MUNDA, BATTLE OF (45 B.c.). Whilst Caesar was campaigning in Africa, Pompey's cause was revived in Spain by his sons Gnaeus and Sextus who had recruited a large army. From Africa Caesar returned to Rome, and towards the end of 46 B.C. once again proceeded to Spain where he suffered a reverse on the river Baetis; but, worsting Gnaeus Pompey at Soricaria, that general retired southwards towards Carteia ; Caesar, however, headed him off and forced him to retrace his steps to Munda.
The site of Munda is undecided; some historians consider that it is the same as modern Monda, but the description of the battle renders this unlikely. It was probably north of the river Singulis in the neighbourhood of Montilla.
The town of Munda was situated on a hill, and under its walls Cn. Pompey camped on March 15, 45 B.c. The next day, Caesar arrived and entrenched a camp near a small stream some five miles away. On the 17th, learning that Gn. Pompey had been standing in battle array for some time he ordered his standards to be raised. The two camps were separated by an undulating plain traversed by a stream, and on this plain and behind the stream Caesar marshalled his army, hoping that Gn. Pompey would come down from the hill of Munda and fight him in the open. Gn. Pompey was in command of some 5o,000 men, his position was exceptionally strong, for any attack on him would have to be made up-hill and over marshy ground.
Caesar's army numbered some 40,00o, and as Gn. Pompey re fused to come down from the hill he advanced towards him. On reaching the stream he halted his line, and pointed out to his officers the disadvantage of attacking up-hill. This becoming known to the men, considerable insubordination was displayed, as they felt certain of victory. Caesar thereupon ordered the ad vance to be continued. This halt, however, had induced Pompey to believe that Caesar had hesitated through fear, which was the case, and plucking up courage he moved his line down the hill, but not so far from Munda that he could not retire to it if defeated.
When the lines met the greatest enthusiasm was shown on both sides. Caesar's legions charging up the hill with great gallantry were met by a storm of pila (javelins). Pompey's men, remembering the terrible slaughter at Thapsus, fought with de termination and fury. The flight of javelins was followed by a charge which struck Caesar's front "like a ram" and staggered his line. The clinch then took place, and little by little Caesar's cohorts were pushed back. The situation now became extremely critical for Caesar was some five miles from his camp, and should his line break, annihilation must follow. Seizing a sword and a shield he rushed forward in the front rank before the ensigns, and by his personal example stimulated the moral of his men.
As evening approached both sides had exhausted their reserves, the auxiliaries had left the field, there was no chance of manoeuv ring except by cavalry, and though both sides had a considerable number of horsemen, apparently no such manoeuvre was made— very few Roman generals ever understood the use of this arm. At length, as the situation became still more critical, Caesar turned to his veteran Xth legion and cried : "Are you not ashamed to deliver your general into the hands of boys?" Stung by this taunt the Xth legion once again charged forward driving back Pompey's left, and compelling him to draw on his right in order to reinforce it. Caesar's cavalry then fell upon the weakened right wing, which was badly shaken. This apparently stimulated Caesar's Numidian cavalry into action, for they moved round Pompey's right wing towards his camp. Labienus, who commanded this wing, despatched five cohorts to head them off ; this rear wards movement was mistaken by the Pompeian army as a general withdrawal. Thereupon the line broke and fell back on Munda in confusion. At last Caesar's 8,000 horsemen were launched, and 30,000 of the enemy were slaughtered. Caesar's losses were 1,000 killed and 500 wounded.