World War

The Collapse of Turkey.

The offensive planned for the spring in Palestine had been interrupted by the crisis in France and the consequent withdrawal of most of Allenby's British troops. The depletion was made up by reinforcements from India and Mesopotamia, and by September Allenby was again ready to take the offensive. (See PALESTINE, CAMPAIGNS IN.) He secretly concentrated, on the Mediterranean flank, the mass of his infantry, and behind them the cavalry. In this way he changed a two to one superiority on the general front into four to one at the decisive point. At dawn on Sept. 19 the western mass attacked, rolling the Turks back north-east towards the hilly interior—like a door on its hinges. Through the open doorway the cavalry passed, riding straight up the coastal corridor for 3o m., before swinging east to cut the Turkish communications and close all exits of retreat. Completely trapped, the main Turkish armies were rounded up, while the British cavalry ex ploited the victory of Megiddo by a swift and sustained pursuit which gained first Damascus and finally Aleppo. Defenceless, and threatened with a direct advance of Milne from Macedonia on Constantinople, Turkey capitulated on Oct. 30.

The First Peace Note.

The capitulation of Bulgaria, con vinced Ludendorff that it was necessary to take a decisive step towards securing peace. While he was scraping together a paltry half dozen divisions to form a new front in Serbia, and arrang ing a meeting with the political chiefs, Foch's grand assaults fell on the Western defences, Sept. 26-28, and the line threatened to crack.

The German supreme command lost its nerve—only for a matter of days, but that was sufficient, and recovery too late. On Sept. 29 they took the precipitate decision to appeal for an armistice, saying that the collapse of the Bulgarian front had upset all their dispositions—"troops destined for the .Western front had had to be despatched there." This had "fundamentally changed" the situation in view of the attacks theri being launched on the Western front, for though these "had so far been beaten off their continuance must be reckoned with." This remark refers to Foch's general offensive. The American attack in the Meuse-Argonne had begun on Sept. 26, but had come practically to a standstill by the 28th. A Franco-Belgo British attack had opened in Flanders on the 28th, but if un' pleasant did not look really menacing. But on the morning of the 29th Haig's main blow was falling on the Hindenburg line, and the early news was disquieting.

In this emergency Prince Max was called to be chancellor to negotiate a peace move, with his international reputation for moderation and honour as its covering pledge. To bargain effec tively and without confession of defeat he needed, and asked, a breathing space "of ten, eight, even four days, before I have to appeal to the enemy." But Hindenburg merely reiterated that "the gravity of the military situation admits of no delay," and insisted that "a peace offer to our enemies be issued at once." Hence on Oct. 3 the appeal for an immediate armistice went out to President Wilson. It was an open confession of defeat to the world, and even before this—on Oct. 1—the supreme com

mand had undermined their own home front by communicating the same impression to a meeting of the leaders of all political parties.

Men who had so long been kept in the dark were blinded by the sudden light. All the forces of discord and pacifism received an immense impulse.

While the German Government was debating the conditions for an armistice and questioning Ludendorff as to the situation of the army for further resistance if the terms were unaccept able, Foch continued his military pressure.

The Final Advance.

The plan agreed upon between Foch and the Allied commanders had been for a series of convergent and practically simultaneous attacks : I and 2. By the Americans west of the Meuse, and by the French west of the Argonne, both in the direction of Mezieres beginning on Sept. 26. (See MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATION.) 3. By the British on the St. Quentin-Cambrai front in the general direction of Maubeuge—beginning on Sept. 27. (See HINDENBURG LINE, BATTLES OF, 1918.) 4. By the Belgian and Allied forces in the direction of Ghent —beginning on Sept. 28.

The general aspect was that of a pincer-like manoeuvre against the vast salient jutting out between Ypres and Verdun. The attack towards Mezieres would shepherd that part of. the Ger man armies towards the difficult country of the Ardennes and away from their natural line of retreat through Lorraine ; it was also dangerously close to the hinge of the Antwerp-Meuse line which the Germans were preparing in rear. The attack towards Maubeuge would threaten the other main line of communication and retreat through the Liege gap, but it had further to go. In these attacks, the Americans had the hardest natural obstacle, the Argonne forest ; the British had to face the strongest defences and the heaviest weight of enemy troops.

Pershing's attack, adding surprise to its five to one superiority in numbers, opened well, but lost impetus owing to the difficul ties of supply and exploitation in such country. When it was eventually suspended on Oct. 14, after bitter fighting and severe losses, the American army was still far distant from the vital railway. A new force, it was suffering the growing pains which the British had passed through in 1915-16. Pershing's difficul ties were enhanced by the fact that he had waived his own pro posal for an exploitation of the St. Mihiel success towards Metz in view of Haig's objection to a move which, however promising in its ultimate aim, would diverge from the general direction of the other Allied attacks. Haig desired that Pershing's attack should converge towards his in order more immediately to ease the task of the British troops. Foch's original plan for the general offensive had accordingly been readjusted, and in consequence Pershing had not only a more difficult sector but a bare week in which to prepare his blow. The shortness of time led him to use untried divisions instead of switching the more experienced divisions used at St. Mihiel. But in the outcome, Haig's insist ence was proved unnecessary, for the British attack broke through the Hindenburg line before the Meuse-Argonne attack had drawn away any German division from his front.