Battle of Lodz

The Russian I. Army was spread over a wide front with three corps north of the Vistula between Mlawa and Nock and two corps south of the river—the V. Siberian at Wloclawek and the II. Corps (lately transferred from the II. Army) between Kutno and Lcczyca. The II. Army was on the Warta, west of Lodz directed on Kalisz. The V. Army was on the left of the II. and was approaching the upper Warta.

First Battle of Lodz.—Mackensen began his advance on Nov. I 1. On the i 2th the isolated Siberian V. Corps at Wloclawek was overwhelmed and driven back on Plock. Two days later the II. Corps acting as a link between the I. and II. Armies about Kutno, and the XXIII., the right corps of the II. Army, were defeated by greatly superior numbers and driven south. Scheide mann, commander of the Russian II. Army, now tried to wheel his corps from their line on the Warta to a position north-east of Lodz, the chief manufacturing town of Poland. But the Ger man movements were too sure and rapid for the ponderous Rus sian counter-march. The columns of the II. Army were attacked in turn as they came up and were thrown back on Lodz.

Meanwhile the two defeated corps of the

I. Army, now joined by the Siberian VI. Corps from north of the Vistula, were forced back towards Warsaw and away from Lodz. Into the gap be tween the two Russian armies Mackensen thrust three divisions, the two of the XXV. Res. Corps and the 3rd Guard Div. and his two cavalry divisions, with instructions to pass round the right flank of the II. Army and encircle Lodz from the south. A corps formed from the Breslau garrison, which had now come up from the west, was to turn the left wing of the Russian II. Army, pinned in front by the attacks of the German XI., XVII. and XX. Corps. Ludendorff was aiming at a second Tannen berg, in which Scheidemann's army was to fill the same role as had the unfortunate Samsonov's. The I. Reserve Corps mean while was by attack to prevent the I. Army from intervening.

By Nov. 18 the position of the Russian II. Army seemed well nigh desperate. It was being driven into a narrow semi-circle round Lodz with both flanks turned, and was becoming exhausted and dispirited. But help from the V. Army was now close at hand. Plehve, its commander, on receiving orders to turn back to the assistance of the II. Army, acted promptly and with reso lution. He attempted to rail one division north to Skierniewice but only one regiment got through before Mackensen's cavalry cut the line. The rest of the division came into action on Nov. 19, south of Lodz against the turning movement of the German XXV. Res. Corps. The whole of the remainder of the V. Army marched north on the i8th, the gap it left on the IV. Army's right being filled with cavalry. The same night the Siberian I. Corps relieved the pressure on Scheidemann's left by a success ful attack on the German XI. Corps. Next day the XIX. Corps routed the Breslau troops. This restored the situation on the west side of Lodz, but to the east and south of the town Schaffer's XXV. Res. Corps and 3rd Guard Div. were still advancing. By the evening of Nov. 20 they had completely turned the right of the Russian II. Army and were attacking Lodz from the south.

During Nov. 21 Ludendorff persisted in a last effort to accom plish the destruction of the Russian II. Army, but the attacks definitely failed. By the 22nd the tables had been turned, and Schaffer's force was itself completely surrounded. While part of Plehve's army, after rescuing the left of the II. Army, turned to attack Schaffer's group south of Lodz, Rennenkampf, the com mander of the I. Army, had been ordered to despatch forces from Lowicz and Skierniewice to gain touch with the II. Army and close the German line of retreat to the north. The Lowicz force which consisted of 31 divisions, started on Nov. 20 and by the

evening of the 22nd, in spite of three changes of command and indifferent staff work, had captured StrykOw and Brzeziny, and had apparently sealed the gap between the Russian I. and II. Armies. The Russians actually ordered up 18 trains to remove the anticipated harvest of prisoners. The Skierniewice column of a division and a regiment accomplished nothing.

Escape of Schaffer's Force.—In the evening of the 2 2nd, Schaf fer, heavily engaged with part of Plehve's army, south of Lodz, received a wireless order from Mackensen to cut his way out by Brzeziny. During the night of Nov. 22, in intense cold, he suc ceeded in slipping from the grasp of the enemy opposing him and concentrating his weary divisions to make the bid for release. Unknown to him, the Russians had already opened a breach. The centre columns of the Lowicz force had marched on to Lodz, leaving the left column, the Siberian 6th Div., isolated west of Koluszki on the Warsaw-Lodz railway. This division fought gallantly during Nov. 23 and repulsed all efforts of the XXV. Res. Corps to escape. Farther west, however, the 3rd Guard Div. moving through the GalkOwek forests, found the gap in the Russian net and captured Brzeziny in the early hours of Nov. 24. Encouraged by this success, the XXV. Corps renewed its efforts against the hapless Siberian 6th Div., whose appeals for help were disregarded by other Russian formations within easy reach of the battlefield. Finally, the division, with both flanks turned and overborne by weight of numbers, broke and left the way open for the XXV. Res. Corps to rejoin the 3rd Guard Div. at Brzeziny. Schaffer's line of retreat was now clear, and on the 25th his whole force, moving by StrykOw, rejoined Mackensen. He brought with him several thousands of prisoners and a number of captured guns.

Effect of the Battle.—Ludendorff's bold stroke had stopped the grand duke's intended invasion of Silesia as effectively as Sir John Moore, by a similar move, had halted Napoleon's incursion into Spain a little more than i 00 years before. Never again during the War were the Russians in a position to threaten Ger man territory. The campaign shows well the value of mobility as a strategical weapon. On Oct. 26 the IX. Army was engaged opposite Warsaw during Hindenburg's first offensive. During the next fortnight it retired 120m. destroying the communications as it went; reorganised and repaired its losses; was transferred by railway across the enemy front ; and deployed in complete fighting trim for its new offensive on Nov. i 1. This shows Ger man organisation and efficiency at its highest. The quality of German leadership was also well-displayed, and was in strong con trast with the irresolution and inertia shown by some of the Russian commanders.

Schaffer's exploit was a masterly one; within a few hours of receiving his orders to retire, he had succeeded in breaking off action and setting his columns in motion to seek a way to safety, which his determination and the fine fighting spirit of his troops was to win. This compares with the inaction of many of the Russian commanders, particularly the failure of the numerous bodies within reach to come to the rescue of the Siberian 6th Div. on Nov. 23. Ludendorff had owed much to Rennenkampf's passivity for his victory at Tannenberg; here again Rennen kampf's inefficiency and lack of the will to victory saved him from the loss of Schaffer's force which his rashness and obstinacy had exposed. Yet Rennenkampf had been accounted a dashing leader of men before the War. The Grand Duke himself, Ruzski (the commander of the Northwest Front), and Plehve, who hid an iron will in a weak and wizened frame, all acted promptly and with determination to take advantage of the opportunity.