THE BATTLE OF MONS On Aug. 21 the British Expeditionary Force began its advance into the line of battle. The cavalry preceded the advance, fol lowed by the II. Corps (Smith-Dorrien) and the I. Corps (Haig) in that order. Reports from aircraft and cavalry on the 21st and 22nd established the presence of hostile cavalry about Nivelles, and of the main enemy forces between Enghien and Charleroi. In rear of the cavalry the British Corps closed up to the line Binche-Mons-Conde canal, the I. Corps on the right as far as Villers St. Ghislain, the II. Corps on the left behind the canal line; one cavalry brigade covered the right of the army, while later in the morning the cavalry division fell back from before the front to a new position south-east of Conde in rear of its left. Sir John French knew on the evening of the 22nd that the French on his right, after heavy fighting, had been forced back from the line of the Sambre, and that strong enemy forces, reckoned at three or four corps, were approaching his own front ; he therefore determined to abandon all idea of an offensive, and to stand for battle next day in the positions then held by his army. In view of this, a request from Lanrezac for a British counter stroke against the flank of the enemy then attacking him could not be complied with ; the most that French could promise was that he would hold his ground for at least 24 hours.
On the German side the I. Army, on the evening of Aug. 2 i, received orders from Billow to be prepared next day to afford direct support to the II. Army. To this scheme Kluck saw serious objections in view of the uncertainty as to the where abouts of the British, and a prolonged discussion took place which resulted in the I. Army commander yielding his point, and agreeing to swing his army on the 22nd more to the south to the line Lessines-Soignies. During this day contact was estab lished, as has already been related, with the British cavalry and Kluck now realized that the B.E.F. was advancing to join up with the left of the French on the Sambre. Once more there arose a divergence of views; Kluck wanted to carry out a wide turning movement to envelop the British left; while Billow considered he could not dispense with his direct support on the Sambre. Even tually orders were issued for the I. Army to advance on the 23rd across the Canal du Centre to the general line north of Mau beuge, north-east of Conde, a movement which was bound to bring them into conflict with the British.
Early on the morning of the 23rd, the latter had taken up their positions for battle—the I. Corps on the right facing north-east between the Sambre and the Haine south-east of Mons, the II. Corps and the 19th Infantry Brigade facing north along the line of the Canal du Centre from Mons to just east of Conde (which was held by part of the 84th French Territorial Division), and the Cavalry Division in rear of the II. Corps left. The whole front was a very long one—about 27 miles; the ground along the line of the canal was enclosed and much built over, but the heights to the south-east of the Haine afforded strong second positions farther in rear. About 9 A.M. the battle opened on the II. Corps' right, but it was not till II A.M. that the action became general all along its front. This pause was due to the fact that early in the morning Kluck, alarmed by a false report that strong hostile forces were detraining at Tournai, well out on his right flank, had ordered his army to halt until the situation there was cleared up— which did not occur till about mid-day. The German attack at first made little progress and suffered heavy casualties from the effective British fire, but in the early afternoon the right of the British Corps was forced to evacuate Mons and the canal bend north of it, and retire to its second position, while a gap in its centre also caused some temporary anxiety. By nightfall it had everywhere fallen or was about to fall back to this new position about 2m. south of the canal. Neither the I. Corps on the right nor the i 9th Brigade and the French on the extreme left had been seriously attacked during the day, since the German right wing, which was moving on Conde, failed to reach the battlefield; the British losses had been slight and the moral was excellent. None the less, Sir John French, on receipt of news from the French G.O.C. and Lanrezac's French army of the situation on his flanks and the greatly superior enemy force available for use against him, realized that he could not continue to hold his posi tion, and issued orders for a retirement next day to a line running east and west through Bavai, with its right covered by the fortress of Maubeuge.
This withdrawal, commencing before dawn on the 24th, was successfully executed, though not without local fighting in which the B.E.F. actually suffered more heavily than in the previous day's battle. The I. Corps and the right of the II. Corps fell back unmolested, but at Frameries and Elouges the centre and left of the II. Corps and Cavalry Divisions were hard pressed by the enemy, who succeeded in cutting off and capturing the greater part of one battalion at Elouges after a gallant resistance. Nevertheless, by the morning of the 24th the B.E.F. stood, wearied but intact, on the line allotted to it on either side of Bavai. The German I. Army, apart from its pressure on the rear guards of the II. Corps, made little attempt to follow up or molest the retirement. Kluck believed the British would stand fast on this day and await his further attack, arrangements for which he had laid down in his orders issued late on the 23rd; it was not till next morning that he realized the true position, and then it was too late to carry out that enveloping movement with his right wing which alone could have enabled him to secure decisive suc cess. In fact, the results of the two days' fighting around Mons were, from the German point of view, disappointing ; the retire ment of the British before it was mainly attributable to the course of events elsewhere and in particular to the ill-success of the French V. Army farther east, and there was at no time any question of a true tactical victory on the German I. Army front.
Fortunately for the Allies, the Germans on their side failed to reap the full fruits of a success so real that it might well have been made decisive. This failure must be attributed to several causes: inadequate information, which lead them unduly to dis perse their forces prior to and during the battles; defective organization of command, which placed the general control of the operations in the hands of one army commander who was bound to be unduly influenced by events on his own immediate front; and faulty leadership, which indulged in sudden and ill-considered changes of plan, and let slip its chance of completely destroying its weaker adversary. It seems that while the Allies were f or tunate to escape as lightly as they did, for the Germans Charleroi and Mons were at once a real victory and a lost opportunity.