Events had now made Lloyd George and his financial policy the centre of the liberal party programme; but party tactics for the moment prevented the ministry, who remained in office, from simply sending the budget up again to the Lords and allowing them to pass it. There was no majority in the Commons for the budget as such, since the Irish nationalists only supported it as an engine for destroying the veto of the Lords and thus preparing the way for Irish Home Rule. Instead, therefore, of proceeding with the budget, the government allowed the financial year to end without one, and brought forward resolutions for curtailing the powers of the Lords, on which, if rejected by them, another ap peal could be made to the people. (See PARLIAMENT.) Hardly, however, had the battle been arrayed when the King's death in May upset all calculations. An immediate continuance of hostil ities between the two Houses was impossible. A truce was called, and a conference arranged between four leaders from each side— Lloyd George being one—to consider whether compromise on the constitutional question was not feasible. The budget for 1909-10 went quietly through, and before the August adjournment the chancellor introduced his budget for 1910-11, discussion being postponed till the autumn. It imposed no new taxation, and left
matters precisely as they were. (X.) The 1910 conference of British party leaders lasted from June till November. The conferring leaders nearly arrived at a very comprehensive and far-reaching scheme of agreement, affecting all the disputed issues—the House of Lords, Home Rule, tariffs and conscription. But the six months of secrecy ended in detach ing the leaders from their followers. While the leaders had passed into a mood of conciliation, the followers were still living in an atmosphere of party warfare. On both sides the proposals put forward were regarded as surrenders.
It is a fit reflection now that, but for the World War, this con ference presented to Great Britain at that moment the last solid alternative to Irish civil war. Lloyd George was ready to come to very bold settlements if they would save the country from civil strife. He and Balfour agreed in this attitude, but party tides still ran too strong.
Lloyd George's first general application of the contributory insurance principle was to sickness and invalidity, and the pro posal produced a formidable social and political crisis in the autumn of 1911. Lloyd George was proposing a new habit to the British people, and at the first shock it was profoundly unpopular.
All classes rose against it. There followed a succession of political revolts; and it seemed as if the combination of forces—of the conservatives—of the press and the public—opposed to the bill would be sufficient to swamp it. By-election after by-election was lost by the Liberal Government. The party managers were in favour of postponement; but Lloyd George held on. He eased the passage of the bill by a series of conferences with all the disturbed parties, and achieved its third reading early in De cember 1911. This was followed by Lloyd George with an Unem ployment Insurance bill which broke new ground. It was extended in subsequent years over the whole working class, and did much to carry the country through the dark years of unemployment which followed the World War.