Second Battle of the Marne

The interest of the battle came to be focussed on the heights dominating the Ourcq valley from the north—Orme du Grand Rozoy and Butte Chalmont. Once these heights were cap tured the Germans could not hope to hold on to the line of the Ourcq. A pause occurred for the relief of tired divisions and the redistribution of the forces. The IX. Army was withdrawn from the front, and the convergence of the advance had so shortened the front that the IX. Army was withdrawn, and even the VI. Army, now reinforced by the fresh American 42nd division, closed up.

Advance Checked at Fere-en-Tardenois.

Some progress was made on July 27 and 28: the VI. Army reached the Ourcq and gained a foothold in Fere-en-Tardenois, the V. Army re occupied its positions on July 15. But from the 28th at noon, the VI. and V. Armies met with a stubborn resistance that was solidly established from Fere-en-Tardenois to Ville-en-Tardenois. The II. Corps was unable to debouch from Fere. The American I. Corps, which had advanced as far as Sergy, was violently counter-attacked there by a Guards Division. The village was taken and retaken four times and finally held by the American 42nd Division, though only at the cost of heavy losses.

In the centre, therefore, the situation remained practically un changed on July 29 and 3o. Only the right of the X. Army made definite progress. On the 28th the XI. Corps took Butte Chal mont, and on the loth the XXX. and XI. Corps with the British 34th Division occupied Grand Rozoy; but the divisions in line had reached the limit of their powers after several days of incessant fighting.

The Germans had solidly maintained their flanks as a safeguard to cover their line of retreat towards the Vesle. All that could be done was to hasten their retreat by convergent action against the plateaux of the Tardenois. The French counter-offensive had at least cleared the Marne valley and the Paris-Avricourt railway line. The second phase was now to begin, and the French armies, on July 29, received fresh instructions from Petain. The VI. Army, reinforced by the III. Corps and charged with the main effort was to "push vigorously, and without stopping, in the general direction of Fismes and Bazoches with its whole front, its left to establish itself in the region of Saponay so as to facili tate the debouching of the right wing of the X. Army towards Cramaille." The X. Army was, by successive actions starting from its right (the south), to press in the general direction of Braine. The V. Army was to support the right wing of the VI.

Army.

Reliefs were carried out within the armies. The VI. Army put considerable American forces into line : the 42nd and 32nd in the first line, the 4th and 28th in second line, while the 26th and 3rd were being reconstituted in the Marne valley. On the 31st the American 28th, 32nd and 4th Divisions entered Cierges and the Meuniere wood. In this way the enemy's attention was drawn to the centre on the evening of the 31st, while the next morning (Aug. I), at 4:45, the right of the X. Army attacked in its turn and, after severe fighting, occupied the whole crest that extends from L'Orme du Grand Rozoy to Saponay inclusive. On the same day the VI. Army, though it succeeded in capturing the Meuniere wood, failed before Saponay on account of the extreme fatigue of its attacking divisions.

German Retirement to the Vesle.---But

at dawn on Aug. 2 the three French armies found themselves facing void. The enemy had fallen back on the Vesle, where he intended to estab lish himself firmly. On the 3rd, the left of the X. Army, which had reoccupied Soissons unopposed the previous evening, reached the Aisne. Its right, together with the VI. and V. Armies, ar rived in the immediate vicinity of the Vesle. Contact was re established everywhere. All along the front the German artillery and machine-guns were active. On Aug. 4 and 5 the Allied troops aligned themselves along the banks of the Vesle, the American 32nd Division entered Fismes and the advanced guards succeeded in crossing the river at some points. But the enemy counter attacked vigorously, and in view of this well-organized resistance and of the impending Allied operations elsewhere (see AMIENS, BATTLE OF, 1918, and WORLD WAR), Foch decided to suspend the offensive.

The clue to the course of this battle might aptly be put in terms of the old conundrum—"When is a counter-stroke not a counter stroke?" Foch's faith in the offensive as a sovereign remedy for all troubles had not been shaken by his hard experience in 1915 and 1916. When the crisis of March 1918 called him to the su preme command of the Allied armies (see WORLD WAR), he had scarcely set about his unenviable task of restoring the bent and battered front before he was contemplating an offensive. Even before the new collapse of the Aisne front on May 27 he had issued a "directive" to Haig and Petain, commanders of the Brit ish and French field armies respectively, for attacks to free the lateral railways.