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The Second Empire

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THE SECOND EMPIRE This new 18th Brumaire resulted naturally in a new "constitu tion of the year VIII." It restored the consular dictatorship and the same political institutions. The sole innovation was the elec tion of the corps legislatif by universal suffrage. This new political change had rapidly the same consequences as that of Brumaire. A year later, on Dec. 2, 1852, Louis-Napoleon re-established the hereditary empire and took the title of Napoleon III., acclaimed by an almost unanimous plebiscite.

The Autocratic Empire (1852-60).

Although the Second Empire had a machinery of government similar to that of the First, it differed in principle : though it was the heir to the Napo leonic tradition of order and authority, the emperor had none the less been chosen by popular vote. It was, therefore, incumbent upon him to give to his people the material and moral benefits that, from his prison at Ham, or his exile, he had often reproached the former oligarchical Governments for having neglected. Re action at home, liberalism abroad—that was his programme. Hence he set himself to paralyze everything that might inculcate in the people a public spirit : universal suffrage, parliament, press, education. The first was mutilated by the system of official candidates, the corps legislatif silenced, the press muzzled by the autorization prealable and by the censorship, education subjected to a severe system of control, and the republican opposition ren dered harmless by the law of public safety after Orsini's attempt to murder the emperor, purely Italian in origin though this was. France became a sickroom in which the people spoke in lowered voices. For ten years political life was dead. The Empire lived upon frequent plebiscites. Until 5857 the opposition was non existent; during 1857-60 it consisted of five members. The monarchists, who were never united, maintained a Fronde in the salons.

Internal Policy.

The condition of the existence of the auto cratic empire was that liberty should be forgotten in a material prosperity that would make all interests tremble at the idea of a revolution. Hence Napoleon sought and found his support in the clergy, great financiers, industrial magnates and great landed proprietors. He revived for himself the slogan of 1840: "Get rich quick." Under the influence of the Saint-Simonians, great credit institutions and public works were launched—the Credit Foncier, the Credit Mobilier, and the amalgamation of the railways. The fever for speculation was heightened by the influx of Californian and Australian gold, and the consumer benefited by lower prices and the removal of customs restrictions. The Universal Exhibi tion of 1855 was the apotheosis of French activity. The court fetes at Compiegne, after Napoleon's marriage with Eugenie de Montijo, set the fashion for the admiring bourgeoisie who were satisfied with this strong Government which kept such good guard over their bank balances. But though the empire was strong, the emperor was weak. At once headstrong and a dreamer, he was full of rash plans, but too irresolute in action; he remained what his life had made him, a conspirator and a revolutionary by reason of his demagogic imperialism, and his democratic chauvinism. Moreover his foreign policy was as full of contradictions as his home government. "L'Ernpire, c'est la paix," he declared at Bor deaux. Yet he made war.

Foreign Policy.

While his power lacked a firm basis, Napo leon III. was compelled above all else to reassure opinion in Europe, uneasy as a result of his earlier protests against the treaties of 1815. The leader of a hostile coalition could only be England, and with her he felt impelled to maintain an entente cordiale. So he allied himself with her against Russia in defence of the integrity of the Ottoman empire, and at the same time rallied round him the Catholics who were preoccupied with the question of the Holy Places and the Liberals hostile to the auto cratic tsardom.

The Crimean War (q.v.) was the prototype of his other wars. Begun without any definite military objective, it was waged with irresolution. After the long and costly siege of Sevastopol, the tsar was thrust back far from Constantinople by the terms of peace; and did not forget the injury. Intoxicated by his triumph and assured of a dynasty by the birth of the Prince Imperial (1856) Napoleon thought that he had wiped out the disgrace of 184o. He requested the congress of Paris (1856) to take into consideration the questions in which he was most interested, Poland and the Roman question, but England refused. Sea-law apart, the sole benefit of the congress was to permit Cavour to bring the Italian question to the notice of Europe.

