The Battle of Charleroi

THE BATTLE OF CHARLEROI (a) Aug. 21.—During the list the I. German Army con tinued its south-westerly advance and the III. Army closed up to a line a few miles east of the Meuse. Billow's orders for the were that the II. Army on the 2i st would continue its advance to the Sambre, but as the III. Army was not yet in position, it was agreed between the two commanders that the combined attack by the two armies against the enemy south-west of Namur should not take place until the 23rd. The right wing of the II. Army reached the line of the Canal du Centre west of Gosselies, driving back the French cavalry, while the left began operations against the eastern forts of Namur. The centre, how ever, early in the afternoon came into contact with the right of the French V. Army on the line of the Sambre and forced its way across the river. Thus on the evening of the 21st the German II.

Army secured the crossings both of the Canal du Centre and of the Sambre, and was in position ready to carry out its part in the combined attack arranged with the III. Army for the 23rd.

The French right on this evening had taken up a new de fensive position running from Fosse to Marchienne au Pont. The left was approaching Thuin, with the cavalry covering its western flank. Of the group of three reserve divisions which had de trained around Vervins, one was on its way to relieve the I. Corps, still guarding the army right on the Meuse south of Namur; the other two were moving north and had reached Avesnes. In these positions Lanrezac decided to await further hostile attacks on the morrow.

(b) Aug. 22.

Billow's orders for the 22nd envisaged nothing more than a general closing up of the II. Army on the north bank of the Sambre and preparations for an advance across that river on the 23rd, so as to open the passage of the Meuse for the III. Army. The I. Army was directed to close up to a position whence it could support the right of the II. Army. News which arrived at II. Army H.Q. in the course of the morning, however, caused a radical change of plan ; it appeared from this that the French immediately south of the Sambre were chiefly cavalry and that their main forces were no farther north than the line Beaumont Philippeville. Billow, faced with the alternative of throwing overboard his pre-arranged scheme of co-operation with the I. and III. Armies, or of losing so apparently favourable a chance of securing the passage of the Sambre at little cost, decided about noon to attack forthwith. Orders were accordingly issued to all corps; the III. Army was asked also to push forward.

The right of the II. German Army encountered no very serious opposition, and by the evening, had succeeded in setting foot on the right bank of the river. In the centre, however, the struggle was much more severe. In the early morning the French right wing launched a series of counter attacks in the hope of regain ing the ground lost on the list; these met with only partial success, and were finally beaten back with heavy loss. A stand was made on the line Fosse-Gerpinnes ; where for some hours the fight swayed to and fro without any decided success on either side. Finally, however, the Germans succeeded in breaking into the positions held by the French, who were driven back once more to the line St. Gerard-Nalinnes, where they reorganized and prepared for a new defence on the morrow. Their left wing was not seriously attacked and maintained its positions.

For the 22nd, the German III. Army had been ordered merely to close up on the east bank of the Meuse, and began preparations for the passage of the river on the morrow. During the day news came in to Hausen that the II. Army, contrary to its commander's previous arrangement with him, had crossed the Sambre that day and asked urgently for his co-operation by an advance across the Meuse. Orders were therefore issued for the III. Army to force the passage of the river early on the morrow.

(c) Aug. 23.

The morning of the 23rd passed without any renewal of fighting on the French V. Army front; Billow was apparently waiting till the effects of the III. Army attack should make themselves felt. It was not till afternoon that his centre began to work forward towards Mettet and forced back the French line some little distance by nightfall. Fighting on the left was more serious and sustained ; the Germans forced the passage of the Sambre in this sector, and after repeated attacks drove back their opponents some miles to the south. On the extreme left the troops of the Reserve Divisions, relieving the cavalry, came into line along the south bank of the Sambre between Merbes le Chateau and Maubeuge.

Despite the progress made by the II. Army during the fighting of the last three days, the view of the situation taken at Billow's headquarters on this evening was gloomy. The expected co operation of the I. Army had failed to materialize, and that of the III. Army seemed to have had little effect. The enemy was believed to be in superior force on the army front ; he had fought well and might be expected at any time to undertake a general counter-offensive, which the German troops, exhausted by three days' incessant fighting, could hardly hope to resist. Nevertheless, the army orders for the 24th laid down a continuance of the attack.

The III. Army had begun its attack east of the Meuse early in the morning. The French positions were strong and well adapted for defence, and their resistance stubborn; but before noon the German left had effected a crossing and observed signs of a hostile retirement, which were attributed to the effect of the II. Army's victorious advance. In accordance, therefore, with an order from the German Supreme Command, Hausen instructed his left to move on Fumay so as to cut off the hostile retreat to the south. But the task of the army was far from accomplished; its centre met with fierce resistance at Dinant and only got across late in the day; the left, pushing forward to Onhaye, was counter attacked and driven back by part of the French I. Corps, sent back to restore the threatening situation on this front ; while the column sent towards Fumay, by reason of the natural difficulties of the route, failed to reach its objective. Still, the III. Army was across the Meuse, and Hausen had ordered it to undertake a pursuit next day in a south-westerly direction, when a staff officer from the II. Army arrived bearing an urgent request for his assistance in the form of an advance due west against the flank of the French V. Army. To this alteration of his plan Hau sen consented and issued new orders directing his right wing on Mettet.

Meanwhile, Lanrezac, on his side, in view of the threat to his flanks and rear afforded by the fall of Namur, the advance of the III. Army and the defeat of the French in the Ardennes, fearing for his left where the B.E.F. had been engaged all that day, with superior enemy forces, and realizing the state of moral and material exhaustion among his own troops, decided that he had no choice but to retreat. Orders were issued that morn ing for a withdrawal to the line Givet-Philippeville-Merbes-le Chateau ; which was carried out on the 24th unmolested by the Germans. Their II. Army advanced only a few miles to the southward; the right of their III. Army, advancing due west, found no enemy before it, and its left column, resuming its advance on Fumay, was unable to cross the Meuse there until the 28th, when it was too late to interfere with the French retirement. The battle of Charleroi had thus terminated in a definite German success, the scope and effects of which, however, were so unduly exaggerated in the reports of army and corps commanders, as to assume, quite without warrant, the dimensions of a decisive victory.