The New Zealand Division had cleared the intricate fortifica tions of Messines itself—here the pace of the barrage was regu lated to ioo yards in fifteen minutes instead of the general pace of loo yards in three minutes. The garrisons of Wytschaete and the White Chateau held out for a time, but the first village was captured after a fierce struggle by troops of the 36th (Ulster) and 16th (Irish) Divisions in a combined effort—a feat of sym bolical significance. Perhaps the most difficult sector was that of the 47th (London) Division, which had not only to overcome the highly fortified position of the White Chateau but had the Ypres Comines canal as an oblique interruption across its line of advance. The Londoners, however, overcame both and by 10 A.M. the objective of the first phase was reached along the whole attacking line. While it was being consolidated, over forty batteries were moved forward to support the next pounce.
At 3.10 P.M. the reserve divisions and tanks "leap-frogged" through and within an hour almost the whole of the final objec tive was captured. Some 7,00o prisoners had been taken, apart from dead and wounded. The success had been so complete that only feeble counter-attacks were attempted that day. When the expected general counter-attack was launched on the whole front on the morrow, it failed everywhere against defences that had been rapidly and firmly organized, and in the recoil yielded the British still more ground.
A long pause now occurred while preparations for carrying out the rest of Haig's programme were being completed. Although Plumer's victory of June 7 had put an end to the enemy over looking Ypres from the south, the Germans still, in a measure, dominated the place from the east, from the north-east and from the north. Thus the preparations could not be concealed and the Germans knew that they were being made. The plan at the outset was that, while the II. Army stood fast, the V. Army under Gough on its left with the French I. Army still further to the left, should attack the enemy front from near Hooge to north of Steenstraat on the Yser canal.
Nearly two months passed before the preparations for the main advance were completed. This gave the Germans, amply warned, time to make counter-preparations of characteristic thor oughness and ingenuity. Having learnt by experience that a continuous system of trenches did not offer a satisfactory form of defence unless there was abundant underground cover, and realizing that the waterlogged soil of Flanders handicapped the creation of subterranean galleries, they had established a system of numerous disconnected trenches and strong points, arranged in depth rather than in breadth, together with numbers of con crete blockhouses armed with machine-guns. As their front line
near Ypres had been in existence since 1915, they trusted to the old system to meet the first shock of attack, and it was rather in the later offensive operations that the Allies found themselves con fronted with these new defensive devices. A further new asset was the introduction of mustard gas which the Germans used to cause serious interference with the attackers' artillery.
On July 22 the bombardment opened, by 2,300 guns, to con tinue for ten days, until on July 31 the infantry advanced on a fifteen-mile front to the accompaniment of torrential rain. On the left substantial progress was made, Bixschoote, St. Julien, and the Pilckem Ridge being gained, and the line of the Steen beke reached. But in the more vital sector round the Menin road the attack was repulsed.
The second blow, on Aug. 16, was a diminished replica of the first in its results. The left wing was again advanced across the shallow depression formed by the little valley of the Steenbeke and past the ruins of what had been Langemarck. But on the right, where alone an advance might have a strategic effect, a heavy price was paid for nought, and even the tally of prisoners shrank to a mere two thousand. Nor did men feel that the enemy's skilful resistance and the mud were the sole explanation of their fruitless sacrifice. Severe complaints against the direction and staff work were general, and their justness seemed to receive recognition when Haig extended the II. Army's front northward to include the Menin road sector, and thereby entrusted to Plumer the direction of the main advance towards the ridge east of Ypres.
It was a thankless task at the best, for the experience of war attested the futility of pressing on in places where failure had already become established, and it seemed heavy odds that the laurels earned by Messines must become submerged in the swamps beyond Ypres. Yet, in the outcome, the reputation of Plumer and the II. Army staff, headed by Harington, was enhanced—less be cause of what was achieved in scale than because so much more was achieved than could reasonably have been expected.