MacMahon, however, was not beaten yet. Ordering Bonne mains' cavalry division to charge by squadrons to gain time, he brought up his reserve artillery, and sent it forward to case-shot range to cover a final counter-stroke by his last intact battalions. But from his position near Froschweiler he could not see into the hollow between Elsasshausen and the Niederwald. The order was too late, and the artillery unlimbered just as the counter attack on the Niederwald alluded to above gave way before Schkopp's reserve. The guns were submerged in a flood of fugitives and pursuers. Elsasshausen passed into the hands of the Germans. To rescue the guns the nearest French infantry attacked in a suc cession of groups, charging home the bayonet with the utmost determination. Before each attack the Prussians immediately in front gave way, but those on the flanks swung inwards, and under this converging fire each French attempt died out, the Prussians following up their retreat. In this manner, step by step, in con fusion which almost defies analysis, the Prussians conquered the whole of the ground to the south of the Froschweiler-Worth road, but the French still held on in the village of FrOschweiler itself and in the woods to the north of the road, where throughout the day they had held the two Bavarian corps in check with little difficulty. To break down this last stronghold, the guns of the V. and XI. Corps, which had now come forward to the captured ridge of Elsasshausen, took the village as their target; and the great crowd of infantry, now flushed with victory but in the direst confusion, encouraged by the example of two horse artillery batteries, which galloped boldly forward to case-shot range, de livered one final rush which swept all resistance before it.
The battle was won and cavalry only were needed to reap its consequences, but the Prussian cavalry division had been left behind without orders and did not reach the battlefield till late at night. Under cover of darkness the French escaped, and on the
following day the cavalry division was quite unable to discover the direction of the retreat.
MacMahon received no support from the neighbouring French troops (see FRANCO-GERMAN WAR). The battle was won by over powering weight of numbers. The Prussian general staff were able to direct upon the field no fewer than 75,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry and 30o guns, of which 71,0oo rifles, 4,250 sabres and guns came into action against 32,000 rifles, 4,850 sabres and rot guns on the French side. The superiority of the French chassepot to the needle guns may reasonably be set against the superior number of rifles on the German side, for though the Germans were generally, thanks to their numbers, able to bring a converging fire upon the French, the latter made nearly double the number of hits for about the same weight of ammunition fired, but the French had nothing to oppose to the superior German artillery, and in almost every instance it was the terrible shell fire which broke up the French counter attack. All of these attacks were in the highest degree honourable to the French army, and many came nearer to imperilling the ultimate success of the Germans than is generally supposed even by students of military affairs. The losses of the Germans were 9,27o killed and wounded and 1,370 missing, or 13%; those of the French were about 8,000 killed and wounded, and perhaps 12,000 missing and prisoners, representing a total loss of about 41%.
See the French and German official histories of the war; H. Bonnal, Froschwiller (1899) ; H. Kunz, Schlacht von Worth (1891) and Kriegs gesch, Beispiele, Nos. 13-18; R. Tournes, De Gunstett au Niederwald and Le Calvaire; and Commandant Grange, "Les Realites du champ de bataille," Revue d'infanterie (1908-1o). (F. N. M.)