Second Battle of the Marne

But even when we have ascribed it to the right source, the ac cumulation of historical error is not fully corrected. For the method was not the revolutionary innovation that it has been termed. The Germans, in fact, had used it on Sept. 25, 1915— nearly three years before—to discomfit the great French autumn offensive in Champagne. And the underlying idea can be traced back another 2,00o years—to Cannae, where Hannibal applied it against the Romans in a distinctly more subtle and decisive way. But it sufficed, even in the mild way of 1918, to thwart the Ger man attack east of Rheims, where its effect was immeasurably strengthened by the German failure to achieve such a surprise as had marked their earlier offensives of 1918. Even the exact hour was discovered by an evening raid on July 14 which brought in 27 prisoners who, on being questioned, revealed the fact that the German attack was to be launched next morning, the artillery preparation being timed for 12.10 A.M. Before it began, the French counter-preparation and counter-battery fire opened on the whole of the enemy front. Between 4.15 and 5.3o A.M., the al ready shaken German infantry advanced to the attack on a so mile front, from Château-Thierry to Massiges (leaving out the Rheims Salient). To the east of Rheims the enemy infantry was broken up by French artillery fire and decimated by the machine-guns distributed along the outpost line before even reach ing the main line of resistance, which, in spite of repeated assaults, they failed to break at a single point. To the west of Rheims the situation was less favourable for the French.

German Success at Dormans.

But the dramatic nature of this repulse east of Rheims has obscured the fact that it was not the whole battle. West of Rheims the front had only been stabilised for a month since the last German thrust, and the newly improvised position was a handicap to the execution of the elastic method by commanders who were slow to grasp it. In front of the French V. Army (Berthelot) the Germans made some progress between the Marne and the Ardre in the direction of Epernay, and the French centre (V. French Corps and II. Italian) was thrown back on the second position along the line Pourcy-Belval Reuil-sur-Marne. Lastly, the right of the VI. Army (Degoutte) was not able to stop the attackers from crossing the Marne on either side of Dormans, between Jaulgonne and Verneuil. The VII. German Army thus established a bridgehead south of the river, in front of the V. Army's left and the VI. Army's right ; it also regained touch with the I. German Army on the slopes of the Montagne de Reims. Thus here the German attack had deepened the corner of the great bulge made in May, and not only pushed across the Marne but behind Rheims, so that it threatened to cut under this pivot of the Allied resistance. If the threat had an important influence on the French plan for the counter-stroke, its physical progress was stopped on July 16. The

German attack had degenerated into local actions, disconnected and therefore useless. By vigorous counter-attacks the French had even recaptured some of the lost ground, while their artillery and aircraft, by bombarding the Marne crossings, made it increasingly difficult for the Germans to obtain supplies. The only progress in the attack—to the south-west of Rheims between the Vesle and the Marne, on July i6--remained fruitless, for it had cost the enemy too dear for him to repeat such sacrifices. Next day a queer hush of expectation spread over the whole battlefield. The stage was set for the great "revanche." The Allied counter-offensive under Petain's direction comprises two phases: (I) the first extends from July 18-28, and includes the victorious battles of Fayolle's main group of armies in the Soissonnais and on the Ourcq, and the closing stage of the de fensive battle of Champagne and Rheims during the same period, in which the centre group under Maistre re-established its front and passed to the attack. This first phase, again, comprised three successive manoeuvres : the breaking of the enemy positions by the Reserve group of armies on July 18 and 19 ; the re-occupation of Château-Thierry and the south bank of the Marne by the centre group of armies, in combination with the right of the Reserve group, on July 20 and 21; and the co-ordination of the advance of the two groups of armies on both banks of the Ourcq in the general direction of Arcy-Sainte-Restitue and Fere-en Tardenois on July 23 and 24. (2) The second phase, sometimes called the battle of Tardenois, July 29 to Aug. 4, which included the recapture of Soissons and the push towards the Vesle.

French Preparations.

Acting upon Petain's instructions, Fayolle, commanding the Reserve group of armies, had prepared a counter-offensive against the west flank of the great German salient which protruded between Soissons and Rheims towards the Marne. These preparations were continued with the utmost secrecy while the centre group of armies (Maistre) were checking the last enemy offensive (July 15 and 16) and (from the 17th) arranging a riposte. This was entrusted to two armies, the V. and the IX.—which adjoined the right of the Reserve group of armies. The V. Army (Berthelot), which had been so heavily attacked at Rheims, had eight divisions in first line (including the Italian 3rd Div.), and one infantry and two cavalry divisions in second line. The British 51st and 62nd Divisions were on the move to reinforce it. The IX. Army (de Mitry) had five divisions, including the American 3rd Division in first line, one division in second line, and two reserve divisions, including the American 28th Division.