MECHANIZATION IN MOUNTAIN WARFARE With nations which may have to wage war in mountainous coun tries, and especially with colonial empires, such as the British and the French, military organisation is complicated by the ter rain, for obviously mechanized weapons are more suited for war fare on the plains, and the older arms, particularly infantry and mountain artillery, for warfare in the mountains. Generally speaking hill tribes are of an independent spirit, and their social organisation being extremely fluid there is no political centre to strike at, consequently, to bring them to book, they must either be defeated in the field, or their villages, herds or crops must be destroyed. Whilst, until recently, most hill tribes have been indif ferently armed when compared to the soldiers of civilised coun tries, to-day many of them are well equipped with modern rifles, and as they possess a far higher mobility than the drilled soldier, the problem of mountain warfare has become more and more difficult.
In these operations tactics are normally subordinated to the problem of supply, supply being most arduous because of lack of roads, and the difficulty of keeping roads, tracks and valley approaches free from flanking fire. On the North West Frontier of India this problem has been partially solved by constructing a network of strategical lorry roads, and to keep them open ar moured cars have proved themselves most useful weapons, since being bullet-proof they reduce the necessity for close road picket ing. Should the supply vehicles be also armoured this necessity will still further be reduced, and it will then be possible in all areas traversed by a road rapidly to reinforce and supply in bulk distant garrisons without extensive picketing of the hills ; quite possibly whilst the convoys are running this protective duty will be taken over by the aeroplane.
Turning now to the tactical side, the use of the small Renault tank by the French in Morocco has not proved satisfactory. The reason for this is not so much the difficult nature of the ground, as the inefficiency of the machine, which is heavy, under-engined, extremely uncomfortable, and which was never designed for moun tain warfare. A close and local study of the North West Frontier of India has led the writer to believe that with a suitable tank the advantages to-day possessed by hill tribes can be greatly re duced. The valleys traversed by rivers of any size should nor mally present few difficulties to the movement of modern tanks, but it must be realised that it is not in the valleys that the tribes men fight ; further, it must be understood that fighting does not usually take place on the summits of the mountains, but along nullahs, and on such eminences which directly command them, the reason being that nullahs are the only natural, and, frequently, possible, avenues of approach, and further that the native vil lages are built along them.
In the attack on villages two difficulties are normally met with : The village may be surrounded by sodden rice fields which prohibit the approach of wheeled vehicles, or it may be protected by mud or stone towers. To an efficient tracked machine the first will
in most cases be readily overcome, but the second presents this further difficulty: Though the tower can be approached in safety, it is normally of great thickness and little liable to damage by field gun shells; how can it be destroyed? Three courses suggest themselves : (i.) The tank can haul behind it one or more large oil drums (steel casks) filled with high explosive, and trail these up to the tower, unhitch them close to it, set in action a time fuse, and then retire.
(ii.) The tank can be used as a smoke producing machine, and when the tower is enveloped in smoke, it can be approached by infantry and destroyed in the normal way; or the village can be occupied and its tower, or towers, besieged.
(iii.) The tank can be moved to the foot of the tower, and shells fired through its loopholes. If these shells are filled with lachrymatory chemicals it will be quite impossible for the tribes men to remain in occupation.
The approach to the village, in all probability a nullah, may run through a gorge, or Tangi, as it is called on the North West Frontier. It is at these gorges the tribesmen gather, and many of them have to be taken by a frontal attack. For infantry the forcing of a gorge is a particularly difficult and dangerous opera tion. The tribesmen occupy one or both sides of the gorge, and a frontal attack is costly; consequently, when it is possible, an out flanking movement has to be resorted to, for it is common knowl edge that, once the tribesmen become aware that their rear is threatened, they retire.
The diagram shows a typical gorge. The nullah is marked by the letters a--e; the gorge is at b, and the tribesmen are holding the ridge c. To occupy this ridge, if infantry alone are used a frontal attack will have to be delivered from d on c; or, if the ground permits, a flanking movement will have to be made towards f. If light tanks are now introduced, these machines can, along a normal nullah, move from a to e in a few minutes, and deliver a rear fire attack on c. The result will be : either the enemy will be shot down as he evacuates c, or he will retire without cas ualties. In either event the gorge ceases to be an obstacle. It is the overcoming of obstacles, such as towers, gorges and supply difficulties, and not the enemy himself, which presents the main problems in mountain warfare. From the above it will be seen that mechanized weapons are likely to play an important, if not a leading, part in hill fighting, and especially so in uncivilised countries, for in civilised ones this form of fighting is quite secondary to warfare on the plains. Then it will generally be more profitable to cut the enemy's communications and so starve him into surrender, than to enter the mountainous region and directly attack him.
See J. F. C. Fuller, On Future Warfare (1927), chaps. ix., xii. and xiv. (J. F. C. F.)