THE BATTLE OF GUISE Between Aug. 24 and 27 the French V. Army carried out a steady retirement southwards from the area south of the Sambre to south of the Oise, and on the evening of the 26th stood with outposts on the line of that river and the Thon between Aubenton and Guise, and its main bodies farther back. The German II. Army, which had bought its victory at Charleroi at a heavy price in casualties, had followed it up and had reached on a line from east of Bohain to La Capelle ; it was now reduced to four corps, the other two having been sent off to the eastern front, where the situation had become menacing for the Germans. No serious contact had taken place between the adversaries during this period.
Meanwhile Joffre, in view of the Allied failure in the frontier battles and the rapid progress of the German right wing, pro posed to strengthen his own left wing by the formation of a new VI. Army about and south of Amiens, to check the enemy advance on the general line Laon-La Fere-St. Quentin-the Somme, and ultimately assume the offensive with the V., VI. and British Armies. But the retreat of the B.E.F. as a result of Le Cateau rendered it necessary in his opinion for some immediate assistance to be given to it if it were to be kept in being as a fighting force, and on the 27th the V. Army received orders for an immediate attack north-westwards towards St. Quentin against the enemy who were following up the British on the west bank of the Oise. Accordingly, the French Corps on the 28th closed to their left in preparation for the attack on the 29th, the left wing facing north-west along the Oise between Origny and Mons, the right guard facing north between Guise and Rumigny. The co-operation of the British I. Corps had been asked for and promised by its com mander, but Sir John French intervened to forbid this. Meanwhile, Billow, as before the battle of Charleroi, had come to the con clusion early on the 28th that he had only strong rear guards in front of him south of the Oise. On the 28th, therefore, he pushed his left wing up and over that river between Guise and ltreau pont, while his right was sent off far to the south-westwards be yond St. Quentin towards the upper Somme so as to keep touch with the I. Army and assist it to cut off the retreat of the British. His orders for the 29th dealt mainly with the preparatory meas ures for the attack on the out-of-date fortress of La Fere, the im portance of which seems unduly to have obsessed him ; the right wing, however, was to continue its advance south-westwards.
The French advance across the Oise towards St. Quentin thus came as a complete surprise to the Germans ; and their right wing, thus menaced on its left flank, was at once checked in its progress and faced hurriedly south-eastwards to meet the unex pected threat. At first only part of one corps was available to stave off the advancing French, who got to within 4m. of St. Quentin, while the wide gap between Billow's wings for a time caused him grave anxiety. Eventually the arrival of the re mainder of his right wing relieved the German situation in this part of the field ; the French having received orders that the attack on St. Quentin was not to be pressed, maintained their ground till nightfall, and then fell back east of the Oise.
The reason for this order lay in the changed situation on the northern part of the field, where the German left wing, advancing southwards, had driven in the French forward troops opposed to them, and menaced the flank of columns about to cross the Oise about Mt. d'Origny. Lanrezac's reserve was thrown in ; a general counter-stroke took place which not only put a stop to the enemy's advance, but forced him to give ground; and by nightfall the progress of the German left wing had been definitely checked.
The object of the French counter-offensive having been achieved, Joffre ordered Lanrezac to resume his retreat on the 30th, to the line originally laid down, and this movement, which commenced early in the morning, was safely completed under cover of strong rear guards. The Germans did not attempt to resume their attack during the morning, but their right wing, having called up to its assistance a division of the I. Army, advanced in force later in the afternoon across the Oise and estab lished itself on the east bank by nightfall ; the left wing also moved forward level with it. By this time the French main bodies had got clear away and no pursuit was undertaken; the II. Army, which was much exhausted, was ordered a rest day on the 30th, leaving to the I. Army the task of following up the retiring enemy by an advance across the Oise south of La Fere. In truth the battle of Guise, if a victoire sans lendemain for the French, was a bad set-back for the Germans, and in it was to be found a presage of the turn of the tide a week later on the Marne.
See French, British and German official Histories; also Lord French, 1914, 2nd ed. (1919) ; C. W. P. v. Billow, Mein Bericht zur Marne schlacht (1919) ; H. R. A. v. Kluck, The March on Paris, Eng. trans. (192o) ; M. C. L. v. Hausen, Erinnerungen an den Marnefeldzug (Leipzig, 192o) ; C. L. M. Lanrezac, Le Plan de Campagne Francais (1920); H. J. v. Kuhl, Die Marne f eldzug (1921) ; H. L. Smith Dorrien, Memories of Forty-eight Years' Service (1925) ; B. H. Liddell Hart, Reputations (1928). (E. W. S.)