Bad weather and the need for preparation delayed the resump tion of the offensive until Sept. 20, but that morning the II. Army attack, on a four-mile front, achieved success in the area of previous failure—on either side of the Menin Road. Fractions of six divisions, the i9th, 39th, 41st, 23rd, 1st and 2nd Australian advanced at 5.4o A.M. ; by 6.15 A.M. the first objective was gained almost unopposed, and, with the exception of one or two strong points, the third and last objective was gained soon after midday, and the counter-attacks were repulsed by fire. A fresh spring on Sept. 26, and another on Oct. 4—the last a larger one on a six mile front, by troops of the 37th, 5th, 21st, and 7th Divisions, the 1st, znd, and 3rd Australian Divisions, and the New Zealand Division—gained possession of the main ridge east of Ypres, with Gheluvelt, Polygon Wood, and Broodseinde, despite torrents of rain, which made the battlefield a worse morass than ever. On each occasion the majority of the counter-attacks had broken down under the British fire, a result which owed much to the good observation work of the Royal Flying Corps and the quick response of the artillery. Some ro,000 prisoners were swallowed in the three bites, and this frightened the enemy into modifying his elastic tactics and strengthening his forward troops—to their increased loss.
As a result of the operations begun on June 7 the crest of the long belt of high ground overlooking the Flanders plain had now, after four' months of intermittent fighting, been secured from Messines northwards to within a few hundred yards of the Ypres Roulers railway. And yet, regarding this Flanders offensive as a whole, the work was in reality only begun. The Houthulst forest, with the long line of high ground forming the quadrant of a circle beyond it, was still in the enemy's bands. Until the ridge had been secured to the vicinity of Staden it would be premature to embark upon the second part of the general scheme of operations—an attack on the German positions along the coast between Nieuport and Ostend, for which the IV. Army
under General Rawlinson had been assembled on the extreme left.
Unhappily, the Higher Command decided to continue the point less offensive during the few remaining weeks before the winter, and thereby used up reserves which might have saved the belated experiment of Cambrai (q.v.) from bankruptcy. Having wasted the summer and strength in the mud, where tanks foundered and infantry floundered, they turned in November to dry ground— where a decisive success went begging for lack of reserves.
At Ypres minor attacks on Oct. 9 and 12 advanced the line a trifle, and then, after an interval, a combined attack by the V. Army and the French was tried, with small result, on Oct. 22. On Oct. 26 the II. Army, in torrents of rain, as usual, made a fresh effort, which was less successful than before, owing to the ex haustion caused by pushing forward over a morass and to the fact that the mud not only got into and jammed rifles and ma chine-guns but nullified the effect of the shell-bursts. The trials of the attackers were augmented by the enemy's increasing use of mustard gas, and by his renewed adoption of his tactics of hold ing the bulk of his troops well back for counter-attack. Thus when, on Nov. 4, a sudden advance by the 1st Division and 2nd Canadian Division gained the empty satisfaction of occupying the site of Passchendaele village, the curtain was at last rung down on the pitiful tragedy of "Third Ypres." It was the long-overdue close of a campaign which had brought the British armies to the verge of exhaustion, one in which had been enacted the most doleful scenes in their history, and for which the only justifica tion evoked the reply that, in order to absorb the enemy's atten tion and forces the Higher Command had chosen the spot most difficult for the defender and least vital for the attacker.