Ii Transport of Materiel

II. TRANSPORT OF MATERIEL Lorries are not specialized for the transport of materiel. The same type is employed as for troops, and therefore the organiza tion is similar. A lorry-group capable of moving a battalion of infantry can alternatively move i oo tons of materiel. Experience in the World War has shown that, during the periods of active operations, a division requires an average of 200 tons per day in foodstuffs and ammunition. This is equally true in the case of defensive areas, as at Verdun; in offensive actions of the type of the Somme battles in 1916; or those of July, August and Septem ber 1918, on the Marne. Two groups are therefore required for the supply of a division, subject to the distance from the railway being, at farthest, within a radius of 4o kilometres. Four groups are necessary if the division is 7okilo. from a railway. An average of 3 hours must be reckoned for loading at the stations; with al lowance for difficulties arising amid intensive operations, 7 or 8 hours are taken up on the journey and 2 hours in unloading. This gives about 13 hours for work, and leaves 1 1 hours per day for the maintenance of materiel, feeding and rest. If the traffic oper ations are to be continued for a number of days, more than this cannot be demanded of the personnel or of the materiel without risking excessive wastage. On the day after a journey with loads the vehicles return empty, and on the day after that they recom mence the journey loaded. As 200 tons a day are required for a division there must be a double set of two groups, with a total capacity of 400 tons.

Non-Specialization of Materiel.—At a general mobilization like that at the opening of the World War, the resources available for transport are necessarily limited not only by financial condi tions, but by the number of vehicles in existence in the country capable of being requisitioned, and by the maximum production of the manufacturing firms. On the other hand, there is no limit to the requirements in lorries, because no general thinks he has a large enough stock of transport at those critical times when every addition means an increase in his power of manoeuvre. During the 20 days which intervened between May 27 and June 15, 1918, the lorries of the French Army had to transport about 800,000 tons of foodstuffs and munitions, in order to ensure the supplies of those armies which were making headway against the German, attack. And yet, during this same period, the French Headquar

ters Staff had transported by automobile the infantry of 63 divi sions. It was necessary also to make numerous evacuations of public records, civil populations, hospitals and engineer parks. This wonderful effort was only possible because in the French Army the principle of non-specialization was adopted. Every lorry was controlled by the motor transport service of the armies, and was utilized by it for any form of transport needed. No vehicle was specially or permanently attached to this or that higher or lower formation. When a higher formation, such as a division, had need of transport, the automobile service arranged the transport, but as soon as it was finished the lorries employed on this service returned and were available for other transport services. In short, the lorry capital never remained unproductive.

The Use and Duties of Depots.

The reasons for avoiding the wastage of lorries apply likewise to avoid wastage of move ment. The carrying-out of "detail" transport is the principal cause of low efficiency. In the battle of Verdun, March 1916, the supply of munitions was taken by rail to Bar-le-Duc and to Bau donvilliers. Trains of munitions arrived daily at these two stations to supply the artillery of the 10 divisions deployed around Ver dun, some 6okilo. from the stations. If, to supply each of these divisions, there had been allotted a motor formation, which could come to load up at the stations and go as far as the batteries, bringing munitions, the efficiency would have been mediocre and uncertain. An accident at a depot, an interrupted road, an advance or a check at the front, would set back the whole time-table of the formation, and one would have seen them arriving in the station for loading their lorries in twos and threes in disorder, and at different hours. There can never be efficiency unless there is regularity of movement. It is never possible to have regularity unless the traffic of the back areas, which can be regular, is defi nitely separated from the traffic of the front areas, which is always uncertain. This separation can be effected by the creation of depots depending on the lines-of-communication authorities, and supplied by them where the formations from the front areas come to refill exactly as they would refill from the railway if there were stations at these fronts.