Hungary

Immediately after the first explosion, the Council, at the re quest of China, took jurisdiction over the dispute. Finding it self unable to effect a cessation of hostilities or to devise con ciliatory procedure acceptable to both sides, it appointed a neu tral commission to go to Manchuria and investigate the funda mental causes of the controversy. The commission found that a restoration of the status quo would be undesirable, but it pro posed a solution designed to preserve the integrity of China while maintaining Japanese privileges in Manchuria. The Assembly, to which the dispute had now been referred by China, adopted these views as its own and recommended in addition that all states should withhold recognition of the new Manchoukuo. The United States officially approved. Japan, however, refused to agree to any settlement not based on Manchoukuo's independence, and when confronted by unanimous insistence, withdrew from the League.

Public condemnation and continued non-recognition of the altered status of Manchuria have not been able to shake the Japanese position. In spite of the League's failure to persuade Japan to settle her differences with China by peaceful methods, the report of the Lytton Commission and the subsequent action of the Assembly were unprecedented events, marking the first time that a great power's course of action was made subject to disinterested review, and the first example of unanimous con demnation of that same power by an international body.

Italy and Ethiopia.

Perhaps the League learned certain lessons from its experience with Japan; undoubtedly the interests of leading European powers, particularly Great Britain, were far more vitally affected by Italy's current attempt at expansion in Africa, than by Japan's adventure in Manchuria. In any case when vanishing trade, increasing population, and unemployment presented problems which the Italian Government decided to meet by the time-honoured method of a colonial campaign, the League acted with a swiftness and decision which surprised even its friends. True, there were some months of inaction and hesita tion following on the Wal Wal border incident of December, But when Italian troops actually began their forward movement in Ethiopia in October of 1935, the Council formally found Italy the aggressor. Two days later a committee composed of represen tatives of all member states moved toward the imposition of sanctions against Italy. The measures decided upon, to take full effect on November 18, 1935, were (I) an arms embargo, (2) ban on loans and credits, (3) boycott of Italian imports, (4) em bargo on export of certain key raw materials.

Great Britain's representatives took the lead along these un tried paths, with apparently unanimous support of her people. At the same time Sir Samuel Hoare, speaking for Britain in the League Assembly, expressed sympathy for Italy's needs and pledged willingness on the part of his Government to open the question of distribution of raw materials. France in spite of spe cial friendship for Italy, was almost equally firm. President Roosevelt, for the United States, recognized the state of war in Ethiopia even before League action, and declared the arms em bargo (against both parties) for which recent neutrality legisla tion had provided. He warned Americans against shipping goods to either belligerent, and travel on belligerent ships.

Th,. need for a rigid embargo on oil supplies, which might have proved effective to stem the tides of war, was appreciated by the League. But this sanction was, in fact, never imposed. At the con clusion of hostilities between Italy and Ethiopia in 1936, the League raised the sanctions imposed on Italy since they had failed to achieve their purpose, but refused to recognize the Italian occu pation of Abyssinia.

Disputes in South America.

Further indication that the effectiveness of the peace machinery depends on the willingness of nations to make use of it is revealed by two wars in South America. Both originated in boundary disputes distinctly sus ceptible to adjudication. Bolivia and Paraguay, however, in their bitter contest over the Gran Chaco, for years rejected all sugges tions for peace. The earlier difficulty seems to have been a con flict of jurisdiction between the League and groups of American neutrals, which were attempting to mediate. Later, when the task was turned over fully to the League, and it followed the same procedure as in Manchuria, the bitterness engendered by the con flict made conciliation extremely difficult.

Bolivia finally accepted certain League proposals, but Paraguay failed to do so, and when an arms embargo imposed by 28 League powers was consequently raised as against Bolivia, Paraguay in February, 1935 gave notice of withdrawal from the League. At this point neighbouring South American States again took the lead, with the happy result that hostilities were definitely ended in June, and a peace conference is now in session.