Collections of writs were made at an early period. They were entitled Registra Brevium, and the oldest one extant is dated 1227. These collections were unofficial, though of course the writs embodied in them originated in the chancery. For three centuries Registrum Brevium continuously multiplied in copies and swelled in bulk. The mss. of it are at present beyond computa tion. Their number and increasing length testify to the industry of the chancery and to the striking import of the writ as one of the modes of keeping law and government reasonably abreast of the needs of the community. Registrum Brevium was first printed in 1531. After that it practically ceased to grow, for it was being outgrown by the law itself, which needed something more elastic.
The chief reason why the writ fell into the background as an agency in the growth of our law is that the centre of gravity in legal procedure shifted from the writ to the plaintiff's written "declaration," which specified the details of his claim. It was this rather than the writ which came to determine the form of action. The correct form of action was vital to success in litiga tion. If the plaintiff chose the wrong one, he was, in general, without a remedy. True, a selection of the wrong writ was, even till the 19th century, equally disastrous, but then, in most cases, it had ceased to be compulsory on a plaintiff to begin his action by an original writ, though its existence was always assumed. There were many other ways in which litigation could be begun, and there is reason to think that they were usually preferred to the original writ, which was neither cheap nor convenient. The transference of energy from the writ to the declaration was a gradual process. So long as the pleadings in an action were oral, the writ must of necessity have attracted to itself all the weight which the written word carries as against the spoken word. But by degrees litigants adopted the practice of exchanging written pleadings. This was well recognized in the 16th and 17th centuries, though the seeds of it are traceable some time before. The multi plicity of writs and of other devices for commencing a common law action was remedied with respect to personal actions by the Uniformity of Process in Personal Actions Act, 1832 (2 Will. IV. c. 39), which substituted for these methods a simple, uniform, writ of summons. Further amendments were made in 1833, by 3 and 4 Will. IV. c. 27, s. 36, which abolished writs in real actions
with the exception of those relating to dower, quare impedit, and ejectment, and by 3 and 4 Will. IV. c. 42, in connection with the writs of debt and of detinue. The Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, s. 3, dispensed with the need of mentioning any form of action in the writ on a personal action, and the Judicature Acts, 1873-75, contain the complete remodelling of procedure under which English civil law is administered in the Supreme Court of Judicature. The Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883, made in pursuance of this legislation, now require every action in the High Court to be commenced by a writ of summons, indorsed with a statement of the nature of the claim made, or of the relief or remedy required in the action. The writ, therefore, nowadays differs considerably in form from its ancient predecessor. And an equally striking distinction is to be found in its much narrower scope as compared with the writs of Registrum Brevium. They dealt with almost every conceivable matter of executive govern ment as well as with legal procedure. But now the province of writs has shrunk to the institution of litigation except in the realm of constitutional law, where writs still issue for the election of members to the House of Commons and for the attendance of individual members in the House of Lords. Elsewhere, more convenient methods of expressing the will of the executive have ousted the writ ; such are Orders in Council, Royal Proclamations, Letters Patent, and regulations made by various Government departments.
The writ, though issuing from the king's chancery, did not, where it was concerned with litigation, necessarily direct the trial of the question in the king's court. In whatever court it was returnable, it frequently called in the aid of the sheriff as executive officer. In such cases, it was either addressed to him or, if addressed to the party alleged to be in default, it concluded with a threat of constraint by the sheriff in the event of disobedience, generally in these terms, et, nisi feceris, vicecomes de N. faciat ne amplius clamorem audiamus pro defectu iustitiae. If the writ was returnable in the county court or the lord's court, the sheriff or the lord sat as the deputy of the king ; he did not sit by virtue of his own inherent jurisdiction. The writ was not necessary for the initiation of proceedings there or before the justices in eyre.