ESTABLISHMENTS TOR THE PURPOSES OF WAR.
The French army first assumed a regular form under Henry IV.; but its peace establishment, includ ing both horse and foot, did not then exceed 10,000 men, while the whole charge for the war department, including ordnance and half pay, was L.500,000. In 1610 Henry carried his army to a war establish ment of 40,000 men. In 1640, under the able ad ministration of Richelieu, France took an active part in the war of Germany, carrying her force at one time to 100,000 men, and her expenditure to the then unexampled sum of L.4,000,000 Sterling in one year. In 1659, Louis XIV., already full of ambi. tious projects, kept up a peace establishment of 70,000 men ; and the war of 1672, having brought Germany, Holland, and Spain, into the field against France, the force of the latter was carried to the number of 160,000 men. From 1679 to 1688 there was peace, but Louis passed the interval in prepar. ing for war, and the introduction of the funding sys tem now enabled France, England, and Holland, to surpass all their former exertions. The contest be gun in 1688 required on the part of France a force of between 200,000 and 300,000 men. The peace of Utrecht gave a long repose to exhausted France, and the war of 1741 did not, until conducted in its advanced stage by Marshal Saxe, call forth a mili tary force equal to that of Louis XIV. In the war of 1756, the French army was less numerous, and far less ably commanded. During the continental peace of thirty years (from 1762 to 1792) its esta blishment was kept, with little fluctuation, at 100,000 men.
The war of the Revolution began with a force on the part of France t of only 140,000 men ; but this was speedily augmented by the compulsory levies of February 1793, and by the still more comprehensive operation of the requisition in September. The re publican spirit was now at its height, and the unli mited issue of assignats led to the maintenance of a force, hitherto unexampled in the annals of any country, ancient or modern. In 1794, the French.
In 1795 the assignats lost their power, and France was obliged to reduce her army by a third, but its discipline was now greatly improved. During the campaigns of 1795, 1796, and 1797, as well as in those of 1799 and 1800, the force maintained by France and Holland was between 300,000 and 400,000. At the peace of Amiens, Bonaparte kept up a peace establishment of 300,000 men, and after the renewal of war it was raised • to 400,000, a force with which he triumphed in 1805 over the united arms of Austria and Russia. His annual levy of French conscripts, though apparently only 80,000, amount ed (Declaration of the Minister at War, 18th Sep tember 1809) to 100,000; a supply which, joined to the recruits of his allies in Germany and Italy, kept up his numbers, and even increased them, notwith standing the wasteful campaigns of 1806 and 1807 in Poland, followed by the no less wasteful campaigns of Spain. In 1812 the force of France and her al lies reached their maximum, Bonaparte having led against the Russian Empire a mass of 360,000 men, while there remained in Spain, Germany, and France, a number which carried the aggregate to between 500,000 and 600,000. Need we then wonder, that, even after the almost total loss of his troops in Russia, there remained a force competent, with the aid of fresh levies, to withstand the efforts of the allies during two campaigns ! In 1815, Bonaparte, in returning from Elba, found under arms in France about 120,000 men, all of whom, with the exception of a few thousands, re joined his standard. But so sick were the French of war, that the greatest efforts, during the next three months, added only 60,000 to this number, and the loss of one battle exposed all the hopeless ness of resistance to the allies.