During the night following the battle Moltke made his next decision. He left one army to invest Bazaine and Metz, and set out with the two others to march towards Paris, the more southerly one leading, so that when MacMahon's army should be found the main blow might be delivered from the south and MacMahon driven to the north. On Aug. 25 it was found that MacMahon was moving north-east for the relief of Bazaine. The moment Moltke was satisfied of the accuracy of his information, he ordered the German columns to turn their faces north instead of west. Mac Mahon's right wing was attacked at Beaumont while attempting to cross the Meuse, his advance necessarily abandoned, and his army with difficulty collected at Sedan. Here the two German armies were so brought up as completely to surround the French army, which on Sept. I was attacked and compelled to raise the white flag. After the capitulation of Sedan, Moltke resumed the advance on Paris, which was surrounded and invested. From this time his strategy is remarkable for its judicious economy of force, for he was wise enough never to attempt more than was practicable with the means at his disposal. The surrender of Metz and of Paris was a question of time. In this Moltke was com pletely successful. Metz surrendered on Oct. 27, and on Jan. 28, 1871, an armistice was concluded at Paris and the war ended.
On Oct. 29, 187o, Moltke was created graf (count or earl) and on June 16, 1871, field marshal. After the war he superintended the preparation of its history, which was published between 1874 and 1881 by the great general staff. In 1888 he resigned his post
as chief of the staff. In 1867 Moltke was elected to the North German Diet, and in 1871 to the Reichstag. His speeches, dealing mostly with military questions, were regarded as models of con ciseness and relevancy. He died suddenly on April 24, 1891, and after a magnificent funeral ceremony at Berlin his remains were laid beside those of his wife in the chapel at Creisau.
As a strategist Moltke cannot be estimated by comparison with Frederick or Napoleon. because he had not the authority either of a king or of a commander-in-chief. While it is doubtful whether he can be convicted of any strategical errors, it seems beyond doubt that he never had to face a situation which placed any strain on his powers, for in the campaigns of 1866 and 1870 his decisions seemed to be made without the slightest effort.
AUTHORITIES.-Gesammelte Schriften and Denkwiirdigkeiten des General Feldmarschalls Grafen Helmuth von Moltke (8 vols., Berlin, 1892-93) ; Moltke's militiirische Werke (Betlin, 9 vols., 1892-1900) ; Feldmarschall Moltke, by Max Jahns (3 vols., Berlin, 1894-1900) : F. E. Whitton, Moltke (1921) ; Spenser Wilkinson, The Brain of an Army, new edition with letters from Count Moltke and Lord Roberts (1913) ; v. Schmerfeld, Graf Moltke, Die deutschen Aufmarschpldne 1871-1890 (1929) ; in this volume are published for the first time Moltke's plans of campaign against France and Russia.