8. As happiness is the end, and the means ought to be nicely adapted to the end, it is necessary to inquire, What are the qualities of mind which chiefly conduce to happiness,—both the happiness of the individual himself, and the happiness of his fellow creatures ? It appears to us, that this distribution includes the whole of the subject. Each of these divisions branches itself out into a great number of inquiries. And, it is manifest, that the complete develops. mint of any one of them would require a greater space than we can allow for the whole. It is, there fore, necessary for us, if we aim at a comprehensive view, to confine ourselves to a skeleton; and this we think is both the most instructive course we can pursue, and the best adapted to the nature of the work for which it is designed.
The next question is, Which of these three divi sions of the inquiry it will be most advantageous to the developement of the subject to begin with. The first, it is evident, is the most practical, and, there fore, likely to be the most interesting. Under the Physical Head, it includes inquiries into the mode in which the qualities of the ind are affected by the health, the aliment, the air, the labour, &c. to which the individual is subject. Under the Moral Head it includes inquiries into what may be called, I. Do mestic education, or the mode in which the mind of the individual is liable to be formed by the conduct of the individuals composing the family in which he is born and bred : 2. Technical or scholastic educa tion, including all those exercises upon which the individual is put, as means to the acquisition of ha bits,—habits either conducive to intellectual and moral excellence, or even to the practice of the manual arts : 3. Social education, or the mode in which the mind of the individual is liable to be af fected by the conduct of the men who form the so ciety in which he moves : 4. Political education, or the mode in which the mind of the individual is act ed upon by the nature of the political institutions under which he lives.
The two latter divisions comprehend what is more purely theoretical; and the discussion of them will, therefore, have fewer attractions to that class of readers, unhappily numerous, to whom intellectual exercises have not by habit been rendered delightful. To the inquiries, however, which are included under the first division, it appears, that those included un der the two last are required as a foundation. The fact is, that good practice can, in no case, have any solid foundation but in sound theory. This is not more important, than it is demonstrable and certain. For, is theory ? It is the putting the whole of the knowledge, which we possess upon any sub ject, into that order and form in which it is most easy to draw from it good practical rules. Let any
one examine this definition, article by article, and show us that it fails in a single particular. If it does not, let us no longer hear of the separation of theory from practice.
1. The first, then, of the inquiries, the great subject of education, is that which the nature of the human mind : and the business is, 'agreeably to the foregoing definition of theory, to put the knowledge which we possess respecting the human mind, into that order and form, which is most advantageous for drawing from it the practical rules of education. The question is, How the mind, with those properties which it possesses, can, through the operation of certain means, be rendered most con ducive to a certain end?? To answer this question, the whole of its properties must be known. Tie whole science of human nature is, therefore, but a branch of the science of educatien. Nor can edu cation assume its most perfect form, till the science of the human mind has reached its highest point of im vement. Even an outline, however, of the p. shy of the human mind would exceed the proportion of the present article ; we must, there fore, show what ought to be done, rather than at tempt, in any degree, to execute so extensive a pro. jact.
With respect to the human mind, as with respect to every thing else, all that passes with us, under the name of knowledge, is either matter of experience, or, to wry on the analogy of expression, matter of guess. The first is real licnowledge : the properties of the object correspond to it. The latter 18 MI* sititious knowledge, and the properties of the ect do or do not correspond to it ; most likely not. first thing desirable is, to make an exact separation of those two kinds of knowledge; and, as much as possible, to confine ourselves to the first.
What, then, is it which we experience with re gard to the human mind ? and what is it which we guess ? We have experience of ourselves, when we see, when we hear, when we taste, when we imagine, when we fear, when we lone, when we desire; and so on. And we give names, as above, to distinguish what we experience of ourselves, on one of those oc casions, from what we experience on another. We have experience of other men exhibiting signs of having similar experiences of themselves, that is, of seeing, hearing, and so on. It is necessary to ex.. plain, shortly, what is here meant by a sign. When we ourselves see, hear, im4ne, &c. certain actions of ours commonly follow. We know, accordingly, that if any one, observing those actions, were to in fer that we had been seeing, hearing, &c., the infer rence would be just. As often then as we observe similar actions in other men, we infer that they, too, have been seeing or hearing ; and we thus regard the action as the sign.