The defection of Russia did not end the Entente tale of woe. Each autumn, with demoralizing regularity, Germany had seized an opportunity to eat up one of the weaker Allies. In 1915 it had been Serbia's fate, in 1916 Rumania's, and now it was Italy's turn, or so the Germans in tended. Ludendorff's decision, taken in September, was deter mined by the appeals of the Austrian authorities, who felt that their troops could not endure the strain of another defensive battle on the Italian frontier. In May, Cadorna had attacked once more on the Isonzo front, but an Austrian counter-attack in the Carso sector had retaken part of the small gains. Losses, how ever, were more nearly balanced than formerly. The question of Allied co-operation on the Italian front was raised afresh with out result, but Cadorna, nevertheless, initiated in August an "eleventh battle of the Isonzo." Capello's 2nd Army captured a large part of the Bainsizza plateau, north of Gorizia, but a long sustained effort brought no further success and Cadorna was forced to break off the offensive after four weeks' struggle. But it had so strained the Austrian resistance that, in Ludendorff's words,
became necessary to decide for the attack on Italy in order to prevent the collapse of Austria-Hungary." Ludendorff had a difficult problem to solve. Russia had not yet capitulated, the front there was already weakly held for its extent, and the British offensive in Flanders made impossible a large withdrawal of troops from France. All he could spare was his slender general reserve of six divisions, which had already been his instrument in countering the Kerensky offensive and in the Riga coup. His adviser in the strategic design of operations, Lt.-Col. Wetzell, was, however, of opinion that the application of even this small force at a "soft spot" such as was offered by the Tolmino-Caporetto sector, north of the Bainsizza plateau, would suffice to cripple the Italian menace. The result proved him right—the trouble was that it unduly exceeded the most sanguine expectations. On Aug. 29 Waldstatten, of the Austrian general staff, had brought to Ludendorff a scheme for a break through at Tolmino, followed merely by rolling up the Isonzo front. But this plan was expanded into a more ambitious one with out an increase of means. The Germans at Caporetto, like the British subsequently at Cambrai, were to provide an example of the profound strategic error of not "cutting your coat accord ing to your cloth." On hearing the Austrian proposals Ludendorff sent Gen. Krafft von Dellmensingen, an expert in mountain warfare and com mander of the Alpine Corps in the Rumanian campaign, to reconnoitre the ground, and on receiving his report, approved the scheme. The six German divisions with nine Austrian formed the 14th German Army under Otto von Below, with Krafft as chief of staff and guiding brain. These troops were to penetrate the mountain barrier at the north-east corner of the Venetian salient, while Boroevic's two Austrian armies were to advance along the stretch of lower ground near the Adriatic shore. The organization and deployment of the attack in such mountainous country were difficult, but were ably overcome. Guns were brought up mostly by hand and at night ; the infantry came up by night marches with all their ammunition and supplies on pack animals. Thanks to skilful precautions and the Italians' limited air reconnaissance, the concentration was undiscovered. On Oct. 24, after four hours' gas shell bombardment and one hour general, the blow was launched and pushed deep down the western slopes of the mountains, imperilling the Italian forces to both south and north. On Oct. 28 Below's van reached Udine, the former Italian general headquarters, and on Oct. 31 the Tagliamento.
Not the least significant feature of this offensive was the way it was prepared by a moral bombardment. Propaganda has been exploited for months as a means of sapping the Italian disci pline and will to resist. But its effect can be exaggerated—the
most formidable propaganda, as with the French in April, was that supplied by the attrition strategy of the Italian command, which had sickened the troops by its limited results at unlimited cost. Cadorna, too, offset undoubted ability by his lack of touch with and understanding of the fighting troops. Troops already too highly tried were kept too long without relief. Despite warnings of a hostile offensive, he had paid too little heed to Capello's complaints about the defensive suitability of the positions on which the Italian offensive had stopped, and had overruled his desire to forestall the enemy by a flank thrust northwards from the Bainsizza plateau.
But the result also surprised Ludendorff, who, with his slender forces, had not calculated on such distant objectives as were now possible of attainment. Boroevic was slow in following up the Italian right, and Ludendorff tried to switch part of his force to Conrad's army which flanked the north of the Venetian salient, but was foiled by the inadequacy of the rail communications. Even so, Cadorna, with his centre broken through, only saved his wings by a precipitate retreat to the line of the Piave, covering Venice, and on Nov. 9 the whole Italian army was behind this river, except for 250,000 prisoners in the enemy's hands, and nearly twice as many other casualties—killed, missing or sick. The same day Cadorna was superseded in supreme command by Diaz. Italy's allies had begun to rush reinforcements, a British and a French army corps, to her aid, and on Nov. 5 their po litical and military chiefs arrived at Rapallo for a conference, out of which sprang the Allied Council at Versailles, and ulti mately a unified command.
The invaders had outrun their transport, and the resistance of the Italians, morally braced by the emergency, succeeded in hold ing the Piave (q.v.) in face of direct assaults and strenuous ef forts by Conrad to turn their left flank from the Trentino. Here Cadorna's preparations for defence had been long initiated and were well matured. At the beginning of December the British and French, who had been waiting in reserve in case of a fresh break through, moved forward to take over vulnerable sectors, but the attack was only renewed in the north, and on Dec. 19 it came to an end with the snows. If Caporetto seriously damaged Italy, it also purged her, and after an interval of recuperation she was to vindicate herself at Vittorio Veneto.
Once more a distant theatre of war provided the sole triumph of the Entente cause during the year—this time in Palestine (q.v.). The second reverse at Gaza, in April 1917, had led to a change ih command, Murray being succeeded by Allenby, who was strong enough and fortunate enough to obtain the adequate force for which Murray had asked in vain. The British Government was anxious for a spectacular success to offset the moral depression of the Nivelle failure and the decline of Russia, and the British general staff desired to dislocate the Turkish attempt to recapture Baghdad by drawing away their reserves.
Allenby took over in July and devoted the first three months to intensive preparations for an autumn offensive, when the sea son would be suitable. The command was reorganized, the com munications developed, and his own headquarters moved forward from Cairo to the front. By complete secrecy and ruses he de ceived the Turks as to the main point of attack. The defences of Gaza were bombarded from Oct. 20 onwards, and an attack followed on Nov. 1 to pin the enemy and draw in his reserves. Meanwhile, as a necessary preliminary to the real blow, the inland bastion of Beersheba was seized by a convergent manoeuvre on Oct. 31, a prelude to the decisive attack on Nov. 6, which broke through the enemy's weakened centre and into the plain of Philistia.