Robert Stewart Londonderry

In 1807 Castlereagh returned to the War Office under Portland, but grave difficulties arose, though Canning at the Foreign Office was then thoroughly at one with him. The operations to avert the ruin of the coalition at Friedland came too late. The Tsar Alex ander believed that England would no longer concern herself with the Continental struggle, and Friedland was followed by Tilsit. The seizure of the Danish squadron at Copenhagen, and the measures taken to rescue the fleets of Portugal and Sweden from Napoleon, crushed a combination as menacing as that defeated at Trafalgar. The expedition to Portugal, though Castlereagh's in fluence was able only to secure Arthur Wellesley a secondary part at first, soon dwarfed other issues. In the debates on the Con vention of Cintra, Castlereagh defended Wellesley against parlia mentary attacks. Early in 1809, Castlereagh secured his friend's appointment as commander-in-chief of the second Portuguese expedition.

Disagreement with Canning.

Meanwhile a breach arose between Castlereagh and Canning. Canning was not openly op posed to the Walcheren expedition, and on the Peninsular question he mainly differed from Castlereagh and Wellington in fixing his hopes on national enthusiasm and popular uprisings. Castlereagh's proposal of action in the Netherlands was for a coup de main, under strict conditions of celerity and secrecy, as Antwerp was unable to make any adequate defence. But the expedition, planned at the end of March, did not reach Walcheren till the end of July 1809; and more time was lost, until sickness in the army necessitated its withdrawal in September. Public opinion threw the whole blame upon Castlereagh, who then found that his col leagues had determined on his removal six months earlier. Castle reagh held himself justified in sending a challenge to the original author, as he held, of a disloyal intrigue against a colleague. In the subsequent duel Canning was wounded and the rivals simul taneously resigned. Though Wellington's retreat after Talavera had been included, with the disasters of the Corunna and Wal cheren campaigns, in the censures on Castlereagh, and though ministers were often depressed and doubtful, Castlereagh never lost faith in Wellington's genius. Lord Wellesley's resignation in 1812, when the Whigs failed to come to terms with the regent, led to Castlereagh's return to office as foreign secretary (March 1812). The assassination of Percival soon threw upon him the leadership of the House of Commons, and this double burden he continued to bear during the rest of his life.

The Duel with Napoleon.

From March 1812 to July 1822 Castlereagh's biography is, in truth, the history of England. He set himself at once to meet Napoleon's designs in north ern Europe, where Russia was preparing for her life-and-death struggle. Castlereagh wisely rejected Napoleon's insincere over

tures for peace. After the Moscow debeicle Napoleon's fate was affected not only by Wellington's progress in Spain, but by the attitude of the northern powers and by the action of Turkey, due to Castlereagh's opportune disclosure to the Porte of the scheme of partition at Tilsit. The British subsidies to the Allies were largely increased as the operations of 1813 developed, but all Castlereagh's skill was needed to keep the Coalition together. The Allied powers were willing, even after Leipzig, to treat with France on the basis of restoring her "natural frontiers"—the Rhine, the Alps and the Pyrenees ; but Castlereagh protested. Early in his colleagues, who needed him in the House of Commons, re luctantly consented to his visit to the allied headquarters. The Great Alliance showed signs of weakness and division. Austria was holding back; Prussia had almost broken away; above all, the ambiguous conduct of Alexander bred alarm and doubt. Napoleon's military genius, confronting a hesitant and divided enemy, was at its best. Castlereagh strove to keep the Allies to gether, to give no excuse for those separate arrangements upon which Napoleon was reckoning, to assert no selfish policy for England, to be tied by no theoretical consistency. At the CM tillon conferences England was represented by others, but Castle reagh was present with supreme authority over all. He declined to commit his country either to a blank refusal to negotiate with Napoleon or to the advocacy of a Bourbon restoration. He in sisted on the return of France within her ancient limits as the basis of a settlement. Even before the Chatillon conference was dissolved (March 18), Castlereagh saw that Caulaincourt's efforts would never bend Napoleon's will. The Allies adopted his view and signed the treaty of Chaumont (March I), "my treaty," as Castlereagh called it, with an unusual touch of personal pride. At Bar-sur-Aube, when at a council of all the representatives of the powers the retreat of the allied armies was discussed, Bernadotte, playing a waiting game in Holland, was unwilling to reinforce Blucher, then in a dangerous position, by the Russian and Prussian divisions of Winzingerode and Billow, temporarily placed under his orders. Castlereagh, without consulting the Cabinet at home, threatened the withdrawal of the British subsidy. Bernadotte gave in. Blucher was reinforced by the two divisions; the battle of Laon was fought and won, and the allies occupied the French capital. In April 1814 Castlereagh arrived in Paris. He did not like Napoleon's position at Elba, close to the French coast, and he summoned Wellington from the south to the embassy in Paris.