Robert Stewart Londonderry

His appointment as British representative at Vienna, where the congress was to meet in September, was foreseen. At Vienna he realized at once that the ambition of Russia might be as formid able to Europe and to Great Britain as that of Napoleon. His aim had been to rescue Europe from military domination ; and when he realized the ambitions of Russia and Prussia, he did not hesitate to take a new line. He brought about the secret treaty (Jan. 3, 1815) between Great Britain, Austria, and France, di rected against the plans of Russia in Poland and of Prussia in Saxony. Through Castlereagh's efforts, the Polish and Saxon questions were settled on the basis of compromise. The threat of Russian interference in the Low Countries was dropped.

Castlereagh had come home for a short visit (Feb. 1815), at the urgent request of the cabinet, just before Napoleon escaped from Elba. The shock revived the Great Alliance under the compact of Chaumont. Napoleon promptly published the secret treaty which Castlereagh had concluded with Metternich and Talleyrand. But Russia and Prussia, though much displeased, dared not weaken the Alliance. British subsidies were again poured out like water. After Waterloo, Castlereagh successfully urged Napoleon's removal to St. Helena.

Peace and the Holy Alliance.

Some of the continental powers demanded fines and cessions that would have crushed France; but in November a peace was finally concluded, mainly by Castlereagh's endeavours, minimizing the penalties exacted, and abandoning on England's part the whole of her share of the indemnity. Castlereagh's policy, impressed upon British repre sentatives abroad, was "to turn the confidence Great Britain in spired to the account of peace, by exercising a conciliatory influence in Europe." Brougham's action, at the end of 1815, denouncing the Holy Alliance, even in its early form, was calcu lated to embarrass England, though she was no party to what Castlereagh described as a "piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense." While he saw no reason in this for breaking up the Grand Alliance, which he looked upon as a convenient organ of diplo matic intercourse and as essential for the maintenance of peace, he agreed with Wellington that to attempt to crush France, as the Prussians desired, or to keep her in a perpetual condition of tutelage under a European concert from which she herself should be excluded, would be to invite the very disaster which it was the object of the Alliance to avoid. It was not till Metternich's idea of extending the scope of the Alliance, by using it to crush "the revolution" wherever it should raise its head, began to take shape, from the conference of Aix-la-Chapelle (1818) onward, that Great Britain's separation from her continental allies became in evitable. Against this policy of the reactionary powers Castle reagh from the first vigorously protested. As little was he pre pared to accept the visionary schemes of the emperor Alexander for founding an effective "confederation of Europe" upon the in clusive basis of the Holy Alliance (see ALEXANDER I. of Russia).

Home Politics.

Meanwhile financial troubles at home, com plicated by the resumption of cash payments in 1819, led to acute social tension. "Peterloo" and the "Six Acts" were furiously de nounced. Throughout, Castlereagh maintained his ascendancy in the House of Commons, though he had few colleagues who were capable of standing up against Brougham. Canning, indeed, had returned to office and had defended the "Six Acts," but Castle reagh bore the whole burden of parliamentary leadership, as well as the responsibilities of the Foreign Office. In 1821, on Sid mouth's retirement, he assumed the duties of the Home Office. The policy of "intervention," with which Great Britain had con sistently refused to identify herself, had been proclaimed to the world by the famous Troppau Protocol, signed by Russia, Austria and Prussia (see TROPPAU, CONGRESS OF). The immediate occa

sion was the revolution at Naples, where the egregious Spanish constitution of 1812 had been forced on the king by a military rising. Castlereagh was prepared to allow the intervention of Austria, if she considered her rights under the treaty of 1813 violated, or her position as an Italian Power imperilled. But he protested against the general claim, embodied in the Protocol, of the European powers to interfere, uninvited, in the internal con cerns of sovereign states.

To Troppau, accordingly, no British plenipotentiary was sent, since the outcome of the conferences was a foregone conclusion; though Lord Stewart came from Vienna to watch the course of events. At Laibach an revive the Troppau proposals was defeated by the firm opposition of Stewart ; but a renewal of the struggle at Verona in the autumn of 1822 was certain. Castle reagh, now marquess of Londonderry, was again to be the British representative, and he drew up for himself instructions that were handed over unaltered by Canning, his successor at the Foreign Office, to the new plenipotentiary, Wellington. In the threatened intervention of the continental powers in Spain, as in their earlier action towards Naples and Sardinia, England refused to take part. The Spanish revolutionary movement, Castlereagh wrote, "was a matter with which, in the opinion of the English cabinet, no for eign power had the smallest right to interfere." Before, however, the question of intervention in Spain had reached its most critical stage the development of the Greek insurrection against the Ottoman government brought up the Eastern Question in an acute form, which profoundly modified the relations of the powers within the Alliance, and again drew Metternich and Castlereagh together in common dread of an isolated attack by Russia upon Turkey. A visit of King George IV. to Hanover, in October 1821, was made the occasion of a meeting between Castlereagh and Met ternich, with whom he joined in taking advantage of the emperor Alexander's devotion to the principles of the Alliance to prevent his taking an independent line in the Eastern Question. It was, indeed, the belief that this question would be discussed at the congress that led Castlereagh to agree to be present at Verona; and in his Instructions he foreshadowed the policy afterwards carried out by Canning, pointing out that the development of the war had made the recognition of the belligerent rights of the Greeks inevitable, and quoting the precedent of the Spanish American colonies as exactly applicable.

The Tragic End.

The tragic ending of Castlereagh's strenu ous life was near ; and the credit of carrying out the policy fore shadowed in the Instructions was to fall to Canning. During the session of 1822 Wellington warned Dr. Bankhead that Castle reagh was unwell, and, perhaps, mentally disordered. Bankhead went down to North Cray and took due precautions. Castle reagh's razors were taken away, but a penknife was forgotten in a drawer, and with this he cut his throat (Aug. 12, 1822). The testimony of statesmen of all parties to Castlereagh's gifts and charm is in strong contrast with the flood of calumny poured out upon his memory by those who knew him not.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.-Castlereagh's

correspondence and papers were pub lished by his brother and successor (1850-53) in 12 volumes. See also Sir Archibald Alison's Biography (3 vols., 1861) ; and lives by Lady Londonderry 1904, and A. Hassall (1909). For an account of his post war diplomacy see C. K. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh 1815-22 (1925) .