Orders for the advance were issued on Jan. 28. The attack in the south was to commence on Feb. 7, with a view to drawing the attention of the Russians to this quarter. The main attack was then to come from the north on the 8th. Conditions were very different from those of the advance in Sept. of the year before. The weather was bitterly cold and the whole country was deep in snow. Large numbers of sleighs had been collected and the scale of clothing and food greatly increased. The German administra tion left nothing undone which could be thought out beforehand.
German Line Advanced.—Litzmann's advance found the marshy country in front of Johannisburg almost impassable, and the attack of the 7th came to little. Many of the units had to force their way through blinding snow storms, and it was not till the 8th that the Russian positions on the Pisseck were reached and taken, and by the 9th the end of the lakes was passed. This diversion served its purpose well, for the attack of the German X. Army in the north came as a complete surprise to the Rus sians in their winter quarters, leisurely thinking of an advance in the spring. They were given no time in which to readjust their line, and reserves had to be thrown in piece-meal to save the situation. On the loth, a determined stand was made by four Russian divi sions on either side of Eydtkuhnen, but by evening their resistance had been broken. Everywhere the effect of the German heavy artillery was decisive. Despite the difficulty of bringing forward
the heavy wheeled vehicles, which broke through the frozen crust of the ground, the Germans never failed to support their infantry at the decisive point. By the 12th, Below's army had reached a line stretching from the forest of Rominten to Ludwinow.
Meanwhile, the German centre had moved forward to keep in touch with the southern wing. Russian resistance in the south seemed to centre round the town of Lyck, and Litzmann was reinforced by a fourth division for its capture. From the loth to the 13th the fighting round Lyck was desperate. Often the opposing sides could not distinguish each other in the blizzards which swept over them, and owing to the difficulty of ammunition supply the infantry were unsupported by artillery fire of any sort, and fierce hand to hand fighting ensued. Casualties on both sides were therefore heavy and the Russians also lost over 8,000 prisoners and 14 guns. By the night of the 13th the Russians had been forced back and the town was in German hands.
Position After the Battle.—By the 14th, the German line ran from Rajgrod in the south, through Suwalki, to Sztabinki in the north, in a semi-circle round Augustowo, at a distance of from 9 to 1 o m., from the town. The wooded and close nature of the country made concerted attacks very difficult, but everywhere the superior individual training of the German soldier triumphed over the more ignorant Russian. The Russians fought with des peration to maintain their positions and it was not till the 17th that Siewers finally gave the order to abandon August6wo. He succeeded in escaping envelopment by abandoning most of his transport and ammunition columns and retiring in disorder on Grodno. By the loth the Germans were no longer in touch with the retreating Russians.
In the winter battle the Russians lost r io,000 prisoners and 30o guns, and the X. Army, like the I. and II. Armies, was placed hors de combat. They had been caught unawares in winter quarters, without proper protection and with an inferior intelli gence service. Had the Germans been able to bring up the whole of their guns and ammunition on Feb. 14 they might have suc ceeded in surrounding Augustow, but the weather prevented this.