlements lay a danger to the monarchy. Ambitious and energetic, Maupeou suppressed the parlements and set up in their stead superior councils of magistrates nominated by the king. The Philosophers supported this bold policy; and it was justified by the religious intolerance of the parlements, the scandalous trials of Calas, Sirven, the cheva lier de la Barre, and Lally-Tollendal, and their selfishness in perpetuating abuses profitable to them. The Abbe Terray began to reform the abuses of revenues and pensions, to organize the famous vingtiemes which had aroused so great a storm, and to create an equitable system of taxation similar to the contribution rnobiliere subsequently set up by the Constituent Assembly, but in spite of it remained as unpopular as every other minister of finance.

A general unrest manifested itself throughout the nation, al though no one sought to destroy either absolute power or the traditional constitution. The Philosophers, like Voltaire, and the Physiocrats sought to utilize the king's autocratic power to ac complish the necessary work of reform. Montesquieu raised his voice in-praise of constitutional and benevolent despotism; and if Rousseau put forward the theory of the "social contract" and a popular sovereignty, he did not pretend that it was applicable in territories of a greater size than Geneva. These new ideas had only reached the educated classes, and formed a piquant subject of discussion among the frequenters of fashionable salons who, however, had no desire to be martyred for their beliefs. The in telligent, ambitious and wealthy bourgeoisie composed of farm ers-general army contractors, financiers, business men and manu facturers, aimed only at securing themselves against the arbitrary action of royalty and bureaucracy. In the face of the extrava gant anarchy of the Government, they were no longer safe from bankruptcy. The peasants, whom the acquisition of had gradually enfranchised, were, above all, eager to enjoy their new wealth. So that to Louis XV.'s cynical and despairing declaration "Apres moi, le deluge," the setting 18th century responded by a belief in progress and an appeal to the future.

Louis XVI., 1774-92.

This persistent loyalty to the Crown and this hope of reform affords an explanation of the confidence ex pressed anew by the nation in the 20-year old Louis XVI. He was popular on account of his virtuous private life and his good nature: but to be a large eater, like all the Bourbons, a great hunter, and a clever locksmith, was not also to grasp and be able to exercise authority. Louis was full of good intentions and con fused ideas. Love of tradition and the old constitution of the kingdom were united in his vacillating personality with a real desire for the public good and a wish to carry through reforms, even though he lacked the necessary force of character to put his desire into action. Since 177o there lived in his company rather than at his side the Archduchess Marie Antoinette of Austria. She was one of the most beautiful and lively women at Versailles, passionately devoted to pleasure and luxury, delighting to free herself from the formalities of court life, lovable and loving with out ceasing to be virtuous. But when, later on, less clever than her mother, she sought to play the part of a Queen-regnant, she gave the rein to her likes and dislikes, and very quickly afforded Beaumarchais a terrible illustration for his Basile. Private jeal ousies and public impostures soon crystallized her tremendous un popularity in the sinister nickname of "l'Autrichienne." Neither Louis XVI. nor Marie Antoinette was capable of reconciling the nation with the throne, nor of taking the leadership in Europe; their reign was but a tissue of contradictions. External affairs ap peared even less hopeful than those at home ; desirous of restoring to her position in Europe a France that had been humiliated by the Treaty of Paris and the partition of Poland, Vergennes re solved to free her from the maritime supremacy of England and to throw off the yoke of Austria. The opportunity came when, in 1776, the English colonies in America rose in revolt. Vergennes desired French intervention; but Louis XVI., yielding to the finan cial objections of Turgot, hesitated, while countenancing the as sistance given to the Americans by volunteers under La Fayette, until after the capitulation of Saratoga (1778). In order to fight against England, France needed to have her hands free on the continent. Vergennes assumed the role of arbiter of Europe. When the Emperor Joseph II., unable to forget the triumphs of Fred erick the Great, wished to compensate himself for the loss of Silesia by the acquisition of Bavaria, Vergennes prevented him by the Treaty of Teschen (1779), thus preserving peace in Europe. Vergennes earned the gratitude of all peoples weary of the naval tyranny of England by the Franco-Spanish-Dutch alliance (17So) and, after the capitulation of Yorktown, by the Treaty of Ver sailles (1783) which crowned his efforts with formal success. Henceforth, partly from want of money and partly from his own natural caution, Vergennes contented himself with maintaining the status quo—a difficult ideal in the face of the desire of Cath erine II. and Joseph II. to partition the Ottoman empire; he sought to crown his work by effecting a reconciliation between France and England in the commercial treaty of 1786, and when he died in 1787 his plans had been realized. But his work was quickly destroyed by the very means taken to ensure its success: his American war had but hastened the "hideous bankruptcy." The Home Government of Louis XVI.—From the outset of his reign Louis XVI. displayed in home affairs the indecision that was to cost him his throne. In an extreme of inconsistency, and in order to please public opinion, he restored the parlements—the merciless enemies of reform—at the very moment when he sum moned the reformers to his Council. Of these Turgot was the most remarkable; Physiocrat and contributor to the Encyclo paedia, he wished to extend to the whole of France that experi ment in liberty which had already succeeded on a small scale in the government of his own province of Limousin. He ordained the free circulation of grain throughout the kingdom despite the flour war (la guerre des farines) aroused by the prejudices of those who saw in this measure a new "paste de famine." For the corvee which had taken away the peasants from their work in order to build roads, he substituted a territorial levy, payable by all land owners ; and he established freedom of commerce and industry by abolishing the privileged trade corporations (1776). He offered himself to Louis XVI. as a minister of economies: there were to be no new loans and no new taxes. But time failed him. He had been 13 years at Limoges; he was a minister for only two years. The two supports on which he had a right to count failed him simultaneously : public opinion that clamoured for reforms on condition of not paying the cost, and the king who was too weak to put down abuses or to refuse privileges. The parlement was induced to register his edicts only by force; the court, the clergy, the financiers—one and all joined in maligning him ; and when, in order to decentralize the too centralized administration, he pro posed to set up consultative bodies of landowners in each parish, town and province, Louis XVI. sacrificed him to the intrigues of Maurepas and to the American ambitions of Vergennes (5776).

