Erich 1865-1937 Ludendorff

After the victorious conclusion of the Balkan campaign in the winter of 1915-16 Ludendorff contemplated a great offensive into the heart of the Ukraine, with the object of breaking the back of the economic resistance of Greater Russia, which was already cut off from the sea. The offensive necessitated the occupation of Rumania; but General von Falkenhayn rejected this scheme, and chose Verdun instead of Kiev as the objective for operations. Accordingly in the year 106 the eastern front of the allied Central Powers was assigned the duty of protecting the rear of the offensive movement in France. This task was amply fulfilled on the northern wing but on the southern wing, held by the Austrians, the front completely collapsed in June and July at Luck and in Galicia. The balance in the East was restored with difficulty by the intervention of the German com mand.

On Aug. 29 Field-Marshal von Hindenburg assumed the office of chief of the general staff of the armies in the field, in the place of Falkenhayn, and Ludendorff became first quartermaster general. In contrast with their predecessor's point of view, the two men still promised themselves triumph, but a triumph which could only result from a more vigorous conduct of the war by drawing upon the whole available strength of the country in wealth and population. The methods adopted for the utilization of these resources were expressed in the so-called "Hindenburg programme" of war industries and in the so-called law of auxili ary services ; and here Ludendorff could only co-operate by means of suggestions and demands. In his own sphere too, he found that, owing to the almost desperate military situation inherited from his predecessor, he was not at first able to put into practice Schlieffen's doctrine of annihilation. The result of the offensive against Rumania was that this new enemy was over thrown in the winter of 1916. This victory was of inestimable value to the Central Powers, for new sources of economic power were thereby opened up.

Submarine Warfare.

After the defeat of the Rumanian army there remained but one further task. This was the frustration of the attacks of the enemy in the west, greatly superior in num bers and material. The restoration of the balance of strength thus aimed at was to enable the Central Powers later to deliver an offensive with decisive effect. A favourable diversion of this kind, however, could only be counted upon, if, during the stra tegical defence on land, England could be reduced to desperate straits. An intensified U-boat warfare in the blockade area round England was therefore adopted, a weapon, recourse to which had hitherto always been postponed on the score of political considerations. The disadvantage of this course was that it would give the United States a pretext for war on the side of the Entente ; but regarding this as inevitable, Ludendorff hoped to render England disposed for peace before the Americans should be in a position to throw considerable forces into Europe.

Unrestricted U-boat warfare did not altogether fulfil expec tations. The technical perfection of the enemy's defensive weap ons and the ample scale upon which they had been completed contributed to this in a very material degree. On the other hand, without the adoption of unrestricted U-boat warfare the strategy of the Central Powers would have been altogether unable to hold the balance on land in suspense until, after Russia's col lapse in the spring of 5918, there dawned a well-founded pros pect of forcing a decision in France before the American forces on land became effective.

In the spring of 1917 in the western theatre of war Luden dorff was enabled, by a timely withdrawal to the Siegfried posi tion and by the elasticity of his defensive tactics, to impose a check upon the Allied attack carried out with a gigantic expend iture of men and material. Subsequently he had another oppor tunity of vindicating his theory of annihilation in the warfare on land. Under the blows dealt by the German hammer at Tarno pol, Riga, Dago and osel, Russia fell. The reckoning with Italy followed in the autumn of 5917, but the situation in the west, particularly in Flanders where the fighting raged with undimin ished fury, rendered it impossible for Ludendorff to secure a decisive victory.

The Offensive of 1918.

The German resolution to take the offensive in the spring of 1918 was rendered imperative by the general position. The psychological condition of the army per emptorily demanded that the role of anvil should be exchanged for that of hammer. Conditions at home called for a potent remedy against the threefold poison instilled by the hunger block ade, enemy propaganda and revolutionary agitation. Germany's hard pressed allies had for long rested their sole hopes of delivery on the efforts of Germany. Ludendorff saw only one road by which a tolerable peace, in harmony with the honour of the Ger man people, could be reached, the road of military victory. This again could be attained solely by means of an offensive which should be decisive, and in taking this course he hazarded every thing. A series of small attacks with limited objectives or a powerfully conducted defence would in favourable circumstances only have secured a temporary advantage, but could not prevent the enemy from finally giving full effect to his superior strength in a battle of annihilation. It is questionable whether the choice of direction for the offensive on French territory can be defended. Many critics would have preferred an offensive in Italy, but apart from the natural difficulties, even the destruction of the Italian army could at best only have preceded the main decisive oper ations on French soil.