Both armies had large masses of cavalry, but there was a pro nounced difference in their tactics. The Austrian cavalry seldom practised dismounted fire action and were singularly ineffective on foot ; the Russian cavalry, on the other hand, fought largely as mounted infantry. The Russian artillery shot well and was far more effective than the Austrian, but the musketry of the Austrian infantryman was better than that of his rival; he was also handier in manoeuvre. The morale on both sides was excellent at the beginning, although that of the Austrian was to deteriorate rapidly under defeat. In the higher command the Russians held the advantage. Ivanov, the generalissimo of the south-western front, was no strategist, though an experienced and well-loved corn mander ; but his chief of staff, Alexeyev, was one of the best brains of the army; and in Ruiski (III. Army), Plehve (V. Army), Brusilov (VIII. Army), and Ewarth (IV. Army) he had under him probably the four ablest army commanders in Russia— certainly the four most successful. Conrad, the virtual com mander-in-chief of the Austrian armies—the Archduke Friedrich was the nominal head—was a man of determined and obstinate character, but a better strategist in the office than in the field; nor were the Austrian army commanders the equals of the Russian.
Numerically, the Russians had a slight advantage. The Aus trian striking wing, which comprised 35o battalions, iso squadrons and iso batteries, was superior in strength to the Russian IV. and V. Armies which had each four corps and two cavalry divisions; but their defensive wing (200 battalions, 170 squadrons, 130 batteries) was considerably inferior to the Russian III. and VIII. Armies, especially before the arrival of the two corps of the II. Army which had been left opposite Serbia.
On Aug. 15, before concentration was complete, the Austrian cavalry pushed forward to ascertain the Russian movements, but gathered little information. On Aug. 20 the I. and IV. Armies be gan their offensive. The first engagements in the neighbourhood of Krasnik were favourable to the Austrians, the advanced troops of the Russian IV. Army being driven back on Lublin. The Austrian I. Army was strengthened by Kummer's Landsturm Corps, which crossed the Vistula to join it, while Woyrsch's Corps of German Landwehr was in close touch on the left bank of the Vistula. The mission of these two formations to foment an insur rection in Russian Poland had proved fruitless.
Meanwhile the Austrian covering force (II. and III. Armies) had met with disaster. Although the II. Army consisted of one corps only and the III. Army was weakened by the absorption of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's group in the Komarow battle, yet the High Command sent the two armies forward to the attack. They joined battle with the Russian III. and VIII. Armies on Aug. 26 on the line of the Ziota Lipa about Zloczow. On the evening of Aug. 27 they were forced to retreat. Reinforced by the VII. Corps from Serbia, they again gave battle on the Gnila Lipa on Aug. 29 and 3o, and again suffered defeat. They now fell back through Lemberg, which was evacuated on Sept. 2, and took up a defensive position west of the city on the line of the Wereszyca and the Grodek lakes.
The rear of the advancing Austrian I. and IV. Armies was seriously threatened by the failure of the eastern wing. The question now arose of withdrawing the whole of the Austrian forces to the line of the San, or of continuing the battle round Lemberg on a different plan. Conrad chose the bolder course and determined to seek an immediate victory. He ordered the IV. Army to break off pursuit of the Russians and to change front from north to south. The plan was that this army should strike towards Lemberg at the right flank of the advancing Russians, while the II. and III. Armies held them frontally. The com plicated wheel of the IV. Army had been executed by Sept. 5. On Sept. 6 it commenced its march southwards, leaving behind a group under the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand to protect its rear. As it advanced south, its left column became engaged with the right of the Russian III. Army and was pinned to the east of Rawa-Ruska, while the centre and right columns, meeting no resistance, continued southwards, and eventually wheeled into line with the Austrian III. and II. Armies, facing east.
Conrad changed his plan again; he had missed with his left, so now, like an obstinate but unskilful boxer, swung his right at the enemy, viciously but ineffectively. On Sept. 7 he ordered the IV. Army to stand fast and hold the Russians to their ground, while the II. and III. Armies left their prepared defensive posi tions and struck northward at the Russian left wing. A radical change of plan so hurriedly evolved was hardly likely to succeed. The II. and III. Armies could make little ground, while the posi tion of the IV. Army rapidly became untenable. In its rear the I. Army was being forced back from Lublin by the reinforced Rus sian IV. Army, while the Russian V. Army had rallied and was again advancing, driving before it the Archduke Joseph Fer dinand's weak group. Finally the left wing of the IV. Army itself was being outflanked north of Rawa-Ruska by the Russian III. Army. On Sept. i i Conrad issued orders for a general retreat to the line of the San.