WRIT, in law, is a species of formal order from the Crown or a delegated officer to an inferior officer or to a private person, en joining some act or omission. The word represents the Latin brevis or breve (sometimes Englished into "brief" in the older authorities), so called from its "shortly" expressing the intention of the framer (quia breviter et paucis verbis intentionem pro ferentis exponit).
The breve can be traced back as far as Paulus (about A.D. 22o), who wrote a work Ad edictum de brevibus, cited in the Vatican Fragments, § 31o. In the Corpus iuris the word generally means a note-book or list. The interdictum of Roman law sometimes represents the writ of English law; e.g., there is considerable like ness between the Roman interdictum de libero homine exhibendo and the English writs of habeas corpus and de homine replegiando. From Roman law the breve passed into the Liber feudorum and the canon law, in both in a sense differing from that at present borne by the writ of English law. The breve testatum of the Liber feudorum was an instrument in writing evidencing the transfer of land.
The breve testatum in England developed into the deed of grant ; in Scotland into the charter, and later into the disposition. In canon law breve or brevilegium denoted a letter from the pope, sealed with the seal of the fisherman and less formal than a bull. In old English ecclesiastical law a brief—still named in one of the rubrics of the Book of Common Prayer—meant letters patent to church-wardens or other officers for the collection of alms. (For counsel's brief see BRIEF.) The origin of the writ is disputed, but its development was clearly influenced by both Anglo-Saxon and Norman law before the Conquest. The Anglo-Saxon contribution appears in the shape of diffuse royal charters, which were used to express the king's commands or wishes. Next, the form of these charters was infected by royal letters employed primarily for the publication of new laws, Which were communicated by such letters to the shire-moots and, presumably, to the hundred-moots and important persons.
These documents, cross-bred between charter and writ, show progress, but fall far short of the pure writ, which was concise, secular, practical and implicit with power. Writ-charters similar to those in England existed in Normandy before the Conquest. After that event, the chancery, or royal office which in England framed the king's orders, had some counterpart in Normandy, which did the like. The exact stages by which the writ disembar rassed itself of the charter element are not certain, but at any rate the process was a rapid one. The distinction between the two is known to have existed as early as 1071. The growth of a more robust Central Government hastened the separation, and in Glanvill's book (1187-89) not only are many writs included, but the idea has become so common that the author does not take the trouble to explain it. The writ, as thus developed, was of supreme importance in the growth of law and government. From the latter part of the 13th century to the early 18th century, if a man had no legal remedy he had no legal right. Without a writ he could not, in general, begin an action, and if there were no writ that covered his complaint he had no remedy. Nor was the writ confined to the initiation of litigation. It was also a machine for hosts of executive acts which never passed to the law courts at all. The chancery from which writs were issued was styled officina brevium, or "writ-shop." Writs had to be paid for, though occasionally poor men might get them free. Nor did Magna Carta c. 4o, make any difference in this respect, except to forbid prohibitive charges for writs in common form ("de cursu," or "of course"). At first new writs could be used freely, but in the Pro visions of Oxford, 1258, the chancellor swore that he would seal no writs except those "of course" without the command of the king and his council; and the statute of Westminster II, 1285, while it recognized the power of the chancery clerks to make writs for cases similar (in consimili case) to those already covered by existing writs, impliedly forbade them to create new writs, that being the province of parliament. But this statute did not seri ously hamper the chancery, for the clerks showed great dexterity in varying existing writs to meet new circumstances.