Having got names to distinguish the state or ex perience of ourselves, when we say, I see, I hear, I wish, and so on ; we find occasion for a name which will distinguish the having of any (be it what it may) of those experiences, from the being altogether with out them; and, for this purpose, we say, I feel, which will apply, generally, to any of the cases in which we say, I see, or hear, or remember, or fear; and comprehends the meaning of them all. The term I think, is commonly used for a purpose near ly the same. But it is not quite so comprehensive. There are several things which we should undoubt edly include under the term our experience of our mind, to which we should not extend the term I think. But there is nothing whatsoever included under it to which we should not extend the term I feel; this is truly, therefore, the generic term.
All our experience, then, of the human mind, is confined to the several occasions on which the term I feel can be applied. And, now, What does all this experience amount to ? What is the know ledge which it affords ? It is, first, a knowledge of the feelings themselves; we can remember what, one by one, they were. It is, next, a knowledge of the order in which they follow one another; and this is all. But this description, though a just one, is so very general as to be little instructive. It is however, to speak about these feel ings minutely and correctly ; because the language which we must apply to tm is ill adapted to the Purlxisr Let us advert to the first branch of that knew the knowledge of the feelings themselves.
This, in the simple cases, may be regarded as easy ; the feeling is distinct at the moment of experience, and is distinctly remembered afterwards. But the difficulty is great with the complex cases. It is found, that a great number of simple feelings are apt to become so closely united, as often to assume the appearance of only one feeling, and to render it extremely difficult to distinguish from one another the simple feelings of which it is composed. And one of the grand questions which divide the mental philosophers of the present day, is to determine which feelings are simple, and which are complex.
• There are two sorts which have, by all, been re garded as simple: Those which we have when we say, I hear, I see, I feel, I taste, I smell, . inn to the five senses, and which Mr. Hume (pushed by the name of impressions; and the feel. ings corresponding to these impressions, which Mr. Hume calls ideas of them; the second taking place only in consequence of the first, and being, as it were, a revival of them ; not the same feelings with the impressions, by any means ; but feelings which bear a certain resemblance to them. Thus, when a
man sees the light of noon, the feeling he has is called an impression,--the impression of light ; when he shuts his eyes and has a feeling,—the type or re. lict of the impression,—he is not said to see the light, or to have the impression of light, but to conceive the light, or lave an idea of it.
These two,—impressions, and their correspondent ideas,—are simple feelings, in the opinion of all philosophers. But there is one set of philosophers who dunk that these are the only simple feelings, and that all the rest are merely combinations of them. There is another class of philosophers who think that there are original feelings beside impres sions and ideas; as those which- correspond to the words remember, believe,judge, space, time, &c. Of the first are Hartley and his followers in England, Condillac and his followers in France; of the second description are Dr. Reid and his followers in this country, Kant and the German school of metaphy sicia' na in general on the Continent.
It is evident, that the determination of this ques tion with regard to the first branch of knowledge, namely, what the feelings are? is of very great im.
with regard to the second branch of know , namely, what is the order in which- those feelings succeed one another ? For how can it be known how they succeed one another, if we are ig norant which of than enter into those several groups which form the component parts of the tzsin? It is of vast importance, then, for the business of education, that the analysis of mind should be accu rately performed; in other words, that all our corn.
plex feelings should be accurately resolved into the simple ones of which they are composed. This, too, is of absolute necessity for the accurate use of lan guage; as the greater number of words are employ. ed to denote those groups of simple feelings which we call complex ideas.
In regard to all the events in this world, of which feeliUgs,are a class, our knowledge extends not be. yond two points. The first is, a knowledge of the events themselves; the second is, a knowledge of the order of their succession. The expression in words of the first kind of knowledge is history ; the expression of the second is philosophy ; and to ren der that expression short and clear is the ultimate aim of philosophy.