It was not his attempted assassination by Orsini that recalled the question to Napoleon. He had never f orgot4 en the days of his youth. He believed that the hour had come for him to execute his chosen mission. Torn between the empress, a fanatical Catho lic who was opposed to everything that might menace the papacy, and the prince Napoleon, who, as brother-in-law of Victor Em manuel, took the side of Piedmont, he hoped to please both by the creation of an Italian federation presided over by Pius IX. At Plombieres Napoleon offered to Cavour the sword of France that had been invoked by Orsini on the steps of the scaffold. By fighting Austria after the tsar, Napoleon carried out another clause in the Liberal programme. On May 3, 18S9, he proclaimed his intention of making Italy "free from the Alps to the Adriatic." As f our years earlier, so now he raised limitless hopes without counting the cost ; hence, two months after the hardly-won vic tories of Magenta and Solferino, Napoleon signed with Francis Joseph the patched-up armistice of Villafranca. Austria ceded Lombardy to Napoleon by whom it was handed over to Victor Emmanuel. But Modena and Tuscany were restored to their respective dukes and the Romagna to the Pope, as the president of an Italian federation. The war with Austria had thus mis carried. A yet disunited Italy spoke of French treason, and from that time believed the emperor too highly rewarded by the cession of Nice and Savoy (May 24, 186o). But the war had also raised the Roman question. To refuse Rome to Italy was to violate the principle of nationalities and to arouse the resentment of the French Liberals. To give it to Italy was to alienate the French Catholics who, since the coup d'etat, had always supported Napo leon. He was only able to reconcile dynastic interests with those of nationality by a provisional solution—which would hold good only so long as he himself remained master of the situation. A powerful Catholic and Protectionist opposition quickly arose. The French clericals were greatly incensed by the Italian revolution aries, who sought to make an end to the temporal power of the pope. The Syrian expedition of 186o, in aid of the Maronite Catholics persecuted by the Druses, did nothing to disarm this opposition. On the other hand the emperor who, to satisfy Eng land, had already dismissed his minister of foreign affairs, Walew ski, signed with that country on Jan. 23, 186o a commercial treaty by which the duties in England upon French agricultural produce, and in France upon English manufactured goods, were lowered. By this free trade policy French industry, though accustomed to protection, was suddenly exposed to foreign competition. Now indeed the Catholics and the Protectionists perceived dangers in the absolutism that they had admired for just so long as it served their ambitions and their interests. To restore the empire to its balance, Napoleon sought that support from the Left which he was losing on the Right ; a general amnesty proclaimed after his return from Italy marked a stage (which lasted for ten years) in the evolution of the autocratic into the liberal and finally the parliamentary empire.

The Liberal Empire (1860-69) .

It was the liberals at home who were to be placated by the establishment of the liberal em pire. By the reforms of Nov. 24, 186o, Napoleon removed the gag which had kept the country silent, increased the powers of the corps legislati f, and proceeded, through the grant of an an nual vote on the address and the right of voting the budget by sections, towards a parliamentary government. He promised the conservatives, who disliked his policy of laisser faire in Italy, an end to interventions in Europe, together with the maintenance of the temporal power, and peace. But his support of the Italian cause had aroused in other nationalities a spirit of impatient hope. Would he be able to abandon them without arousing the indigna tion of the Liberals, and without adding further embarrassments to those already occasioned him by his Italian venture? In 1863 in Poland, Schleswig-Holstein, the Danube Principalities, and in Italy, united even though it lacked frontiers and a capital, the new principle of nationality loudly demanded satisfaction. Con fronted with the opposition of Europe Napoleon III. was once again forced to curb Italian impatience, to permit Poland to be exterminated, and to hand over the Danes to the Austro-Prussian Coalition (see SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN QUESTION).

