If, however, our standard of judgment for the results of the eight years is not the pre-War position but the ultimate ideals of the League, it is no less clear that the League's work is only in its infancy. The League is not yet universal in its composi tion. Its ability to deal with a first-class dispute between first class Powers has fortunately not yet been tested. There is as yet no complete assurance that such a dispute would find the League united and effective. Nor has more than a beginning been made in removing the causes from which such disputes may arise. This, the ultimate object of the League, must in the nature of the case be a progressive, and indeed a permanent task. It means a complete, if gradual, revolution in the traditional and historic attitude of the nations of the world to each other and a trans formation of many of their policies. In this work the League may lead, but it can never advance far beyond, the public opinion of the world. The scope is illimitable and the task unending.
(A. SA.) The Years After 1928.—The years since 1928 have been critical for the League of Nations. Perhaps it could hardly be expected that the League would escape its share in the most serious depression the world has ever known. Increasing tend ency toward an extreme nationalism to meet domestic problems of utmost urgency would result inevitably in severe strain upon the machinery of international co-operation. Where considerable sacrifices of nationalist ambitions were called for, the League has therefore met with great difficulties. In its less spectacular but important role of smoothing the path of international intercourse through the securing of agreements on common technical prob lems, steady progress has been achieved.
Before discuss ing the various phases of the League's work, it is well to indicate the changes in composition and structure that have occurred in recent years. League membership has assumed a more universal aspect through the admission of six states, Afghanistan, Ecuador, Iraq (the first state to pass from a mandatory regime to inde pendence), Mexico, Turkey, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the last of special significance. On the other hand, two great powers, Japan and Germany, have withdrawn from the League under circumstances described below. The United States in recent years has offered increasing co-operation, climaxed by its adherence to the International Labour Organization in August,
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, upon her admission in September, 1934, was made the sixth permanent member of the Council, though withdrawal of Japan and Germany now re duces the number of permanent Council members to four. The number of non-permanent members of the Council was in 1933 provisionally increased from nine to ten, in order to provide a place for those states, not belonging to any particular geographical or political grouping, whose chances for Council membership, under the existing system of regional representation, had hitherto appeared remote.
Until 1932 executive action for the preservation of peace had always been regarded as a function in which the Council should take the lead. In that year, however, the Assembly was appealed to by China, when the Council had failed to act effectively, and it pursued a prompt and vigorous course which increased its authority and prestige.
The League has, in the period under review, lost its first Secre tary-General, Sir James Eric Drummond, a veritable "charter member," named in the Annex to the Covenant. His resignation, effective in June, 1933, was received with profound regret, for no small part of whatever success the League had attained during its first decade was due to his tact and skill. M. Joseph Avenol of France was elected his successor.
With the spirit of na tionalism everywhere in the ascendant, League machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes did not until 1935 function with the hoped-for effectiveness. The League's failure to bring about a peaceful adjustment of the differences between China and Japan was a set-back of the first order. On the other hand, in cases where the parties concerned could be brought to a realization of their responsibilities under the Covenant, several successes have been achieved. In the case of Japan, the fault did not appear to lie with the League's machinery as such, but rather in the unwill ingness of the great powers to utilize it. Now in the closing months of 1935, led by Great Britain and France, the League has at last come to grips with the question of whether its machinery is adequate to protect a weaker nation against aggression, prevent a major conflict, and effect a just peace.
In September, 1931, Japan, in an at tempt to protect her special position in Manchuria which she felt was jeopardized by Chinese nationalism, undertook extensive mili tary operations which finally resulted in the complete separation of the territory in question from China and the establishment of an independent state under Japanese domination. Hope that the League would be able to prevent just such forceful revision of the status quo had been one of the fundamental reasons for its creation. But the methods that the League can employ are re stricted to those which its leading members will support. Sanc tions, though urged in many quarters, were not used, because the great powers upon whom the burden of enforcement would rest refused to run the risk of war with Japan to compel her to ob serve her Covenant obligations. The methods adopted, namely, attempts at conciliation, impartial investigation, world-wide con demnation proved ineffective.