MARATHON, a plain about 5m. long by 2M. wide on the east coast of Attica 24m. N.E. of Athens. There is a large marsh at the northern end from which extremity the Kynosura promon tory a mile long ending in Cape Marathon forms an anchorage sheltered from the north and east. From the village of Marathon the Charadra brook bi?ects the plain and a small marsh lies at the southern end. Here (490 B.c.) 9,00o Athenian and i,000 Plataean heavy infantry defeated part of a Persian army under Datis and Artaphernes. During the Ionian revolt the Athenians and Ere trians had aided the rebels in the attack on Sardis. The Persian king, Darius, ordered his generals to "enslave Athens and Eretria and bring the slaves into his presence." (Herodotus vi. 94.) Eretria, after a siege, was surrendered by treachery. The city was destroyed and the inhabitants enslaved. The Persian host, guided by Hippias, the former tyrant of Athens, landed at Mara thon "thinking to do the same to the Athenians." (Herodotus vi. 102.) When news of the fall of Eretria reached Athens a courier, Pheidippides, was sent to Sparta for aid. Miltiades, with knowledge of war and of the Persians, was selected as one of the Athenian generals under the Polemarch, Callimachus, and seems to have dominated the war council and dictated the plan of campaign. The Athenians marched on Marathon to delay the Persian advance in the passes leading to Athens and to enable the Pla taeans and Spartans to join. On the march the Plataeans came up. The passes were found unoccupied and the Greeks took up a position in the Avlona valley covering the direct roads to Athens and flanking the southern road. The result was to pin down the Persians. Against the Greek position in a narrow valley with both flanks secured by hills they could not use their cavalry. To ad vance by the southern road would commit their column to a defile between the mountains and the sea and enable the Greeks to fall upon their rear while the main body would be unable to come up. To re-embark would expose part of their army to almost
certain disaster. In spite of the Spartan delay on account of a religious festival, time fought for the Athenians.
While the Spartans were on the Isthmus of Corinth the Per sians embarked their cavalry and part of their infantry to make a dash on Athens by sea. A rear guard, probably about 20,000 strong, was drawn up on the southern part of the plain parallel with the beach. Callimachus, probably on the advice of Miltiades, decided to attack—the date was probably Sept. 21. A mile from the Persian line the Greeks were marshalled, the centre thinned so as to extend the line to equal that of the Persians and to strengthen the Athenian right under Callimachus and the Platae ans on the left. Down the sloping plain moved the bronze-clad Greeks. When the ranks came within range of the Persian missiles they broke into a charge. The weak Athenian centre recoiled; but the shock of the heavy Greek wings crushed in and rolled up the Persian flanks. The victorious Persian centre was then dealt with. The hostile rear guard was destroyed losing 6,400 killed. The Greeks lost 192. The Athenians then marched back to Athens and arrived in time to forestall a landing by the Persian main body.
The failure of the Persians was due to neglect of security measures and lack of aggressive action which resulted in failure to make use of superior numbers, and finally to a division of forces. The Greeks were prompt in action and sought to unite their strength for the decisive battle, and bring it to bear against a part of the Persian army. Tactically, the successful double en velopment of the hostile flanks foreshadowed the design of Cannae. If at Marathon the situation is unlikely to have been created in tentionally, the opportunity at least was ably exploited. (See GRAECO-PERSIAN WARS.)