Moltke now marched with the first army on Vienna. The Aus trian Emperor then sued peace.
After the peace, the Prussian Diet voted Moltke the sum of L30,000, with which he bought the estate of Creisau, near Schweid nitz, in Silesia. The Campaign of 1866 in Germany (1867), pro duced under Moltke's personal supervision, was remarkable for its accuracy and reticence. On Dec. 24, 1868, Moltke's wife died at Berlin.
Franco-German War.—In 187o suddenly came the war with France. The probability of such a war had occupied Moltke's attention almost continuously since 1857, and a series of memoirs is preserved in which from time to time he worked out and re corded his ideas as to the transport and arrangement of the Prussian or German forces for the opening of the campaign. The great successes of 1866 had strengthened Moltke's position, so that when the mobilization order of the Prussian and south Ger man forces was issued (July 15, 187o) his plans were adopted without dispute, and five days later he was appointed "Chief of the general staff of the army at the headquarters of H.M. the King" for the duration of the war. This gave Moltke the right to issue in the king's name, though of course not without his approval, orders which were equivalent to royal commands. Moltke's plan was to assemble the whole army to the south of Mainz. If the French should disregard the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg, and advance on the line from Paris to Cologne or any other point on the Lower Rhine, the German army would be able to strike at their flank, while the Rhine itself, with the fortresses of Coblenz, Cologne and Wesel, would be a serious obstacle in their front. If the French should attempt to invade south Germany, an advance of the Germans up either bank of the Rhine would threaten their communications.
Moltke expected that the French would be compelled by the direction of their railways to collect the greater part of their army near Metz, and a smaller portion near Strasbourg. The German forces were grouped into three armies : the first of 6o,000 men, under Steinmetz, on the Moselle below Treves ; the second of 131,000 men, under Prince Frederick Charles, round Homburg, with a reserve of 6o,000 men behind it ; the third under the Crown Prince of 130,000 men, at Landau. Three army corps amounting to ioo,000 men were not reckoned upon in the first instance, as it was desirable to keep a considerable force in north-eastern Germany, in case Austria should make common cause with France. If, as seemed probable, the French should take the initiative before the German armies were ready, and for that purpose should advance from Metz in the direction of Mainz, Moltke would merely put back a few miles nearer to Mainz the points of debarcation from the railway of the troops of the second army. This measure was actually adopted, though the anticipated
French invasion did not take place.
Moltke's plan of operations was that the three armies while advancing should make a right wheel, so that the first army on the right would reach the bank of the Moselle opposite Metz, while the second and third armies should push forward, the third army to defeat the French force near Strasbourg, and the second to strike the Moselle near Pont-h-Mousson. If the French army should be found during this advance in front of the second army, it would be attacked in front by the second army and in flank by the first or the third or both. If it should be found on or north of the line from Sarrebourg to Luneville, it could still be attacked from two sides by the second and third armies in co-operation.
The intention of the great right wheel was to attack the principal French army in such a direction as to drive it north and cut its communications with Paris. The fortress of Metz was to be observed, and the main German forces to march upon Paris. This plan was carried out in its broad outlines. The battle of Worth was brought on prematurely, and therefore led, not to the capture of MacMahon's army, which was intended, but only to its total defeat and hasty retreat as far as Chalons. The battle of Spicheren was not intended by Moltke, who wished to keep Bazaine's army on the Saar till he could attack it with the second army in front and the first army on its left flank, while the third army was closing towards its rear. But these unintended or un expected victories did not disconcert Moltke, who carried out his intended advance to Pont-h-Mousson, there crossed the Moselle with the first and second armies, which he then ordered to face north and wheel round in order to cut off Bazaine from Paris. But Frederick Charles, contrary to these instructions, directed the second army towards the Meuse and consequently found him self with only two corps facing the whole French army at Mars la-Tour. The two corps, however, defeated Bazaine (August 16), who retreated to the position St. Privat-Gravelotte. Next day Moltke brought up the rest of the second army and on the 18th attacked Bazaine and drove him into the fortress of Metz. Moltke has been blamed for the last local attack at Gravelotte, in which there was a fruitless heavy loss, but it is now known that this attack was ordered by the king, and Moltke blamed himself for not having used his influence to prevent it.