David Lloyd George

It was one thing to raise so gigantic an army. It was another thing to apply it to its full use and value. On all these questions Lloyd George in 1915-16 held vigorous views. He was not con tent to confine himself to the function of creating guns and shells. In the beginning of 1915 he began to pour out to the cabinet a succession of memoranda, in which he endeavoured to put before them the full seriousness of the military situation fol lowing upon the collapse of the Russian attack in the spring and summer of 1915.

Lloyd George and the Eastern Front.

The policy and strategy laid before the cabinet in the Lloyd George memoranda in the year 1915 were never fully adopted. In the language of the time, the cabinet was divided between "Westerners" and "Eastern ers"—those who looked for a decision only on the Western Front, and those who believed that victory could he quickened by trans ferring part of the British effort to the Near East. It ended in a compromise which resulted in the expedition to Salonika. But Lloyd George aimed at something far larger—nothing less than a considerable diversion of armies from the West to the East of Europe. He proposed and contemplated the diversion of an army of at least 1,000,000 from the Western to the Eastern Front. With the development of the German submarine warfare Lloyd George's Eastern idea became less and less practicable; and with the increase of the German armies the danger of a German break-through on the West finally held the British armies to their task. But in early 1915 these facts had not been fully disclosed.

As the year 1915 advanced, Lloyd George's general discontent with the conduct of the war grew stronger with every month. It extended to home policy as well as foreign. The war required a continual supply of vast armies. Such armies, Lloyd George now began to perceive, could not be secured by the voluntary principle alone. Having once made up his mind on that point, he became a vehement advocate of conscription in the autumn of 1915. But liberal sentiment was against it, and Asquith hesitated. At last Lloyd George swung the cabinet into conscription; and only one minister—Sir John Simon—resigned. Everything possible had now been done to supply the generals both with men and with munitions. But the question of policy remained, and there Lloyd George's discontent continued to grow. The tragic death of Kitchener by the sinking of the cruiser H.M.S. "Hampshire" on June 5, 1916, created a vacancy at the war office which could only be filled in one way. So in that month Lloyd George passed from the ministry of munitions to the war office. In this new position of power he obtained a firmer grip on the military machine at the front, and in particular he carried out a drastic reform of com munications in France.

From these lesser tasks his mind was diverted to the main issue of victory or defeat by the tremendous tragedy that befell the Allied cause in the autumn of 1916. Rumania, tempted by Russia into the War on the side of the Allies at an unseasonable moment, was violently attacked by General Mackensen and dra matically crushed before the eyes of her distant and helpless Allies. In vain Lloyd George appealed to the cabinet to make

some effort to save Rumania. Italy had entered the war in the previous year, and the Russian armies were still in being—could nothing be done? Nothing was done; and for the moment Rumania was blotted out. But the event had a profound effect on the mind of Lloyd George. It brought him to the parting of the ways. "Is it necessary," he used to say, "that a little nation should be laid on the altar of this war every Christmas? It was Serbia in 1915, now it is Rumania. What nation will come next?" Possessed with this dread, he decided to raise the issue in a definite form, and on Friday, Dec. f, 1916, he laid his views before Asquith.

Collapse of the Asquith Government.

His main contention was that so large a war committee as then existed could not con duct the war to victory. He proposed a smaller and more efficient body of three or four men, solely devoted to this one object of winning the war. What was wanted was unified and unsleeping control. But he proposed—and here was the crux of the political situation—that the existing prime minister should not be chairman of the committee. That was where the dividing line came. For frankly and definitely Lloyd George had ceased to believe in Asquith as war leader. Asquith's pride was touched to the quick; and it was quite clear that he profoundly resented the proposal, although he himself had first named Lloyd George as chairman of the new war committee. On Saturday, Dec. 2, Lloyd George was under the impression that his proposal had been accepted. But friends intervened on both sides: the Northcliffe Press in favour of Lloyd George, and Asquith's friends in favour of a chief whose loyalty had always commanded a fit return of per sonal devotion. On Monday, Dec. 4, 1916, The Times published a leading article displaying exultation over Asquith's defeat, and immediately Asquith wrote to Lloyd George breaking off the agreement. In the afternoon of that day Asquith resigned office. He received authority from the king to form a new ministry. He wrote to Lloyd George asking him to join on condition that he Asquith—as prime minister should be chairman of the new War Committee. Lloyd George refused that condition and placed his office at Asquith's disposal.

Already, on Sunday, Dec. 3, the conservative rank and file had met. They had decided at first against following Lloyd George, whereupon Bonar Law had emphatically said that, in that case, they could not count on his leadership. He and his friends re fused to join the new ministry and so Asquith's efforts to reform his coalition without Lloyd George broke down. The king then sent for Bonar Law. But as some of the Liberals and the Labour party refused to support him, he too failed to form a government, although Lloyd George offered to serve under him. The king then called a conference at Buckingham Palace and tried to form a new coalition ministry under Bonar Law, with the offer of the Woolsack to Asquith. Asquith refused. Thereupon the king sent for Lloyd George, as he was clearly the only possible premier.