These inconsistencies produced in France, under the name of the Union liberate, a coalition of all the discontented elements— the Catholics, the leaders of industry, and the anti-Napoleonic parties of the Monarchists and the Republicans. In the elections of 1863 the opposition won 4o seats and obtained a leader, Thiers, who in its name, instantly demanded "the necessary liberties." Industrial Policy.—Confronted with the constitutional oppo sition of Thiers and the irreconcilable opposition of the Republi cans, while the bourgeoisie grew daily more ambitious, Napoleon strove to reinforce his threatened authority by turning to the working classes from whom he had received it. Nothing seemed more easy of accomplishment than to exploit their old hatred of the capitalist ; Chapelier's law (1791) had denied them the right of combination, the limited suffrage had conferred a political monopoly on capital, and the workers remembered how the selfish bourgeoisie had called upon them to defend now the Charter, now universal suffrage, and had repaid them only with ingratitude, or with machine-guns. The silencing of public opinion under the Empire and the general prosperity had caused a cleavage between the Labour party and the other political parties. But the despatch of a Labour delegation to the London exhibition in 1862 had enabled them to resume contact. Henceforth the emperor put no obstacle in the way of consumers' co-operative societies, of the right to strike, or of the development of trade unions ; he did not even oppose Tolain's plan for the foundation of an international association of workers (see INTERNATIONAL), and even gave his patronage to employers' welfare and friendly societies which had for their object the betterment of the working man's lot. Thus secured in his rear, the emperor believed himself able to reject, through Rouher, every fresh demand of the liberals : always seek ing for a success abroad that would establish his dynasty, he returned to the policy of seeking "compensation." European Politics.—By the expedition to Mexico, Napoleon believed that he had diverted the thoughts of the French Catholics from Rome. He even hoped that, in return for the Mexican crown thus conferred on his brother Maximilian, the emperor, Francis Joseph, would peacefully yield Venetia to Italy. At Biarritz, in 1865, in return for vague promises of "compensation," he prom ised his neutrality to Bismarck, who wished to exclude Austria from Germany. Suddenly there came the news that the Austrian army had been defeated at Sadowa (July 4, 1866). The strength that till then Prussia had prudently concealed was laid bare. An intervention on behalf of Austria would deprive Napoleon of the reward for which he hoped. Moreover he could hardly have intervened, for want of the men and the money thrown away in Mexico. All over France there arose a feeling of surprised irrita tion against Prussia which, since the days of Frederick the Great, had persistently enjoyed the goodwill of France. By the Treaty of Prague, Prussia eliminated Austria from Germany, united, through the annexation of Schleswig-Holstein and Hanover, the hitherto scattered fragments of the Prussian monarchy, placed herself at the head of a great North German Confederation, and concluded military conventions with the South-German states from which this was only separated by the rubicon of the Main.

All confidence in the superiority of imperialism vanished at once. In the name of the opposition, Thiers and Faure denounced in the Corps Legislati f the blunders of 1866. Emile 011ivier broke up the official majority by forming a third party between the anti-dynastic opposition and the extreme Bonapartists, and gave it out that a reconciliation with the empire would be impossible until the emperor granted full political liberty. Undecided by nature, and rendered still more so by disease, the emperor during three years made concessions on the lines laid down by 011ivier, but destroyed their value by permitting Rouher to mutilate them by the way in which he put them into force. Meanwhile in his foreign policy Napoleon met with defeat after defeat.

1867-68.-1867

was a particularly disastrous year. In Mexico the "greatest idea of the reign" ended in a humiliating evacuation in answer to an ultimatum from the United States. Supported by a new ally, Prussia, Italy mobilized the forces of revolution to achieve her unity in Rome. This time the chassepots of Mentana checked the onslaught of Garibaldi's Red Shirts. When the emperor tardily recalled the promises made to him at Biarritz and sent Bismarck his "innkeeper's account," in which he first de manded Mainz, then Belgium, and finally said he would be satis fied with Luxembourg (q.v.), his ambassador, Benedetti, added to the mistake of asking at the wrong time the humiliation of obtaining nothing. Napoleon dared not resort to force and so laid bare his weakness; and finally courted the mockery of Europe by inviting it to a display of the external magnificence which con cealed the decline of France. In the new Paris of Haussmann, the Exposition Universelle opened with Berezowski's attack upon Alexander III., and closed amid the echoes of the tragic fate of Emperor Maximilian of Mexico. Well might Thiers exclaim: "There are no blunders left for us to make." Yet the emperor managed to commit still more, entailing irreparable consequences for the dynasty, and for France. Old and ailing, stung by the triumph of the opposition in the elections of 1867, he was faced with the choice between a lasting peace and a decisive war. He allowed himself to drift in the direction of war without making the necessary preparations to wage it. Indifferently supported by the Government, distrusted by an electorate that had allowed commercial or international interests to oust patriotism, and strongly opposed by the Left which feared to strengthen the hands of the emperor, the military reforms of Marshal Niel were de feated. By the laws of May–June, Napoleon sought in vain to preserve his right of action by granting freedom of speech and assembly. Everything he did redounded to the credit of his enemies. The Chatiments of Victor Hugo, the Lanterne of Roche fort, and Gambetta's terrible indictment in the law courts proved that the Republicans were irreconcilable. The Ultramon tane party grew sulkier and sulkier; the manufacturers grew daily more and more dissatisfied with free trade. Worse still, the work ing-classes, gradually won over to the theories of Karl Marx and Bakunin, had passed to the enemies' camp, and the strikes that grew daily more frequent became, in effect, a review of the fight ing strength of the Revolution.

