LEMBERG, BATTLES OF. Lemberg (Polish, Lwow), the capital town of Galicia, was twice during the World War the centre of a series of battles. The first series constituted the open ing campaign between Russia and Austro-Hungary in Aug. and Sept. 1914; it resulted in the defeat of the Austrians and the occupation by the Russians of the whole of Eastern Galicia. The second series was fought some ten months later during the great Russian retreat which was started by Mackensen's offensive on the Dunajec in May 1915. It gave Austria re-possession of Lem berg and of practically the whole of Eastern Galicia.
The main concentration of the Austro-Hungarian forces for action against Russia at the opening of war in Aug. 1914 was made in Central and Eastern Galicia. In the general plan of the Central Powers the role of the Austro-Hungarian army was to engage the main Russian forces till the German army had over whelmed France and was free to transfer its principal weight to the Eastern theatre. Two main alternatives were open to the Austrians, to await attack or themselves to take the offensive. If the former course were chosen, the line of the river San, between the Carpathians and the Vistula, was indicated as the strongest available position. On this they might well hope by an active defence to hold up the maximum Russian effort for some time and to win local successes by counter-attack. But defence en tailed not only the abandonment of Eastern Galicia but also the surrender of the passes over the Eastern Carpathians and the opening of a road into Hungary. This might have serious political consequences. Moreover, in the years preceding the War, the military opinion of almost every country in Europe had pro claimed insistently that offensive action was the solution of all major difficulties in war. Certainly Conrad von Hotzendorf, the chief of the Austrian general staff, optimistic by temperament, was not the man to adopt a defensive attitude willingly. He deter mined to attack, though the advantages hoped for from a speedier mobilization were not secured owing to errors made during the preliminary deployment against Serbia.
The chosen line of attack was northwards against one flank of the Polish salient ; probably Conrad hoped that a German offen sive might eventually be made from East Prussia against the other flank of the salient. The problem of supply was not easy, since the terrain between the Vistula and Bug rivers, where the advance was to be made, had been left, at the instance of the Russian general staff, without good communications in anticipation of the Austrian plan. It was indeed the obvious direction of any invasion of Russia from Galicia, since an advance eastwards would leave the lines of communication exposed, while to the north-east lay the trackless marshes of the Pripet.
North of the Vistula, Kummer's group of Austrian Landsturm and Woyrsch's corps of German Landwehr were to advance on Sandomierz and Doblin (Iwangorod) respectively, to protect the left flank of the I. Army and to foster a Polish rising in favour of Austria.
The Russians also deployed four armies on their south-western front. Their plan was almost the exact counterpart of the Austrian. They purposed to hold the Austrian offensive wing by a defensive force of two armies on the line Lublin-Chelm, and to smash the Austrian defensive wing by an offensive group of two armies advancing west from the Kiev military district on Lemberg. Each of the opponents was thus dependent on the power of his defen sive wing to resist the shock of the other's striking force long enough to enable him to gain a decision by his main effort.