LODZ, BATTLE OF, 1914. The repulse at the end of Oct. 1914 of their first offensive in Poland (see VIS TULA-SAN) placed the Germans in a perilous position on the East ern Front. The were again in retreat, and were rapidly becoming demoralised; the Germans themselves, on the northern part of the Eastern Front, were greatly outnumbered and could expect no considerable reinforcement till the Ypres battle in the west had been decided. The evident intention of the Russian Commander-in-Chief, the Grand Duke Nicholas, was to advance on the great industrial region of Silesia. In their retreat from Warsaw and Poland the Germans had done their best by elaborate destruction of communications to impose as slow a rate as possible on this advance ; but their numbers were insufficient to stem the oncoming tide of Russia's hordes by a direct defence. Invasion of German territory might be slow, but it seemed inevitable.
Ludendorff's Plan.—The German High Command solved their portion of the problem by placing Hindenburg, commander of the IX. Army, in charge of all German forces on the Eastern Front (VIII. and IX. Armies and Woyrsch's detachment) and instructing him to do his best without immediate reinforcement. Hindenburg kept Ludendorff as his chief of staff, and the latter at once proposed a characteristically bold solution. This was to withdraw the IX. Army from Central and southern Poland and, taking advantage of the excellent railway system, to transfer it north to a base between Posen and Torun (Thorn), from which to strike a blow at the Grand Duke's communications as he ad vanced southwest on Silesia. The plan was an audacious one. In the first place it left the direct route to the enemy's objective, the province of Silesia, barred only by the unreliable Austrians and by weak German elements. Ludendorff 'trusted to the de stroyed communications and to the customary Russian sluggish ness of manoeuvre for time sufficient to carry out the contem plated counterstroke. Secondly, East Prussia, again threatened by invasion, would be further denuded of defenders, for Luden dorff proposed to call on the VIII. Army to furnish a quota to
his striking force. Lastly, the manoeuvre involved thrusting a body of between five and six corps within reach of Russian forces twice that size, and the greater the success of the blow, the deeper the penetration into the Russian rear, the heavier would be the weight of the enemy masses concentrated on it. But the result of the battle of Tannenberg had been to persuade Hindenburg and Ludendorff that disparity in numbers could be largely discounted with the Russians as foes.
Disposition of the Russian Forces.—On the Russian side, the first fortnight of Nov. 1914 saw the high-water mark of that onward sweep towards Germany of Russia's exhaustless masses, on which the Allies had built such high hopes. There were at this time eight Russian armies deployed. The X. Army, which had replaced the defeated I. Army on the eastern frontier of East Prussia, had begun to move forward. The I. and II. Armies, to the northwest and west of Warsaw, protected the flank of the main advance by the V., IV. and IX. Armies; on the south, the III. and VIII. Armies covered the left flank by pressure on the Austrian main forces in the direction of Cracow. But progress was slow, hampered by difficulties of supply; and already the Russians were beginning to feel that shortage of munitions and of trained drafts which was to lead to their disasters of 1915.
Their armies were strung out in linear formation and no central reserves were available.
The point of attack chosen by Ludendorff for the IX. Army under Mackensen, which now comprised 51 corps and two cavalry divisions, was the junction between the I. and II. Russian Armies. The Vistula and Warta rivers, to east and west, would protect the flanks of the German advance. To prevent any transfer of Russian forces. from north of the Vistula, a detachment, mainly of fortress troops, was to advance on Mlawa, while another pushed up the right bank of the river towards Plock.