The Parliamentary Empire (1869-70) .

Held amidst this fevered state of public opinion, the elections of 1869 inflicted a resounding moral defeat upon the emperor. He was compelled to come to terms with the victorious Third Party and to entrust to its chief, 011ivier, the Government of the parliamentary empire (Jan. 2, 1870). The plebiscite of May 8 sanctioned this trans formation by an enormous majority in spite of republican risings and intimidation.

This success, which should have consolidated the empire, de termined its downfall. A diplomatic triumph seemed essential to complete the success. To the empress was ascribed the saying : "Unless there is a war my son will never be emperor." On July 3, 187o the opportunity presented itself with the candidature of a Hohenzollern prince for the throne of Spain. To the French it seemed that Prussia, barely mistress of Germany, was reviving against France the traditional policy of the Habsburgs. 011ivier's liberal ministry was desirous of showing itself as jealous for the national honour as any of its absolutist predecessors. Carried away by the force of public opinion which it had itself set free, it accepted war as inevitable and prepared for it "d'un Coeur It was in vain that French diplomacy, aided by the uneasiness of Europe, secured the withdrawal of the Hohenzollern candidature. This did not suit either the war-party in Paris, or Bismarck, who wanted the other side to declare war. To pre serve their popularity, 011ivier and Gramont, the minister for foreign affairs, sought to extort from King William one of those promises for the future which are humiliating, but never binding. Thus they afforded Prussia the desired pretext for returning a refusal, which Bismarck in the "edited" telegram from Ems trans formed into an insult. The Chamber, which was composed of government deputies, notwithstanding the desperate efforts of Thiers and Gambetta, and the th-hour offers of mediation on the part of England, fell into the trap and voted for war, which was declared on July 19, 187o.

The War of 1870-71.

Thanks more to the duplicity of Na poleon than that of Bismarck, France found herself isolated ; she did not possess a single ally. Through revenge for her defeat in the Crimea, Russia gave Prussia a free hand ; while Bismarck's disclosure of the "Benedetti" claim of 1867 on Belgium and Luxembourg, secured for Prussia the benevolent neutrality of England. The emperor counted, at least, on the support of Austria and Italy, with whom he had been in negotiation since the Salzburg interview (Aug. 1867). Italy did not even wait for the defeat of France before entering Rome; Austria, while con cerned to take revenge for Sadowa, was distrustful of Napoleon and conscious of the strength of Prussia. The armies of Marshal Leboeuf were no more effective than the alliances of Gramont. All was ready in Germany for the mobilization of a well-equipped and disciplined army under the leadership of experienced gen erals. All this was lacking in France, where everything had been left to the good luck that had always attended the emperor, and where the army was badly officered and the supreme com mand entrusted to incapable hands. Thus it was that defeat came with a terrifying swiftness. The battles of Froeschwiller and Forbach (Worth and Spicheren) were lost on Aug. 6, and on Aug. 18 the "Army of the Rhine" was shut up in Metz. Mac Mahon's army, which had been given the task of relieving it, was in its turn surrounded at Sedan (Aug. 3o) where it surrendered with the emperor on Sept. 2. The capitulation of Sedan destroyed the empire by removing its sole support, the army. Paris was lef t unprotected and empty of troops. With a helpless woman at the Tuileries, a terrified Assembly at the Palais Bourbon, a ministry, that of Palikao, without authority, and leaders of the opposition who fled at the approach of disaster, the republicans had no need to overthrow the empire. It fell of its own accord on Sept. 4 without a single hand being raised in its defence. (See FRANCO

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