Monroes Message

MONROE'S MESSAGE This was the situation when, in Aug. 1823, George Canning, British foreign secretary, wrote to Richard Rush, American min ister in London, suggesting a joint declaration in substance that the recovery of the colonies by Spain was hopeless ; that neither Great Britain nor the United States was aiming at the possession of any portion of these colonies; and that they could not see with indifference any portion of them transferred to any other power. Great Britain, however, had not at that time recognized the new States in Spanish America. President Monroe sought the advice of Jefferson and Madison. Jefferson regarded the question as "the most momentous" which had arisen since that of Independence. "Our first and fundamental maxim," said he, "should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. Our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs." Jeffer son favoured the acceptance of the British suggestion in some form and Madison took the same view. John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, opposed a joint declaration. He wished to take the ground "of earnest remonstrance against the interference of the European powers by force with South America, but to dis claim all interference on our part with Europe ; to make an American cause and adhere inflexibly to that." Upon the advice of Adams, and after mature deliberation by the president and his cabinet, it was decided to make a separate declaration on the sole responsibility of the United States, and this declaration was formulated in the president's message of Dec. 2, 1823.

Original Statement of the Doctrine.

The doctrine is set forth in two paragraphs of this message. The first of these had a genesis distinct from the situation of the former colonies of Spain. It grew out of the question of Russian claims on the north-west coast of North America. The Russian emperor had issued a ukase In 1821 prohibiting citizens of other nations from navigating and fishing within Too Italian miles of the north-west coast of North America from Bering straits to the 51st parallel of north latitude. Protests had followed. In July, 1823, Secretary Adams informed the Russian minister that the United States "should contest the right of Russia to any territorial establishment on this continent, and that we should assume distinctly the principle that the Ameri can continents are no longer subjects for any new European colonial establishments." It was in connection with this situation that President Monroe, after adverting to the proposal of arrang ing the respective rights and interests on the north-west coast by amicable negotiations, declared in his message : "In the discussions to which this interest has given rise, and in the arrangements by which they may terminate, the occasion has been judged proper for asserting as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American con tinents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers." The other paragraph of President Monroe's message bore upon the situation of the nations to the south of the United States, as follows : "In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to them selves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defence. With the movements in this hemisphere we are, of necessity, more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. . . . We owe it, therefore, to candour, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great con sideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. . . . It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can any one believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition, in any form, with indifference." The message, so far as it related to the revolted Spanish col onies, had widespread approval in England. Three years later, Canning made his famous boast that he had "called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old." There

was, indeed, general agreement between the sentiments of the Governments of Great Britain and the United States as to the Spanish colonies, but this was qualified, as Canning himself had pointed out, by the important difference that the United States had acknowledged the independence of the new Governments and the British Government had not. With the portion of President Monroe's message relating to future colonization, which lay outside the purview of Canning's suggestion, Canning was not in sympathy. This proposal was as new to the British Govern ment as it was to France. The basis of the objection on the part of the United States to future colonization by European powers was found in the fact, as John Quincy Adams said later, when president, that "With the exception of the existing European colonies, which it was in no wise intended to disturb, the two con tinents consisted of several sovereign and independent nations, whose territories covered their whole surface. By this, their in dependent condition, the United States enjoyed the right of com mercial intercourse with every part of their possessions. To attempt the establishment of a colony in those possessions, would be to usurp to the exclusion of others a commercial intercourse which was the common possession of all." Manifestly, it was not intended to assert that there were no unoccupied lands, for there were vast regions of territory not actually settled by the subjects of civilized powers, but the declaration proceeded in the view "that the several American territorial sovereigns enjoyed by virtue of constructive occupation, exclusive rights of ownership and sovereignty which should be respected." Later Extension or Modification.—Not only did the states men of the United States fear the extension of European coloni zation, but they viewed with deep concern the possibility of the transfer of American territory from one European power to an other, or the transfer of such territory from an American to a non-American power. In 1811, the Congress of the United States passed a resolution as to East Florida, stating that "considering the influence which the destiny of the territory adjoining the southern border of the United States may have upon their se curity, tranquillity, and commerce," the United States could not, "without serious inquietude, see any part of the said territory pass into the hands of any foreign power." The declarations in the messages of President Polk in 1845 and 1848 were so closely associated with the doctrine announced by Monroe that they may be deemed to fall within the same governing principle. With reference to the case of Yucatan, when the authorities of the country offered to transfer the dominion and sovereignty to the United States and at the same time made a similar offer to Great Britain and Spain, President Polk said : "Whilst it is not my pur pose to recommend the adoption of any measure, with a view to the acquisition of the 'dominion and sovereignty' over Yucatan, yet, according to our established policy, we could not consent to a transfer of this 'dominion and sovereignty' to either Spain, Great Britain, or any other European power." President Polk's refer ence to the transfer of dominion and sovereignty evidently meant opposition to the acquisition of territorial control by any means and this position has frequently been reiterated by the Govern ment of the United States. In 1912, the Senate of the United. States adopted a resolution, apparently having immediate refer ence to Magdalena bay, "that when any harbor or other place in the American continents is so situated that the occupation thereof for naval or military purposes might threaten the communications or the safety of the United States, the Government of the United States could not see without grave concern the possession of such harbour or other place by any corporation or association which has such a relation to another Government, not American, as to give that Government practical power or control for naval or mili tary purposes." It was explained in support of the resolution that it rested on the principle of self-defence and that it was "allied to the Monroe Doctrine, of course, but not necessarily dependent upon it or growing out of it." Since the declaration of Monroe, the famous Doctrine has been modified in only two particulars. What was said with Europe exclusively in view, must be deemed applicable to all non American powers ; and the opposition to the extension of coloni zation was not dependent upon the particular method of securing territorial control, and, at least since Polk's time, may be deemed to embrace opposition to acquisition of additional territory through transfer of dominion or sovereignty. Neither of these modifications changes the doctrine in its essentials and it may thus be summarized as being opposed (I) to any non-American action encroaching upon the political independence of American States under any guise, and (2) to the acquisition in any manner of the control of additional territory in the western hemisphere by any non-American power.