Necker, the Genevan banker and Protestant, succeeded him. He abolished the Turgot edicts and then, either because he dared not or could not attack the evil at the root, proposed, like Law, a marvellous remedy: an unlimited loan. He succeeded in fi nancing the American war, but at a grave charge upon the future. His administrative work showed no greater signs of originality, and borrowed largely from the ideas of Turgot. He transformed the municipal bodies set up by Turgot into provincial assemblies, heirs of the parlements and the intendants, and immediately they assembled they revealed themselves to be inspired with a ref orm ing spirit—while opposition on the part of the privileged classes broke out again. Necker replied with his famous compte-rendu, showing that the monarchy rewarded the idleness of the courtiers far better than it had ever rewarded the zeal of its servants; but in 1781 he in his turn was overthrown by the reaction which he had helped to promote in attacking Turgot. To the reforming ministers succeeded ministers who were courtiers only. The Mar quis de Segur removed from the army all officers of low birth, while the nobles displayed a fierce energy in enforcing their seignorial rights ; the Church reasserted more strongly than ever its sovereign right to control the civil estate of all Frenchmen; but the reaction was not able to fill the empty coffers of the State, and in two years, two ministers, Joly de Fleury and d'Ormesson, were discarded. Calonne, a business man, a veri table Cagliostro of finance, succeeded. Madly extravagant, he feigned an optimism which nourished the confidence necessary to ensure the success of his perpetual loans ; but, like his predeces sors, he experienced the enmity of the parlements. After two years of combat, realizing that Louis XVI. would never consent to a repetition of the coup d'etat of 1771, he sought the support of a national suffrage ; and it was on his advice that the king summoned an assembly of notables, thus exposing the monarchy at a time when it was already compromised by the affair of the Diamond Necklace (q.v.).

Lomenie de Brienne, who succeeded Calonne in 1787, was no more successful. The notables referred him to the representa tives of the people, to the States-General. But Brienne, remem bering Etienne Marcel and the League, preferred to present to the parlements his edicts for a stamp duty and a territorial sub sidy. He met with the same refusal, and was referred again to the States-General. Against his own wishes, Louis XVI., by his declaration of Nov. 19, 1787, was forced into open warfare with the parlements which he had re-established—a battle in which the king was to be the loser, for the royal Government was too exhausted to overthrow even a decaying power like that of the parlements.