Thus the Peace treaties were a recognition of the rights which the minorities had claimed, and the new frontier lines of Europe followed more closely than any that had preceded them the ethno graphical frontier lines. But, of course, in the intermixture of nationalities it was inevitable that minorities should still exist, and it was perhaps also inevitable that the defeated countries should lose more than a strict interpretation of ethnographical frontiers would have taken from them. Some mitigation was ob tained by the institution of plebiscites in Schleswig, Klagenfurt and in Upper Silesia, where the line of demarcation was later settled by the League of Nations. Nevertheless, both against Ger many in the east, against Austria in the south and most of all on all the frontiers of Hungary, lines were drawn, which were in some cases determined by other considerations, and included greater minorities than was necessary in the new States. While such a transfer would in any case have caused great suffering and protest, this has been increased by the arbitrary nature of some of these frontier lines. And since many of the former minorities now rule over those who had previously tyrannized over them, bitter memories tend to make them unjust in their turn. Ger many, for example, while accepting to a certain extent the loss of Posen to Poland, has felt deeply the loss of Danzig, the corridor to Poland and the partition of Upper Silesia, though these two last can be defended on ethnographical grounds. The Polish State includes also other nationalities, such as the Ruthenians of Ga licia, and the White Russians, which were increased by the occu pation of Vilna. The Czechs were allotted all Bohemia and there fore, the two and a half million Germans in it became a minority, while strategic reasons included numbers of Hungarians in Slo vakia, as well as the Ruthenes of the Carpathians. Similarly the Rumans obtained not only the inevitable islands of Magyars and Germans in Transylvania, but also a large slice of Hungary proper, though not nearly so much as their secret treaty had promised them. The Italians, also, obtained a large portion of South Tirol, which was almost purely German, while their extension round the Adriatic brought many Slovenes and Serbs under their rule. Thus in one way or another nearly thirty millions of Europeans were still living as "minorities," the majority necessarily so, since they were surrounded by men of other race, but others arbitrarily included as a result of the war.
The situation was naturally much worse in some parts than others. The Germans of Czechoslovakia for example were united by many ties to the Czechs and were soon to take part in the activities of the new State. But the situation is very different as regards the Magyars who are sustained by the unceasing propa ganda of their compatriots in Hungary. Even worse is the situa tion between Hungary and Rumania, where a policy of land ex propriation has added bitterness to the struggle. The minorities in Greece and Yugoslavia have been sustained by an active or ganization, which styles itself "Macedonian," and is only partially connected with Bulgaria. The Germans of the Tirol, in spite of promises made in 1919, have been subjected by the Italian Fascist Government to a regime, which has caused a loud outcry not only in Austria, but also in Germany. Europe still contains, therefore, in its minorities a number of explosive forces of which the future is uncertain, but which obviously need special treatment. How far that has been organized under the League of Nations is described below, but it remains to sketch here such efforts as were made in the 19th century with a similar object and the causes of their failure.
The protection of minorities by the action of an outside power is a very old one. It constantly occurred with regard to religious minorities, Cromwell's action on behalf of the Protestants of Piedmont being a well-known one. But the attempt to protect by
international treaty dates only from the settlement of 1814-15; the British Government insisted on clauses being inserted in the treaty which guaranteed, though only in vague terms, the rights of the Poles to special treatment by the Governments of Russia, Austria and Prussia. It was on these clauses that Britain and France founded their protests against Russian action after the in surrections of 183o and 1863. Moreover, when the new State of the Netherlands was created in 1814, by adding Belgium to Hol land, the new king guaranteed, in a document drawn up by the victorious Allies, religious equality and equal commercial oppor tunity to his new Belgian subjects. It was, however, in the Balkan peninsula, that the principle was to receive its fullest rec ognition. New States were created out of the Turkish empire by the action of the Powers, who had therefore both the opportunity and the duty to place limits on the sovereign power of the new States, as a condition of their recognition. This policy began in 183o in connection with Greece and was continued throughout the century. It was again applied to Greece in 1863, and 1881, when additions to its territory were agreed to by the Powers and it was made a cardinal feature of the Treaty of Berlin. Clauses protecting religious minorities were inserted, as a condition of the recognition of Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Rumania. Tur key herself could not be treated in exactly the same manner, since she was already an established State. But in return for the guaran tee of her territory made in 1856 at the Treaty of Paris, the sultan made, expressly as it was said of his own free will, a declaration that he would maintain religious liberty, while in the Treaty of Berlin the Powers took note of a similar declaration.
One of the main causes of these provisions especially as regards Rumania was a desire to protect the Jews. Efforts to obtain for them full civil rights and freedom of religion in Germany by international action had been made as early as the Treaty of Vienna (1815). Jewish communities in France, Britain and, later, in the United States not only influenced their Governments, while the Treaty of Berlin was being made, but established organizations to watch over the execution of the clauses of the treaty, which protected the Jews with the other national minorities.
Nevertheless, it was admitted that this attempt to protect the minorities by treaty was not a success. No machinery was set up to see that the promises of the new States were carried out, and they were often evaded or broken. Protests could be made and were sometimes made by one of the signatories of the treaty, but there was no means of ascertaining the facts and no method by which the Great Powers could act as a body in the name of Europe. Consequently the new governments who resented interference in their domestic concerns by outside Powers found it comparatively easy to defy their sponsors, when they wished to do so. When, therefore, the question arose at the Paris Conference, where again the Jewish community through a special delegation brought their influence to bear on the proceedings, it was only natural that some new method of control should be sought to protect the minorities in the new or greatly enlarged States, which were then being made. Opportunity was found in the permanent machinery of the League of Nations, to whom the supervision of the special treaties on this subject was entrusted. It was, of course, only on new States or on States that had been greatly enlarged as a result of the war that the obligations were imposed. No Great Power would submit to them, and Italy therefore, in spite of her new accessions of territory, is outside this machinery described below.