MARSHALL, JOHN (1755-1835), American jurist, chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, was born on Sept. 24, at Germantown (now Midland), in what four years later became Fauquier county, Va. He was of English descent, the son of Thomas Marshall (1732-1806) and his wife, Mary Isham Keith. Marshall served first as lieutenant and, after July 1778, as captain in the Continental army during the Revolutionary War. He re signed his commission early in 1781; was admitted to the bar after a brief course of study, first practised in Fauquier county, and after two years began to practise in Richmond. In 1786 we find him counsel in a case of great importance, Hite v. Fairfax, in volving the original title of Lord Fairfax to that large tract of country between the headwaters of the Potomac and Rappahan nock, known as the northern neck of Virginia. Marshall repre sented tenants of Lord Fairfax and won his case. From this time, as is shown by an examination of Call's Virginia Reports which cover the period, he maintained the leadership of the bar of Vir ginia. He was a member of the Virginia assembly in 1782-91 and again in 1795-97; and in 1788, he took a leading part in the Virginia convention called to act on the proposed Constitution for the United States, with Madison ably urging the ratification of that instrument. In 1795 Washington offered him the attorney generalship, and in 1796, after the retirement of James Monroe, the position of minister to France. Marshall declined both offers because his situation at the bar appeared to him "to be more in dependent and not less honourable than any other," and his "preference for it was decided." He spent the autumn and winter of 1797-98 in France as one of the three commissioners ap pointed by President John Adams to adjust the differences be tween the young republic and the directory. The commission failed, but the course pursued by Marshall was approved in America, and with the resentment felt because of the way in which the commission had been treated in France, made him, on his return, exceedingly popular. To this popularity, as well as to the earnest advocacy of Patrick Henry, he owed his election as a Federalist to the House of Representatives in the spring of 1799, though the feeling in Richmond was overwhelmingly in favour of the opposition or Republican Party. His most notable service in Congress was his speech on the case of Thomas Nash, alias Jonathan Robbins, in which he showed that there is nothing in the U.S. Constitution which prevents the Federal Government from carrying out an extradition treaty. He was secretary of State under President Adams from June 6, 1800, to March 4, 180i. In the meantime he had been appointed chief-justice of the Supreme Court, his commission bearing date Jan. 31. Thus while still secretary he presided as chief-justice.
At the time of Marshall's appointment it was generally con sidered that the Supreme Court was the one department of the new Government which had failed in its purpose. John Jay, the first chief-justice, who had resigned in 1795, had just declined a reappointment to the chief-justiceship on the ground that he had left the bench perfectly convinced that the court would never acquire proper weight and dignity, its organization being fatally defective. The advent of the new chief-justice was marked by a change in the conduct of business in the court. Since its organi zation, following the prevailing English custom, the judges had pronounced their opinions seriatim. But beginning with the December term 1801, the chief-justice became practically the sole mouthpiece of the court. For II years the opinions are almost exclusively his, and there are few recorded dissents. The change was admirably adapted to strengthen the power and dignity of the court. The chief-justice embodied the majesty of the judicial department of the Government almost as fully as the president stood for i the power of the executive. That this change was ac quiesced n by his associates without diminishing their good will towards their new chief is testimony to the persuasive force of Marshall's personality; for his associates were not men of medi ocre ability. After the advent of Mr. Justice Joseph Story the practice was abandoned. Marshall, however, still delivered the opinion in the great majority of cases, and in practically all cases of any importance involving the interpretation of the Constitu tion. During the course of his judicial life his associates were as a rule men of learning and ability. During most of the time the majority were the appointees of Democratic presidents, and be fore their elevation to the bench supposed to be out of sympathy with the federalistic ideas of the chief-justice. Yet in matters pertaining to constitutional construction, they seem to have had hardly any other function than to add the weight of their silent concurrence to the decision of their great chief. Thus the task of expounding the Constitution during the most critical period of its history was his, and it was given to him to preside over the Supreme Court when it was called upon to decide four cases of vital importance : Marbury v. Madison, M'Culloch v. Maryland, Cohens v. Virginia and Gibbons v. Ogden. In each of these cases it is Marshall who writes the opinion of the court ; in each the continued existence of the peculiar Federal system established by the Constitution depended on the action of the court, and in each the court adopted a principle which is now generally per ceived to be essential to the preservation of the United States as a Federal State.