LEUCTRA, BATTLE OF, 371 B. C. Leuctra, a village of Boeotia in the territory of Thespiae, is chiefly noticeable in the annals of general history for the battle fought in its neighbour hood in 371 B.C. between the Thebans and the Spartans and their allies. But in military history it is far more than noticeable—in fact, epoch-making. For here the "oblique order" was born which came to maturity under Alexander the Great, and was resurrected in modern times with equally startling success by Frederick the Great. And apart from its originality, at Leuctra Epameinondas's manoeuvre was in some ways more unconven tional in its execution than those of his more famous successors. This is the more remarkable when we judge him by the criterion of his time, and remember that he was flagrantly breaking with the tradition of centuries of warfare.
A Peloponnesian army, about i o,000 strong, which had in vaded Boeotia from Phoecis, was confronted by a Boeotian levy of perhaps 6,000 soldiers under Epaminondas (q.v.). In spite of inferior numbers and the doubtful loyalty of his Boeotian allies, Epameinondas offered battle on the plain before the village.
The Peloponnesian army formed up in the traditional man ner, with the Spartans on the right under their king, Cleombrotus, who was in command of the whole. Instead of following suit and placing his best on the right, Epameinondas not merely re versed this procedure but massed a so-deep column of Theban infantry on his left wing, with the famous Sacred Band at its head and cavalry protecting its flank. He sent forward this body in advance of his centre and right wing, thus by "refusing" the latter, saving it from the otherwise inevitable overlapping which would have occurred on contact with the enemy. After a cavalry engagement in which the Thebans drove their opponents off the field, the decisive issue was f ought out between the Theban and Spartan foot. The latter, though fighting well, could not sus tain in their 12-deep formation the cumulative impact of their opponents' column, and were hurled back with a loss of about 2,000 men, of whom 700 were Spartan citizens, including the king Cleombrotus. Seeing their right wing beaten, the rest of the Peloponnesians retired and left the enemy in possession of the field. Owing to the arrival of a Thessalian army under
Jason of Pherae, whose friendship they did not trust, the Thebans were unable to exploit their victory. But the battle is none the less of great significance in Greek history. Its political effects were far-reaching, for the loss in material strength and prestige which the Spartans here sustained deprived them for ever of their supremacy in Greece. But by its influence on tactics it was still more far-reaching, for it was to affect vitally the out come of the struggle between Greece and Persia and both indi rectly and directly the destiny of modern Europe. It is the first known instance of a deliberate concentration of strength against a vital point of the enemy's formation as a means, first, to offset an inferiority on the whole front by a local superiority at the decisive point, and, secondly, to obtain a decision by dislocating instead of merely wearing down the enemy's body. This is the true art of war. And it is specially significant that Epameinon das directed his concentration against the enemy's command, the moral objective, because the seat of his will to victory.
See Xenophon, Hellenica, vi. 4, 3-15; Diodorus xi. 53-56; Plutarch, Pelopidas, ch. 20-23 ; Pausanias ix. 13, 2-10; H. Delbriick, Geschichte der Kriegskunst (1900), i. 13o ff.