It has been questioned whether Ludendorff assembled adequate forces for the spring offensive of 1918. In March, at the beginning of this offensive, the Germans disposed of 193 divisions and three brigades in the Franco-Belgian theatre of war. The estimates of the forces commanded by the Entente in France and Belgium at the beginning of the spring offensive vary between 167 and i8o divisions. The Germans, therefore, enjoyed a slight superi ority in the number of divisions. The original intention that a section of the Austro-Hungarian forces should take part in the decisive encounter in France was finally thwarted by the oppo sition of the Habsburg emperor. Ludendorff accordingly chose the expedient of indirect assistance to be rendered by a relieving offensive carried out by the Austro-Hungarian army in Upper Italy. This offensive, however, was undertaken much too late for the objective in view, in the middle of June, and, moreover, ended with a severe reverse. The occupation of Rumania called imperatively for four divisions and a greater number of Land sturm formations. The invasion of the Ukraine, carried out in February and March, demanded about 20 weak divisions, includ ing eight divisions of Landwehr and three of cavalry. It is dis putable whether it would have been wiser to abandon the enter prise in the Ukraine. The secretary of State of the Kriegser itarungsamt urged with the utmost emphasis that the economic resources of the Ukraine should be thrown open to Germany. Failing this, the Austrians' system of food supplies would collapse. The delivery of meat was important for Germany, too, and the delivery of horses was, above all, a matter of the greatest urgency.
On political and military grounds Ludendorff had resolved to deal the first decisive blow in the west against the English. For this purpose he chose the southern flank, on both sides of St. Quentin, as tactically the least defensible, with the intention of forcing his way through at this point and by advancing north of the Somme towards the northwest, to roll up the whole front gradually and press the English towards the sea. The southern wing of the German offensive was to guard his flank against a relieving attack on the part of the French. This strategy became subject to certain changes in consequence of the unexpected mag nitude of the initial success of the German southern wing, which continued the offensive across the Somme and the Crozat canal against the French, in order to effect a cleavage between the English and French at and beyond Amiens. This end was not completely attained, and the result of the first offensive, though great from the tactical standpoint was strategically nugatory. A second attack on the Lys front, against the English and Portu guese, was made in the middle of April and was designed to gain possession of the commanding heights north of Bailleul and to cut off the Ypres salient; its result, however, was indecisive.
During the following months, in spite of successive brilliant diversive attacks carried out against the French front, no further headway was made in forcing a decisive engagement in Flanders ; and the heavy toll of the spring offensives could not be made good rapidly enough. And yet, prior to the last great attempt to break through on both sides of Reims in July 1918, there still remained a prospect of final victory for the German arms. The goal had nearly been reached—which was a proof that the strategy adopted might have succeeded and was, therefore, the right strategy. But the fortune of war was against Ludendorff. His plans were revealed by treachery to the enemy, at a time when everything depended on secrecy and surprise. The great successes hitherto achieved had led to a wide extension of the German front, calling for the employment of disproportionately large forces and offering in its many angles and salients dangerous surfaces to the enemy's attacks. These factors now made their
disastrous influence felt.
But the final cause of Ludendorff's inability to resume the initiative lay in the absence of a free command of reserves, due to the drying up of the sources of supply at home. When the German command fell back on the defensive before hostile attacks, Ludendorff realised that there was nothing to be done except to hold out until diplomacy succeeded in securing a tol erable peace, or to perish with honour. On Oct. 26, however, he was overthrown by the cabinet of Prince Max of Baden. The collapse of Germany's allies, combined with difficulties at home, rendered hopeless any further resistance by the army in the field now thrown upon its own resources.
General Ludendorff was above all a man of action, and one who rated formation of character and the attributes of leader ship more highly than the acquisition of comprehensive learning. His resolution, his almost super-human and invincible powers of work and action, his understanding of the moral factors in war fare, inspired the German army with boundless confidence in his leadership and qualified it for mighty exploits. If like Hanni bal and Lee he failed in the final issue, it was through no fault in generalship, but was partly due to slowness in realising that his weapon had grown blunt and that the population at home was no longer capable of the effort of endurance and the indis pensable will to victory. His powers of leadership reflected his character; brain, heart and will were all unsparingly enlisted in the service of one aim, the honour of his country. Along this path he was impelled to travel, whether it led to victory or defeat.
(W. Fo.) Ludendorff's complete collapse at the end of the war was one of the tragic sensations of the time. After demanding an uncon ditional armistice, when the armistice was actually concluded, he abandoned his country and fled to Sweden. In the spring of 1919 he returned, to become, with his former chief of staff, Colonel Bauer, the focus of all extreme reactionary conspiracies. With Bauer he was the initiator and organizer of the "Kapp Putsch" of March 1920, although he remained in the background and avoided responsibility, nevertheless, his role was known, and he retired to the more conservative atmosphere of Munich to engage in fresh intrigues which showed a complete lack of any sense of political reality. In 1923 he emerged into the open in connection with the attempted coup of Adolf Hitler, the National Socialist leader. After wavering between the rival con spiracies of Hitler and von Kahr, Ludendorff joined the former in an attempt to establish an anti-Marxist dictatorship in Ger many. The coup (Nov. 8, 1923) proved an ignominious fiasco, but Ludendorff's past reputation saved him from its consequences. In May 1924 he entered the Reichstag as a National Socialist, and in 1925 stood for president of the Reich, securing slightly over 1% of the votes cast. In the same year he retired from the presidency of his small party and began to take a less promi nent part in politics. He died in Munich, Dec. 20, 1937.
Ludendorff published several books on the World War, the most important of which are : Meine Kriegserinnerungen 1914-18 (Eng. trans. My War Memories) (1919) ; Urkunden der obersten Heer esleitung uber ihre Tdtigkeit 1916-18 (1920) ; Kriegfiihrung and Politik (1922) ; Das Friedens and Wajenstillstandsangebd. (1919). Among his polemical writings may be mentioned Ver nichtung der Freimaurerei durch Enthfillung ihrer Geheimnisse (1927).
See H. Delbreck, Ludendorffs Selbstportriit (loth ed., 1922).
(C. A. M.)