MASURIAN LAKES, BATTLES OF THE, 1914 AND 1915. (See TANNENBERG.) It was the lake barrier which had proved the undoing of the Russians in their advance into East Prussia, and twice again was it to bring about their defeat when the Germans in their turn assumed the offensive. Jilinsky had failed to combine the action of his two armies, urging one forward to intercept what he thought to be a beaten enemy and dispatching the other on a subsidiary objective. The disaster to the II. Army had come to him as a crushing surprise, and in his fear that Rennenkampf would share the fate of Samsonov, he ordered the I. Army to halt and act on the defensive until fresh troops could be brought up from the centre of Russia. All chance of catching the Germans at a disadvantage during their tempo rary disorganization after the fighting at Tannenberg was thus lost.
Ludendorff was not long in deciding what was to be done after the destruction of Samsonov. Even before the fighting at Tannen berg was over, on Aug. 29, 1914, he had commenced moving troops northwards to meet Rennenkampf. He was strongly urged to move southwards to the support of the sorely tried Austrians, but this would have meant leaving a strong and undefeated enemy directly in his rear, whilst attempting to traverse the self-same desert area which had tried Samsonov so greatly. From the German point of view it was more important to free East Prussia from the invader at once, and the Austrians must therefore wait their turn.
Position Before the Action.—All the German divisions had received their first reinforcements and were flushed with victory and full confidence in their leaders. Two fresh corps had arrived from the west. Rennenkampf did not appear to be on the move and was evidently commencing the blockade of Konigsberg.
Lotzen, the little fortress holding the main gap in the centre of the line of lakes, was still in German hands. Everything there fore seemed favourable for a German offensive.
Ludendorff's plan for his advance was in outline as follows: (I) Goltz with 21 divisions was to check any advance on the part of the Russian II. Army from Poland; (2) Francois with
three divisions and a cavalry brigade was to move round the southern end of the lakes at Johannisburg with the primary object of turning Rennenkampf's left, and at the same time dealing with any Russian forces assembling to the south of the lakes; (3) Mackensen with two divisions and two cavalry divisions was to cross the LOtzen gap and join with Francois in the attack against Rennenkampf's left (4) the main body of eight divisions was to move direct on the Insterburg gap; (5) the Konigsberg garri son was to make a demonstration against the blockading troops.
Rennenkampf had commenced withdrawing on Aug. 3o, and on Sept. 2 he issued orders for a position to be taken up for defensive action from the sea near Libau to Angerburg at the northern end of the lakes. This position offered many advantages from a defensive point of view, running as it did behind the rivers Deime, Alle and Omet, but it was too extensive for the force of 12 divisions which Rennenkampf had at his disposal, the distance from flank to flank being 6o miles. Moreover, the left flank was exposed to attacks coming from the Lotzen gap and the southern end of the lakes. But it was chiefly in the manner in which he proceeded to occupy this position that he erred. He had no idea where the Germans were or what they had been doing in the interval since Tannenberg. He only had persistent rumours that the Germans were sending billeting parties to Konigsberg.
Instead of maintaining strong forces in front of his chosen posi tion, in order to discover the enemy's intentions, Rennenkampf committed his troops at once to a linear defence of the line. He placed four of his divisions along the Deime on a front of 18 m., while keeping seven divisions to hold the remainder of his line of 42 miles. A single division was placed opposite the Liitzen gap to the east of the lakes.